Japan in 2014: all about Abe
In: Asian survey: a bimonthly review of contemporary Asian affairs, Band 55, Heft 1, S. 103-118
ISSN: 0004-4687
61 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Asian survey: a bimonthly review of contemporary Asian affairs, Band 55, Heft 1, S. 103-118
ISSN: 0004-4687
World Affairs Online
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 20, Heft 5, S. 740-750
ISSN: 1460-3683
Any political party has a profound interest in maximizing seats, which in turn requires running the optimum number of candidates. However, to do this presumes solving a collective action problem among self-interested party members or leaders, and is deeply conditioned by the electoral system. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party under the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system provides a superb illustration of how party leaders, even in a famously electorally successful party, will be unable to solve these dilemmas because of key facilitating institutions: first, party president selection rules; second, prime ministerial control over allocation of positions; third, a weak party label. Contrary to existing literature, we find ambitious factions consistently nominated too many candidates - deliberately risking the party's losing seats. We draw attention to the sources of party strength in a novel way, and to how party rules interact with electoral systems to shape both parties and politics. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 20, Heft 5, S. 740-750
ISSN: 1354-0688
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 20, Heft 5, S. 740-750
ISSN: 1460-3683
Any political party has a profound interest in maximizing seats, which in turn requires running the optimum number of candidates. However, to do this presumes solving a collective action problem among self-interested party members or leaders, and is deeply conditioned by the electoral system. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party under the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system provides a superb illustration of how party leaders, even in a famously electorally successful party, will be unable to solve these dilemmas because of key facilitating institutions: first, party president selection rules; second, prime ministerial control over allocation of positions; third, a weak party label. Contrary to existing literature, we find ambitious factions consistently nominated too many candidates – deliberately risking the party's losing seats. We draw attention to the sources of party strength in a novel way, and to how party rules interact with electoral systems to shape both parties and politics.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 45, Heft 6, S. 747-774
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 45, Heft 6, S. 747-773
ISSN: 1552-3829
Why would a candidate in a mixed-member electoral system willingly forego the chance to be dual listed in the party list tier along with the single-member district tier? Mixed-member systems create a "reverse contamination effect" through which list rankings provide important information to voters and thus influence behavior in the nominal tier. Rankings signal importance of the candidate within the party and also constitute information about the likelihood that the candidate will be elected off the list tier. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems create different incentives for parties and candidates to send voters different signals. Candidates in Japan's MMM "burned their bridges" successfully and gained more votes. In New Zealand's MMP system, parties instead built "bridges" between the proportional representation and nominal tiers by sending different signals to voters through list rankings. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 45, Heft 6, S. 747-773
ISSN: 1552-3829
Why would a candidate in a mixed-member electoral system willingly forego the chance to be dual listed in the party list tier along with the single-member district tier? Mixed-member systems create a "reverse contamination effect" through which list rankings provide important information to voters and thus influence behavior in the nominal tier. Rankings signal importance of the candidate within the party and also constitute information about the likelihood that the candidate will be elected off the list tier. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems create different incentives for parties and candidates to send voters different signals. Candidates in Japan's MMM "burned their bridges" successfully and gained more votes. In New Zealand's MMP system, parties instead built "bridges" between the proportional representation and nominal tiers by sending different signals to voters through list rankings.
In: British journal of political science, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 499-525
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article examines party discipline and party cohesion or defection, offering as an illustration the rebellion over postal privatization in 2005 by members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It explores the importance of party rules – especially the seniority rule and policy specialization for district rewards – as intervening variables between election rules and party defection in a decentralized and diverse party. It is argued that in such cases, party rules like seniority can help prevent defection. When these rules are changed, as in the postal case of 2005, defection is more probable, but it is found that the relationship between defection and seniority is likely to be curvilinear, and also that the curvilinearity is conditional upon each legislator's having different incentives for vote, policy and office.
In: Nissan Institute
Although local neighborhood associations are found in many countries, Japan's are distinguished by their ubiquity, scope of activities, and very high participation rates, making them important for the study of society and politics. Most Japanese belong to one local neighborhood association or another, making them Japan's most numerous civil society organization, and one that powerfully shapes governance outcomes in the country. And, they also often blur the state-society boundary, making them theoretically intriguing.Neighborhood Associations and Local Governance in Japan draws on a unique and
In: British journal of political science, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 499-525
ISSN: 0007-1234
This article examines party discipline and party cohesion or defection, offering as an illustration the rebellion over postal privatization in 2005 by members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It explores the importance of party rules - especially the seniority rule and policy specialization for district rewards - as intervening variables between election rules and party defection in a decentralized and diverse party. It is argued that in such cases, party rules like seniority can help prevent defection. When these rules are changed, as in the postal case of 2005, defection is more probable, but it is found that the relationship between defection and seniority is likely to be curvilinear, and also that the curvilinearity is conditional upon each legislator's having different incentives for vote, policy and office. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 100, Heft 2, S. 183-193
ISSN: 1537-5943
How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a "best loser" or "zombie" provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.
In: American political science review, Band 100, Heft 2, S. 183-193
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
1. Introduction -- 2. Japanese Politics 2017 to 2021 -- 3. The 2021 Election Results: Continuity and Change -- 4. How the Liberal Democratic Party Avoided a Loss in 2021 -- 5. The Opposition in 2021: A Second Party and a Third Force -- 6. Kōmeitō in 2021: Strategizing between the LDP and Sōka Gakkai -- 7. Abe's legacy -- 8. Candidate Selection for the 2021 General Election -- 9. Generational Change or Continuity in Japan's Leadership? -- 10. Should I Stay or Should I Go? Party Switching in Japan -- 11. Ministerial Selection under Abe, Suga, and Kishida -- 12. Public opinion and COVID-19 -- 13. Social media in the 2021 Election Campaign -- 14. Are the Kids Alright? Young People and Turnout in Japan -- 15. Did COVID-19 Impact Japan's 2021 General Election? -- 16. Japan's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic -- 17. Economic Policy Trilemma: Macroeconomic Politics in the 2021 Election -- 18. Does Income Inequality Matter in Japan? -- 19. Women's representation and the gendered impact of COVID-19 in Japan -- 20. Black Lives Matter in Japan: The Specter of Race and Racism Haunting Japan -- 21. Constitutional Revision in the 2021 Election -- 22. Covid-19: The International Dimension -- 23. Foreign Policy and Defense Issues in Japan's 2021 Election -- 24. China in Japan's 2021 Elections -- 25. The Olympics in the 2021 Election -- 26. Conclusion: The 2021 Japanese Election in the Shadow of the Coronavirus Pandemic.