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This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy

A Pulitzer Prize-winning historian serves as a guide to the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence, providing historical contexts and offering interpretive commentary.

Rational choice theorists have long been ambivalent about the rationality postulate. Although many agree that humans have imperfect foresight and inaccurate understandings of the world within which they act, no satisfactory approach relaxing the rationality postulates exists. In this article, we apply a new method that allows us to model directly rational action when agents have incomplete or inaccurate mental models of their world. In particular, we utilize the game theoretic notion of self-confirming equilibrium. The self-confirming equilibrium framework allows us to model an environment where a player's predictions about one another's behavior are inaccurate. It also allows us to model a common aspect of disputes; viz., that both sides believe they are acting reasonably while the other side is acting unreasonably. Finally, the approach allows a type of surprise in which a player's mis-conjectures about another's behavior results in behavior that was not anticipated. We apply this framework to the problem of the American Revolution, helping to resolve several unexplained puzzles in the historical literature. Historians of the Revolution emphasize the role of ideas in underpinning the revolutionary crisis. From the rational choice standpoint, a critical omission in the literature is that historians do not connect the realm of ideas with the realm of action. We demonstrate how the framework we propose can more directly shed light on three aspects absent in the existing literature. First, to explain why either side fought about abstract ideals or how those ideals were connected to the realm of action, and thus why the two sides failed to come to some accommodation despite their differences. Second, to explain why the colonists became so incensed over seemingly trivial taxes imposed by the British after the Seven Years' War ended in 1763. And, finally, to explain that if the clash of fundamental ideals led the two sides to armed confiict, how the British and the Americans could be unaware of their profound differences during the previous 100 plus years of cooperation.

Rational choice theorists have long been ambivalent about the rationality postulate. Although many agree that humans have imperfect foresight & inaccurate understandings of the world within which they act, no satisfactory approach relaxing the rationality postulates exists. In this article, we apply a new method that allows us to model directly rational action when agents have incomplete or inaccurate mental models of their world. In particular, we utilize the game theoretic notion of self-confirming equilibrium. The self-confirming equilibrium framework allows us to model an environment where a player's predictions about one another's behavior are inaccurate. It also allows us to model a common aspect of disputes; viz., that both sides believe they are acting reasonably while the other side is acting unreasonably. Finally, the approach allows a type of surprise in which a player's mis-conjectures about another's behavior results in behavior that was not anticipated. We apply this framework to the problem of the American Revolution, helping to resolve several unexplained puzzles in the historical literature. Historians of the Revolution emphasize the role of ideas in underpinning the revolutionary crisis. From the rational choice standpoint, a critical omission in the literature is that historians do not connect the realm of ideas with the realm of action. We demonstrate how the framework we propose can more directly shed light on three aspects absent in the existing literature. First, to explain why either side fought about abstract ideals or how those ideals were connected to the realm of action, & thus why the two sides failed to come to some accommodation despite their differences. Second, to explain why the colonists became so incensed over seemingly trivial taxes imposed by the British after the Seven Years' War ended in 1763. &, finally, to explain that if the clash of fundamental ideals led the two sides to armed conflict, how the British & the Americans could be unaware of their profound differences during the previous 100 plus years of cooperation. Figures, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

In the wake of the 2000 Election, the relationship between the Supreme Court and the American states has become more important. Once derided by the Supreme Court as a 'truism,' the Tenth Amendment has in recent years been transformed from a neglected provision into a vital 'first principle.' As such, it has provided the foundation for a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court has elevated the status of the states, often at the expense of federal power and in the face of previously settled assumptions. In this important volume, four prominent scholars--two historians and two law professors--examine carefully one of the central tenets in the Supreme Court's recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence: the assumption that the results fashioned by a narrow majority are compelled by history and consistent with the intentions of the framers. They shed important new light on a series of decisions that mark a major change in our thinking about the nature of a constitutional system within which both the federal government and the states properly regard themselves as sovereign entities.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Introduction -- 1. The Tension between Law and Politics in the Modern Republican Tradition -- 2. Impotence, Perspicuity and the Rule of Law: James Madison's Critique of Republican Legislation -- 3. Kant, Madison and the Problem of Transnational Order: Popular Sovereignty in Multilevel Systems -- 4. Republicanism and Democracy -- 5. Two Views of the City: Republicanism and Law -- 6. A Kantian Republican Conception of Justice as Nondomination -- 7. Two Republican Traditions -- 8. Freedom, Control and the State -- 9. Legal Modes and Democratic Citizens in Republican Theory -- 10. Rights, Republicanism and Democracy -- 11. Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch -- 12. Republicanism and Transnational Democracy -- Index