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AbstractIn the 1980s, a wave of new–extremely clever and detailed–studies revolutionized the Japanese politics field. The empirical findings of this 'new paradigm' literature remain the conventional wisdom on Japanese policy-making patterns under the '1955 System'. In this paper, we offer a critical reinterpretation of the new paradigm literature. We do not offer new empirical analysis, but, rather, reconsider this conventional wisdom by putting a new spin on the evidence previous authors utilized to analyze the policy-making process in Japan under the 1955 System. Contrary to the conventional view of strong central bureaucratic power, we argue that in the 1960s policy making was quite fragmented. In contrast to literature suggesting substantial politician influence in the 1980s, we argue that there was a decline in the influence of politicians in general in policy making.

Utilizing data from 15 countries that employ mixed electoral systems, we provide a cross-national analysis of the defining elements & potentially constraining effects of such systems. Using district level election results, we examine the effects of the proportional representation (PR) & single-member district (SMD) tiers of mixed systems separately & in combination. We also test the effects on electoral outcomes of different components of mixed systems such as linked tiers, ratio of SMD to PR seats, & majority versus plurality rules in the SMD tier. Our findings suggest that, despite claims of a "contamination effect" between the two tiers, in countries with developed party systems, PR & SMD electoral arrangements tend to approximate their expected effects even when used in combination in mixed systems. We also find that particular institutional characteristics within mixed systems have a substantial constraining effect on the number of significant political parties. However, the nature of the party system itself, in particular the extent to which its parties are institutionalized, also plays a very important role in shaping the degree to which constraining effects are truly felt. 6 Tables, 1 Appendix, 28 References. [Copyright 2004 Elsevier Ltd.]

Examining the 1993 split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan offers an opportunity to gain greater insight into the impact of the various incentives that influence the behaviour of politicians. Surprisingly, previous analyses of the LDP split have been able to demonstrate only weak evidence of any electoral connection driving politicians' decisions. However, by also examining the role of policy preferences (support for reform) and utilizing interaction terms, our analysis takes into account the fact that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in very different ways. Our findings thus confirm the importance of the electoral connection. We are also able to add that a variety of other incentives also shape political behaviour and that politicians do not necessarily all respond to similar stimuli in the same way.

Examining the 1993 split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan offers an opportunity to gain greater insight into the impact of the various incentives that influence the behaviour of politicians. Surprisingly, previous analyses of the LDP split have been able to demonstrate only weak evidence of any electoral connection driving politicians' decisions. However, by also examining the role of policy preferences (support for reform) and utilizing interaction terms, our analysis takes into account the fact that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in very different ways. Our findings thus confirm the importance of the electoral connection. We are also able to add that a variety of other incentives also shape political behaviour and that politicians do not necessarily all respond to similar stimuli in the same way. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

The 2012 election in Japan ejected the governing DPJ and returned the LDP overwhelmingly to power while brand new parties pulled in millions of voters. This book explains what happened, why it happened and what it means. International experts analyze the election results, parties strategies, gender issues, policy implications and more

In this, the first volume in a new Japanese General Election Series, an impressive roll call of contributors explores the 2012 Lower House poll, an election that was characterized by the return to power of the longtime dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the growth in popularity of smaller 'outsider' parties as well as the concomitant demise of Japan's first 'opposition' (Democratic Party of Japan) government. The volume boasts high-quality, original analysis by top scholars from Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe. With chapters focusing on a variety of facets of the election, including the major political parties, important policy issues, and campaign practices, the volume provides a comprehensive analysis. It is vital reading for anyone interested in Japanese politics, as well as elections in general.

Nearly all systematic empirical work on the relationship between social diversity and the number of parties asserts the "interactive hypothesis"—Social heterogeneity leads to party fragmentation under permissive electoral rules, but not under single-member district, first-past-the-post (FPTP) rules. In this article, we argue that previous work has been hindered by a reliance on national-level measures of variables and a linear model of the relationship between diversity and party fragmentation. This article provides the first analysis to test the interactive hypothesis appropriately by using district-level measures of both ethnic diversity and the effective number of parties in legislative FPTP elections and considering a curvilinear relationship between the variables. We find that there is a strong relationship between social diversity and the number of parties even under FPTP electoral rules, thus suggesting that restrictive rules are not as powerful a constraint on electoral behavior and outcomes as is usually supposed.