Suchergebnisse

In context of post-cold war US military capability and strategy. Reprinted from "The future of airpower in the aftermath of the Gulf war," edited by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Deterrence and defense, and strategic and tactical employment of air assets against Iraq.

Considers state sponsored terrorism and confrontations between the US and Libya since 1980.

Following the 11 September (2001) terrorist attack, a number of media revelations asserted that it could have been prevented if only the intelligence community (IC) had acted on information in its possession regarding the impending attack. This article explains why & how the intelligence agencies failed on 11 September, & assesses the need for, & viability of, preemptive military options for striking first to combat terrorism. First, it describes how the IC doggedly refused to regard terrorism as war through the 1990s. Second, the authors explain that an alternative perspective challenged this orthodoxy in the early 1990s, arguing that war was changing & entering its fourth generation. Third, based on new information about Al-Qaeda, the article addresses how Al-Qaeda organized for war & how it carried it out by delineating Al-Qaeda's organizational structure, ideology, linkages with other terrorist groups & supporting states, use of sanctuary, & financial base, & then detailing its targeting, weapons, & war-fighting strategy. This assessment reveals how intimately the Al-Qaeda network bears an unmistakable resemblance to fourth-generation asymmetrical warfare & not to the 1990s profile of the IC. Finally, the authors demonstrate that President Bush has grasped fourth-generation warfare by advocating preemptive first strikes against terrorists in his new national security strategy. Adapted from the source document.