Suchergebnisse

This article explores the role of visuality and narrative in the forging of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the UN Security P5+1. We advance strategic narrative theory by explaining how narrative alignment between longstanding antagonists can occur through protagonists' coordination of communication – a methodology of orchestration – across public and private spaces of diplomacy. Analysis of news, policy and social media materials as well as interviews with protagonists allows us to trace the gestures and performances through which actors sought to reinforce or overcome an identity narrative of Iran as untrustworthy and dangerous. We draw on Foucault's concept of alethurgy to show how verification mechanisms were constructed to ensure Iran's actions (if not its intentions) could be brought into public view. US and Iranian leaders' political will was significant, and sanctions and sabotage exerted considerable pressure on Iran. This article demonstrates how communication can enable alignment and peace-making rather than confusion and conflict in world affairs.

This article explores the role of visuality and narrative in the forging of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the United Nations Security Council P5 + 1. We advance strategic narrative theory by explaining how narrative alignment between longstanding antagonists can occur through protagonists' coordination of communication–a methodology of orchestration–across public and private spaces of diplomacy. Analysis of news, policy and social media materials as well as interviews with protagonists allows us to trace the gestures and performances through which actors sought to reinforce or overcome an identity narrative of Iran as untrustworthy and dangerous. We draw on Foucault's concept of alethurgy to show how verification mechanisms were constructed to ensure Iran's actions (if not its intentions) could be brought into public view. US and Iranian leaders' political will was significant, and sanctions and sabotage exerted considerable pressure on Iran. This article demonstrates how communication can enable alignment and peace-making rather than confusion and conflict in world affairs.

In 1947, the United States of America launched the European Recovery Programme to support the post-war reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan, as it became known after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was one of the major success stories of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine provoked interest – and division in Ukraine. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 demonstrated the EU's capacity to mount grand economic and political projects. However, since then, the EU has faced difficulties exerting influence and constructing a coherent narrative of its role in the European neighbourhood and the wider world. Would a more transformative aid and development programme for its Ukrainian neighbour offer an opportunity for the EU as well as Ukraine? In this article we use a series of elite interviews conducted across Ukraine in 2016-17 to explore how such a notion is understood. We find that Ukrainian elites have mixed feelings about existing EU aid programmes; many respondents resented the conditions the EU imposes, but nor do they want or expect aid to be given unconditionally. Whilst many aspire for Ukraine to reach EU standards of law and prosperity, Ukrainian elites favour self-help in their efforts to forge a stable sovereign state. Both the EU and Russia are understood as metonymies – as standing for two sets of values and geopolitical futures – and neither quite fit what Ukrainians seek. We conclude that whilst a Marshall Plan-style action could have benefits, it is not desired as a basis for a shared narrative and basis of cooperation and development. ; В1947 году Соединенные Штаты Америки развернули Программу европейского оздоровления с целью поддержки восстановления послевоенной Европы. План Маршалла, названный в честь Госсекретаря США Джорджа Маршалла, стал одним из наиболее существенных достижений в американской внешней политике двадцатого столетия. Идея европейской программы, направленной на оздоровление Украины, вызывает как интерес, так и несовместимость мнений украинцев. Расширение ЕС в 2004 и 2007 годах продемонстрировало способность Европы осуществлять масштабные экономические проекты. Однако с тех пор ЕС испытывает трудности в распространении своего влияния и формулировке понятного нарратива относительно своей роли в европейском соседстве и на мировой арене. Сможет ли более конструктивная помощь Украине, а также программа развития для украинского соседа предоставить новые возможности как для ЕС, так и для Украины? В этой статье мы анализируем серию интервью, взятых у представителей элиты из разных регионов Украины в 2016-2017 годах с целью получить ответ на поставленный вопрос. Результаты анализа показывают, что представители украинской элиты демонстрируют смешанные чувства относительно существующих программ помощи Украине со стороны ЕС; многие респонденты возмущены условиями, выдвигаемыми ЕС, однако они и не ожидают отсутствия условий как таковых. Значительная часть украинской элиты стремятся к тому, чтобы Украина достигла европейских стандартов в законодательстве и благополучии граждан, но одновременно отдают предпочтение самостоятельному построению независимого государства. И Украина, и Россия воспринимаются метонимично – как носители двух систем ценностей и геополитических устремлений; и ни одна из этих систем не удовлетворяет требования украинцев. В итоге мы утверждаем, что, хотя действия, подобные Плану Маршалла, могут быть полезны, их вряд ли можно рассматривать как объединяющий общественный нарратив и основу для сотрудничества и развития. ; У 1947 році Сполучені Штати Америки започаткували Програму європейського оздоровлення задля підтримки відбудови післявоєнної Європи. План Маршалла, названий на честь Держсекретаря США Джорджа Маршалла, став одним із найвагоміших досягнень в американській зовнішній політиці двадцятого століття. Ідея європейської програми, спрямованої на оздоровлення України, викликає як інтерес, так і несумісність думок українців. Розширення ЄС у 2004 і 2007 роках продемонструвало здатність ЄС здійснювати масштабні економічні та політичні проекти. Однак з тих пір ЄС зазнала труднощів у розповсюдженні свого впливу і формулюванні зрозумілого наративу щодо своєї ролі в європейському сусідстві та у широкому світі. Чи зможе конструктивніша допомога та програма розвитку для українського сусіда надати нові можливості як для ЄС, так і для України? У цій статті ми аналізуємо серію інтерв'ю, взятих у представників еліти з різних регіонів України в 2016-2017 роках з метою отримати відповідь на поставлене запитання. Результати аналізу показують, що представники української еліти мають змішані почуття щодо існуючих програм допомоги Україні з боку ЄС; багато респондентів обурені умовами, висунутими ЄС, проте вони й не очікують на відсутність умов як таких. Численні представники української еліти прагнуть досягнення Україною європейських стандартів у законодавстві і добробуті громадян, але водночас надають перевагу самостійній розбудові незалежної держави. І Україна, і Росія сприймаються метонімічно – як носії двох систем цінностей та геополітичних прагнень; і жодна з цих систем не задовольняє вимоги українців. У висновку ми стверджуємо, що хоча дії, подібні до плану Маршалла, можуть бути корисними, їх навряд чи можна розглядати як об'єднуючий суспільний наратив та основу для співробітництва та розвитку.

In 1947, the United States of America launched the European Recovery Programme to support the post-war reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan, as it became known after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was one of the major success stories of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine provoked interest – and division in Ukraine. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 demonstrated the EU's capacity to mount grand economic and political projects. However, since then, the EU has faced difficulties exerting influence and constructing a coherent narrative of its role in the European neighbourhood and the wider world. Would a more transformative aid and development programme for its Ukrainian neighbour offer an opportunity for the EU as well as Ukraine? In this article we use a series of elite interviews conducted across Ukraine in 2016-17 to explore how such a notion is understood. We find that Ukrainian elites have mixed feelings about existing EU aid programmes; many respondents resented the conditions the EU imposes, but nor do they want or expect aid to be given unconditionally. Whilst many aspire for Ukraine to reach EU standards of law and prosperity, Ukrainian elites favour self-help in their efforts to forge a stable sovereign state. Both the EU and Russia are understood as metonymies – as standing for two sets of values and geopolitical futures – and neither quite fit what Ukrainians seek. We conclude that whilst a Marshall Plan- style action could have benefits, it is not desired as a basis for a shared narrative and basis of cooperation and development.

This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia's global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia's identity narratives, international system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia's narratives and potential points of convergence with Western powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia's historical-facing narratives and weakened material circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer cooperation with third parties challenging.

This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia's global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia's identity narratives, international system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia's narratives and potential points of convergence with Western powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia's historical-facing narratives and weakened material circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer cooperation with third parties challenging.

This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia's global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia's identity narratives, international system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia's narratives and potential points of convergence with Western powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia's historical-facing narratives and weakened material circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer cooperation with third parties challenging.

This article outlines how Germany has sought to project a strategic narrative of the Eurozone crisis. Germany has been placed center stage in the Eurozone crisis, and as a consequence, the German government's crisis narrative matters for the future of the common currency. We highlight how the German government has sought to narrate a story of the cause of the Eurozone crisis and present policy solutions to influence policy decisions within the EU and maintain domestic political support. This focus on the public communication of the crisis is central to understanding the development of Germany's policy as it was negotiated with EU partners, the U.S. and international financial institutions. We draw on speeches and interviews by Chancellor Angela Merkel and two of her senior cabinet ministers delivered at key moments of the Eurozone crisis between May 2010 and June 2012. The article argues that while Merkel and her governments have been able to shore up domestic support for her Eurozone policies, she has struggled to find a coherent strategic narrative that is both consistent with German domestic preferences and historical memory, and with those of other Eurozone members.