Suchergebnisse

AbstractLatin American and Caribbean countries are world leaders in intentional homicide rates. Our estimates suggest that the intentional homicide rate in the Latin America and Caribbean region is 40 per cent higher than the average for the rest of the world. The intentional homicide rate for a group of violent countries (Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Jamaica) is nearly 58 per cent higher than the world's average. Utilising an international panel data set to study the determinants of intentional homicide, we demonstrate that intentional homicide is highly inert, counter‐cyclical, declines with development and rises with violence and income inequality. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuring trading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resource transfers and global participation, a scheme which we call "Ideal Kyoto Protocol," yields an efficient equilibrium allocation for a global economy. An altruistic international agency – say, the Global Environment Facility – should operate the resource transfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments should be able to make independent policy commitments regarding how to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipation of the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggests that the USA should be "bribed" to reverse its decision of not participating in the Kyoto Protocol.

We investigate how externalities and cooperation affect nations' efforts to counter transnational terrorism activities. Our model captures three factors whose interplay determines counterterrorism (CT) efforts and terrorist activity: the size of the spillover effect, the degree of internalization of the externality, and whether nations' CT efforts have an asymmetric or symmetric effect on the security of other nations. In our symmetric model, preemptive CT efforts and terrorist activities decrease with the size of the externality regardless of the degree of cooperation between nations. In our asymmetric model, as the externality of the "smaller" nation increases, the "larger" nations reduce their efforts, and the smaller nation reacts by increasing its own efforts. We also investigate coalition stability and show that (a) in the preemptive case, the full coalition is not stable and partial coalitions are stable for sufficiently small externalities; and (b) in the defensive, symmetric case, only the full coalition is stable.