The Obama Administration is now on track to get "fast track" legislation through the Senate, heading towards a close vote in the House. The end goal is to conclude two major business treaties: the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The House Democrats are right to withhold their support until key treaty positions favored by the White House are dropped.
As negotiations are ongoing in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), CCSI staff and Jeffrey Sachs discuss the implications of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) for domestic law and policy, focusing on effects within the US. The paper concludes that the risks ISDS poses for domestic law are significant and unjustified, and that there are preferable policy alternatives to pursue as a means of protecting the rights of investors operating overseas.
President Barack Obama and the Republican leadership in Congress are trying to pass "fast track" legislation in order to push through major economic agreements with eleven countries of the Pacific region (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and Europe (the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) without the possibility for Congressional amendments. Both are being sold generally as "trade agreements," yet they involve key areas of business law and regulation far beyond trade. Before Congress approves fast track, these agreements need to be made public and exposed to thorough public scrutiny.
As negotiations are ongoing in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), CCSI staff and Jeffrey Sachs discuss the implications of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) for domestic law and policy, focusing on effects within the US. The paper concludes that the risks ISDS poses for domestic law are significant and unjustified, and that there are preferable policy alternatives to pursue as a means of protecting the rights of investors operating overseas.
This is a crucial moment in international investment policymaking. Two factors have converged, calling for a new direction. First, it has become increasingly difficult to justify investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS); even governments that had been among its strongest proponents are now changing course and have raised a range of fundamental, systemic and inter-related issues relating to ISDS. Second, policy makers and other stakeholders have a greater awareness of the need to design appropriate policies to maximize the contributions cross-border investment can make to sustainable development. Influenced by these factors, various reform efforts related to investment policy are underway at the national, regional, and international levels. These discussions about reform are likely to be slow, and outcomes uncertain. In the meantime, governments and their stakeholders remain tied to an outdated system that is widely acknowledged to be ill-suited for modern investment policy objectives, with increasingly concerning consequences. This policy paper explores two near-term options that governments engaged in reform discussions can pursue, alongside longer-term work on substantive and procedural reform. These options are: (1) a joint instrument on withdrawal of consent to arbitrate; and/or (2) a joint instrument on termination. The paper examines how both options could be implemented, and makes the case for putting a pause on ISDS to ensure that investment treaties and their dispute settlement mechanisms achieve their desired ends, produce legitimate decisions, and do not undermine international economic cooperation and sustainable development more broadly. In connection with ISDS reform efforts proceeding in UNCITRAL's Working Group III, CCSI submitted Draft Treaty Language: Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate and Termination of International Investment Agreements, which sets forth specific treaty language that can be used to (1) amend existing international investment agreements to withdraw consent to investor-state arbitration (leaving in place substantive protections, which can be enforced through state-state arbitration, or permits consent to investor-state arbitration on an case-by-case basis) or (2) terminate existing international investment agreements.
Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions provides the first major holistic examination and interdisciplinary analysis of sovereign wealth funds. Sovereign wealth funds currently hold three trillion dollars' worth of investments, almost twice the amount in all the hedge funds worldwide, and are predicted to hold nine trillion more by 2015. This relatively new and rapidly expanding phenomenon remains relatively unregulated, but the International Monetary Fund and the G7 aim to establish temporary and voluntary rules to introduce transparency and uniformity until more permanent regulatory structures are instituted. What permanent rules and procedures should govern sovereign wealth funds? What bodies should enforce them? Do the current provisional rules answer the national security concerns of host countries? Editors Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa Sachs, and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed address these questions in a collection of essays by leading authorities from the IMF, academic institutions, law firms, multi-national corporations, and think tanks. Together, these authors analyze how sovereign wealth funds have helped to limit the effects of the current global economic crisis, and what rules can govern their operation in the future. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_books/1002/thumbnail.jpg
This paper analyzes the expected benefits of investment treaties, including: increased inward investment, increased outward investment, and depoliticization of investment disputes. It then considers evidence of the costs of investment treaties, including: litigation, liability, reputational cost, reduced policy space, distorted power dynamics, reduced role for domestic law-making, and uncertainty in the law. The authors set forth practical steps that states can take relating to both existing treaties as well as future treaties with an objective of increasing desired benefits and decreasing unexpected and high costs of investment treaties.
This policy paper explores two near-term options that governments engaged in reform discussions can pursue, alongside longer-term work on substantive and procedural reform. These options are: (1) a joint instrument on withdrawal of consent to arbitrate; and/or (2) a joint instrument on termination. The paper examines how both options could be implemented, and makes the case for putting a pause on ISDS to ensure that investment treaties and their dispute settlement mechanisms achieve their desired ends, produce legitimate decisions, and do not undermine international economic cooperation and sustainable development more broadly.
The use of incentives to attract investment is connected to and impacts the most pressing challenges facing us today, including climate change, corruption, employment, development, harmful competition, and public spending efficiency. How, when, where, and why governments use incentives to attract investment is therefore critically important to whether and how society benefits from investments and to other public policy decisions and trade-offs. It is increasingly apparent, however, that the use of incentives is not well understood – including by the policy makers who use them – which necessitates a closer look and, in many cases, a policy response. In that context, this book explores the use of incentives by governments worldwide, illustrating current trends relating to a diverse range of incentives. It also discusses current and possible future efforts at the sub-national, national, and international level to address the policy and governance challenges that are both driving, and driven by, the use of incentives. By linking economic analysis, development impacts, regulatory issues and policy options, this book is a key resource for understanding what the increasing mobility of capital means for the cities, states, nations and regions that seek to attract, direct, and retain investments. As an overall conclusion, this volume suggests that careful investment policies are particularly crucial to guide the strategic and efficient mobilization of public and private resources for improved economic, social and environmental outcomes. Investment incentives may play a useful role, if they are strategically and thoughtfully designed and are based on a robust cost-benefit analysis. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_books/1003/thumbnail.jpg
This report is part of an ongoing annual series of reports on Fixing the Business of Food initiated and actively supported by the Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition (BCFN). The report is the product of a team including BCFN, the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) at Columbia University, the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UN SDSN), and the Santa Chiara Lab (SCL) of the University of Siena. CCSI and UN SDSN are responsible for Section 1 of the report, on the Four Pillar Framework. Santa Chiara Lab is responsible for Section 2 of the report, on applying the Four Pillar Framework to a selection of major food companies. The BCFN has generously and actively supported the entire project and has been involved in all aspects of this work. We emphasize that Fixing the Business of Food is an annual report and very much a work in progress. The challenges that we are describing and aiming to address are deep, complex, and still very much under-addressed. Food companies are just becoming aware of the magnitude of the crisis, and many governments remain wholly unaware. The UN Food System Summit aims to change this reality, with all due urgency. We recognize that we are just at the start of a longterm transformation of the food system, and other parts of society (energy, infrastructure, health, education, and others) to achieve the SDGs, fulfill the Paris Climate Agreement, and ultimately, to build the future we want. Companies are just now becoming aware of the Four Pillar Framework. We intend to continue to develop, deepen, and expand our work in the years ahead, and therefore welcome comments, feedback, and opportunities for exchanging viewpoints and information.
