Review: International Political Economy: Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century
In: International journal / Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 402-405
ISSN: 2052-465X
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In: International journal / Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 402-405
ISSN: 2052-465X
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 479-484
ISSN: 1460-3667
In: Rationality and society, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 74-82
ISSN: 1461-7358
A sharp distinction is made between normative and descriptive theories of decision. The former is purely deductive and thus can be regarded as belonging to a branch of mathematics. The results of a normative decision theory are not applicable to descriptions or predictions of how people will make decisions in given situations. Given a sufficiently precise definition of a "rational decision," a normative theory can prescribe one in a given situation. Descriptive decision theory attempts to predict decisions of people in given situations sufficiently precisely described. In his critique of Prisoner's Dilemma, Aaron Wildavsky regards the theory underlying this game as a descriptive (or predictive) theory. For this reason, although his discussion calls attention to many interesting questions relating to people's decision behavior, his conclusions have no relevance to the theory of games.
In: Behavioral science, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 289-290
In: Behavioral science, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 154-158
In: Innovation: the European journal of social sciences, Band 1, Heft 4-5, S. 421-433
In: Peace & change: PC ; a journal of peace research, Band 13, Heft s1, S. 18-43
ISSN: 1468-0130
In: Peace & change: PC ; a journal of peace research, Band 13, Heft s1, S. 44-62
ISSN: 1468-0130
In: Peace & change: PC ; a journal of peace research, Band 13, Heft s1, S. 9-17
ISSN: 1468-0130
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 32, Heft 3, S. 457-472
ISSN: 1552-8766
Subjects for single play experiments with n-person social traps (strong and weak versions of Prisoner's Dilemma, Volunteer's Dilemma, Largest Number) were recruited from several populations: students, professionals, business people, employees, and foreign visitors. Performances were compared across the subject pools, across the games, and across instructions. The results indicated that subjects receiving full instructions, including warnings about the social traps, avoid the social traps more frequently than those receiving minimal instructions. However, the differences in frequencies of cooperative choices were all slight except for the strong version of Prisoner's Dilemma. Fewest cooperative choices were observed in business people, the most in foreign visitors. However, the latter effect may have been an artifact due to self-selection. Among the games, Largest Number is distinguished by possessing no individually rational equilibrium. The cooperative solution of this game, however, is salient, namely, for each to name the smallest number. In spite of this salience, the smallest frequencies of cooperative choices were observed in this game, and full instructions did not significantly increase the frequency. When the subjects had an opportunity to organize five-person cooperative groups, each of which had a good chance of winning $1000, only 30 of 60 subjects formed such groups.
In: Journal of peace research, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 287-290
ISSN: 1460-3578
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 32, Heft 2, S. 399-401
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: Peace & change: a journal of peace research, Band 13, S. 18-43
ISSN: 0149-0508
The importance for social & behavioral sciences of the mathematical theory of games, developed over the past five decades, is in the refinement of the concept of rationality that follows from rigorous strategic analysis of game-like conflicts. This refinement comes to the forefront in the course of analyzing nonconstantsum games & games involving two+ players, where the interests of the players, though generally divergent, are not diametrically opposed. Situations of this sort often give rise to so-called "social traps" -- decision problems in which individual rationality clearly indicates a course of action to each player, leading to an outcome that is to everyone's disadvantage. Thus, a distinction is forced between individual & collective rationality. Here, several types of games & social traps are described, & illustrated with examples, & developments of game-theoretic analysis are outlined. 12 Figures, 11 References. Modified AA
In: Peace & change: a journal of peace research, Band 13, S. 44-62
ISSN: 0149-0508
Debate is defined as a form of human conflict in which the objective of each participant is not to harm, incapacitate, or outwit an opponent, but to convince an opponent or, at least, to modify his views. It is argued that a debate can benefit both participants if it is conducted in accordance with the following rules: (1) Before stating his own position, the debater must state the position of the opponent to the opponent's satisfaction. (2) Before offering arguments against the opponent's position, the debater must state conditions (no matter how far-fetched they may seem) under which the opponent's position would be justified. It is assumed that it is always possible to imagine such conditions. (3) The polemical phase of the debate is thereby reduced to arguing that the situation under which the opponent's position would be justified does not obtain. This phase encourages investigations of facts or more or less objective situations, thus reducing aggressive or competitive elements in a confrontation of views or attitudes, providing opportunities for cooperation in attempts to ascertain objective truths. This technique can contribute toward identifying the objective of a debate through conflict resolution rather than with the defeat of the opponent & a polarization of attitudes. The approach is illustrated in the context of ideological confrontation. Modified AA