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The literature on indirect tax reforms in pollution-ridden economies is quite limited. This paper, using a model of a small open economy with production and consumption generated pollution, considers the welfare implications of tax reforms within an integrated structure of consumption and production taxes. Specifically, both in the presence and absence of a binding government revenue constraint, we derive sufficient conditions for welfare improvement in the case where we implement (i) reforms in either production or consumption taxes, (ii) reforms in both consumption and production taxes and (iii) uniform changes in consumption taxes.

We construct a two-good general equilibrium model of international trade for two small open economies where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Governments in both countries impose emission taxes non-cooperatively. Within this framework, we examine the effect of trade liberalization and of changes in the perception of cross-border pollution on Nash emission taxes, emission levels, and welfare.

The paper examines the interaction among taxes on factors income, environmental quality and welfare. We construct a two-country regional block model with capital mobility and crossborder pollution. Pollution in the two countries is simultaneously abated by the private sector, in response to a pollution tax and by the public sector utilizing income and pollution tax revenue. We demonstrate, among other things, that due to the existence of cross-border pollution in many cases the Nash optimal policy on capital income is a positive tax, even if taxes on the income of immobile factors are chosen optimally. This tax rate increases with the degree of cross-border pollution.

We develop a two–country model of foreign aid and cross–border pollution resulting from production activities in the recipient country. There is both private and public abatement of pollution, the latter being financed through emissions tax revenue and foreign aid. We characterize a Nash equilibrium in which the donor country chooses the amount of aid and the recipient chooses the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement and the emission tax rate. At this equilibrium, an increase in the donor's perceived rate of cross–border pollution reduces emission levels. JEL Classification: Q28, F35, H41 Est–ce que la pollution trans–frontière peut réduire le niveau de pollution? Les auteurs développent un modèle à deux pays d'aide à l'étranger et de pollution trans–frontière résultant d'activités de production dans le pays qui reçoit l'aide. Il existe des efforts privés et publics pour réduire la pollution, ces derniers étant financés par les rentrées fiscales d'une taxe sur la pollution et par l'aide étrangère. On définit un équilibre à la Nash pour lequel le pays donateur choisit le montant de l'aide, et le pays récipiendaire choisit la fraction de l'aide étrangère qu'il allouera à la lutte à la pollution ainsi que le taux de taxation sur la pollution. A cet équilibre, un accroissement dans le taux de pollution trans–frontière perçu par le donataire réduit le taux de pollution.

We construct a general equilibrium model of a two-country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital, and provide an imported public consumption good. At Nash equilibrium, when the public good is under-provided, (i) a country with a large GDP, has a large Nash equilibrium income tax rate, (ii) if initially the existing foreign capital in the country is zero or small, then the country with a large population or high individual marginal willingness to pay for the public good has a large Nash equilibrium income tax rate. When the two countries act cooperatively, then for each country, the cooperative optimal income tax rate is positive, and if they are identical then the cooperative income tax rate is greater than the Nash. When the two countries are different, then it is possible that the cooperative income tax rate is less than the Nash.