IntroduzioneNegli ultimi anni lo studio del mutamento è venuto acquistando una posizione sempre piú importante nel campo della scienza politica. Attualmente si riconosce che l'avanzamento dello studio dei fenomeni politici fino al punto in cui divenga possibile esprimere valide proposizioni predittive richiede la disponibilità di un corpo di conoscenze teoriche concernenti il mutamento politico.
ABSTRACTIn political systems that do not require the legislator to have his residence in the constituency which elects him, a data matrix can be created by juxtaposing the two variables of constituency affiliation and residence affiliation of legislators. This geographical matrix of representation will display a characteristic pattern which can be rendered understandable by means of a simple axiomatic model of political recruitment The model is based upon the assumption that rational office‐seekers and agents of selection will make their decisions with regard to nomination in such a way that the costs of communication between the representative and his constituency are minimized. This decisional premise is operationalized by means of the three spatial distances between residence, constituency, and the site of the legislature. From the triadic distance model a number of hypotheses are derived. These are tested by means of data on Danish legislators. As the model gains considerable support, the article concludes with a discussion of the possibilities of refining and further testing the model.
Everywhere a disparity can be observed between the socioeconomic composition of the electorate and the composition of the elected, representative body, which acts as a legislature for the society. Microcosm and macro- cosm are never identical; the legislature never mirrors the population at large. This is a universal generalization. It holds true for all representative systems at all times. It is furthermore true that the character of this disparity differs cross-nationally and over time: each legislature is unique in this sense.