Suchergebnisse

After holding power continuously from its inception in 1955 (with the exception of a ten-month hiatus in 1993-1994), Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost control of the national government decisively in September 2009. Despite its defeat, the LDP remains the most successful political party in a democracy in the post-World War II period. In The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP, Ellis S. Krauss and Robert J. Pekkanen shed light on the puzzle of the LDP's long dominance and abrupt defeat. Several questions about institutional change in party politics are at the core of their investigation: What incentives do different electoral systems provide? How do politicians adapt to new incentives? How much does structure determine behavior, and how much opportunity does structure give politicians to influence outcomes? How adaptable are established political organizations?The electoral system Japan established in 1955 resulted in a half-century of "one-party democracy." But as Krauss and Pekkanen detail, sweeping political reforms in 1994 changed voting rules and other key elements of the electoral system. Both the LDP and its adversaries had to adapt to a new system that gave citizens two votes: one for a party and one for a candidate. Under the leadership of the charismatic Koizumi Junichiro, the LDP managed to maintain its majority in the Japanese Diet, but his successors lost popular support as opposing parties learned how to operate in the new electoral environment. Drawing on the insights of historical institutionalism, Krauss and Pekkanen explain how Japanese politics functioned before and after the 1994 reform and why the persistence of party institutions (factions, PARC, koenkai) and the transformed role of party leadership contributed both to the LDP's success at remaining in power for fifteen years after the reforms and to its eventual downfall. In an epilogue, the authors assess the LDP's prospects in the near and medium term

The year 2015 revolved around Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who led his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to a resounding electoral victory in December 2014, thus opening the door for the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito to pass a major revision of Japan's security policy, despite public outcry and over a fragmented field of opposition parties.

It was all about Abe in 2014. With few intra-party challengers, a divided and weak opposition, and a huge victory in a December snap election gamble, Japan's Prime Minister Abe finds unusual scope to lead the nation both domestically as well as internationally in his chosen course of "proactive pacifism."

Any political party has a profound interest in maximizing seats, which in turn requires running the optimum number of candidates. However, to do this presumes solving a collective action problem among self-interested party members or leaders, and is deeply conditioned by the electoral system. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party under the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system provides a superb illustration of how party leaders, even in a famously electorally successful party, will be unable to solve these dilemmas because of key facilitating institutions: first, party president selection rules; second, prime ministerial control over allocation of positions; third, a weak party label. Contrary to existing literature, we find ambitious factions consistently nominated too many candidates - deliberately risking the party's losing seats. We draw attention to the sources of party strength in a novel way, and to how party rules interact with electoral systems to shape both parties and politics. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Any political party has a profound interest in maximizing seats, which in turn requires running the optimum number of candidates. However, to do this presumes solving a collective action problem among self-interested party members or leaders, and is deeply conditioned by the electoral system. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party under the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system provides a superb illustration of how party leaders, even in a famously electorally successful party, will be unable to solve these dilemmas because of key facilitating institutions: first, party president selection rules; second, prime ministerial control over allocation of positions; third, a weak party label. Contrary to existing literature, we find ambitious factions consistently nominated too many candidates – deliberately risking the party's losing seats. We draw attention to the sources of party strength in a novel way, and to how party rules interact with electoral systems to shape both parties and politics.

Why would a candidate in a mixed-member electoral system willingly forego the chance to be dual listed in the party list tier along with the single-member district tier? Mixed-member systems create a "reverse contamination effect" through which list rankings provide important information to voters and thus influence behavior in the nominal tier. Rankings signal importance of the candidate within the party and also constitute information about the likelihood that the candidate will be elected off the list tier. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems create different incentives for parties and candidates to send voters different signals. Candidates in Japan's MMM "burned their bridges" successfully and gained more votes. In New Zealand's MMP system, parties instead built "bridges" between the proportional representation and nominal tiers by sending different signals to voters through list rankings. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Why would a candidate in a mixed-member electoral system willingly forego the chance to be dual listed in the party list tier along with the single-member district tier? Mixed-member systems create a "reverse contamination effect" through which list rankings provide important information to voters and thus influence behavior in the nominal tier. Rankings signal importance of the candidate within the party and also constitute information about the likelihood that the candidate will be elected off the list tier. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems create different incentives for parties and candidates to send voters different signals. Candidates in Japan's MMM "burned their bridges" successfully and gained more votes. In New Zealand's MMP system, parties instead built "bridges" between the proportional representation and nominal tiers by sending different signals to voters through list rankings.

This article examines party discipline and party cohesion or defection, offering as an illustration the rebellion over postal privatization in 2005 by members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It explores the importance of party rules – especially the seniority rule and policy specialization for district rewards – as intervening variables between election rules and party defection in a decentralized and diverse party. It is argued that in such cases, party rules like seniority can help prevent defection. When these rules are changed, as in the postal case of 2005, defection is more probable, but it is found that the relationship between defection and seniority is likely to be curvilinear, and also that the curvilinearity is conditional upon each legislator's having different incentives for vote, policy and office.

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Nonprofit Advocacy: Definitions and Concepts -- Part One: The Local and National Dimensions of Nonprofit Advocacy -- 1 The Group Basis of City Politics -- 2 Nonprofit Advocacy in Seattle and Washington, DC -- 3 Shaping the Government-Nonprofit Partnership: Direct and Indirect Advocacy -- 4 Nonprofit Advocacy in the Nation's Capital -- 5 From Skid Row to the Statehouse: How Nonprofit Homeless Service Providers Overcome Barriers to Policy Advocacy Involvement -- Part Two: Organizational Politics, Strategy, and Tactics -- 6 Advocacy in Hard Times: Nonprofit Organizations and the Representation of Marginalized Groups in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina and 9/11 -- 7 Gender Identity and the Shifting Basis of Advocacy by US Women's Groups, 1920-2000 -- 8 The Political Voice of American Children: Nonprofit Advocacy and a Century of Representation for Child Well-Being -- 9 Analyzing the Practice of Nonprofit Advocacy: Comparing Two Human Service Networks -- 10 Effective Advocacy: Lessons for Nonprofit Leaders from Research and Practice -- List of Contributors -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.

In this, the first volume in a new Japanese General Election Series, an impressive roll call of contributors explores the 2012 Lower House poll, an election that was characterized by the return to power of the longtime dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the growth in popularity of smaller 'outsider' parties as well as the concomitant demise of Japan's first 'opposition' (Democratic Party of Japan) government. The volume boasts high-quality, original analysis by top scholars from Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe. With chapters focusing on a variety of facets of the election, including the major political parties, important policy issues, and campaign practices, the volume provides a comprehensive analysis. It is vital reading for anyone interested in Japanese politics, as well as elections in general.