Suchergebnisse

Subjects for single play experiments with n-person social traps (strong and weak versions of Prisoner's Dilemma, Volunteer's Dilemma, Largest Number) were recruited from several populations: students, professionals, business people, employees, and foreign visitors. Performances were compared across the subject pools, across the games, and across instructions. The results indicated that subjects receiving full instructions, including warnings about the social traps, avoid the social traps more frequently than those receiving minimal instructions. However, the differences in frequencies of cooperative choices were all slight except for the strong version of Prisoner's Dilemma. Fewest cooperative choices were observed in business people, the most in foreign visitors. However, the latter effect may have been an artifact due to self-selection. Among the games, Largest Number is distinguished by possessing no individually rational equilibrium. The cooperative solution of this game, however, is salient, namely, for each to name the smallest number. In spite of this salience, the smallest frequencies of cooperative choices were observed in this game, and full instructions did not significantly increase the frequency. When the subjects had an opportunity to organize five-person cooperative groups, each of which had a good chance of winning $1000, only 30 of 60 subjects formed such groups.

The importance for social & behavioral sciences of the mathematical theory of games, developed over the past five decades, is in the refinement of the concept of rationality that follows from rigorous strategic analysis of game-like conflicts. This refinement comes to the forefront in the course of analyzing nonconstantsum games & games involving two+ players, where the interests of the players, though generally divergent, are not diametrically opposed. Situations of this sort often give rise to so-called "social traps" -- decision problems in which individual rationality clearly indicates a course of action to each player, leading to an outcome that is to everyone's disadvantage. Thus, a distinction is forced between individual & collective rationality. Here, several types of games & social traps are described, & illustrated with examples, & developments of game-theoretic analysis are outlined. 12 Figures, 11 References. Modified AA

Debate is defined as a form of human conflict in which the objective of each participant is not to harm, incapacitate, or outwit an opponent, but to convince an opponent or, at least, to modify his views. It is argued that a debate can benefit both participants if it is conducted in accordance with the following rules: (1) Before stating his own position, the debater must state the position of the opponent to the opponent's satisfaction. (2) Before offering arguments against the opponent's position, the debater must state conditions (no matter how far-fetched they may seem) under which the opponent's position would be justified. It is assumed that it is always possible to imagine such conditions. (3) The polemical phase of the debate is thereby reduced to arguing that the situation under which the opponent's position would be justified does not obtain. This phase encourages investigations of facts or more or less objective situations, thus reducing aggressive or competitive elements in a confrontation of views or attitudes, providing opportunities for cooperation in attempts to ascertain objective truths. This technique can contribute toward identifying the objective of a debate through conflict resolution rather than with the defeat of the opponent & a polarization of attitudes. The approach is illustrated in the context of ideological confrontation. Modified AA

Ausgehend von einer Gesellschaft, die durch vielfältige Risiken und gleichzeitig dem Bedürfnis nach Sicherheit gekennzeichnet ist, werden in dem Beitrag die subjektiven Aspekte des Risikobegriffs erörtert. Am Beispiel des nuklearen Krieges wird gezeigt, daß Wahrscheinlichkeitsschätzungen von nichtwiederholbaren Ereignissen objektiv nicht begründet werden können. Es wird gefragt, was ein wiederholbares Ereignis ist. Am Beispiel der Kubakrise und des Kalten Krieges wird deutlich, daß in gewissen Fällen die Einschätzungen der Wahrscheinlichkeiten nicht wiederholbarer Ereignisse von (evtl. unbewußten) Vergleichen mit früheren Erfahrungen bestimmt werden. Der subjektive Moment in Analogien zwischen sozialen Ereignissen und auch entsprechend die Risikoeinschätzungen werden untersucht. Dann wird das doppelseitige Wesen des Risikos betrachtet, indem nicht die tatsächlichen Risiken eingeschätzt werden, die z. B. mit Abrüstung oder Entspannung verbunden sind, sondern indem darauf hingewiesen wird, daß alle vermuteten Risiken immer als einseitige Risiken dargestellt werden und daß das andere Risiko, dem man sich aussetzt, wenn man Rüstungskontrollmaßnahmen ablehnt, kaum erwähnt wird. Ausgehend davon, daß das Risiko aus dem menschlichen Leben nicht ausgeschaltet werden kann, wird deutlich, daß kleine Wahrscheinlichkeiten im Alltag oft ignoriert werden. Aus psychologischer Sicht wird geklärt, daß die Risikoeinschätzung davon abhängt, ob ein Aspekt einer Wahlsituation besonders auffallend ist. Abschließend wird die Rolle der Wahrnehmung bei der subjektiven Einschätzung von Wahrscheinlichkeiten betrachtet. Aufgrund der subjektiven Wahrnehmung wird zwischen persönlichem und sozialem Risiko unterschieden. Die beiden Komponenten des Risikos werden beschrieben: die vermuteten Wahrscheinlichkeiten der relevanten Ereignisse und die ihnen zugeschriebenen Nutzenfunktionen. (RW)