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Published 18 March 2020 ; These Discussion Papers often represent preliminary or incomplete work, circulated to encourage discussion and comment. Citation and use of such a paper should take account of its provisional character. ; Populist rulers in economic superpowers have important effects on international relations, conflict risk and inequality. We show that the consequences for civil war risk and inequality are largely negative, while interstate conflict risk increases for dyads with sufficient asymmetry in terms of trade openness and relative military power. ; ERC, advanced grant 694583.

Priorat Workshop in Theoretical Political Science (Falset, Spain ‐ June 6‐8, 2013) ; "Todas las ponencias disponibles en el canal de YouTube de la Fundación BBVA http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLP2felHI9JfzQcOg975FCcimQ8oR4Ylx5 ; Priorat Workshop in Theoretical Political Science is a record of the talks given at an international workshop organized by the Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE) of the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) in collaboration with the BBVA Foundation. This workshop, celebrated in June 2012, linked together international experts from the fields of Economics and Theoretical Political Sciences, focusing on agency problems and constitutional issues, topics related to information aggregation and distributional concerns and dynamic models and voter turnout. Therefore this multimedia website offers insights into the active current developments within state-of-the-art theoretical, experimental and empirical analyses from each of the underlying disciplines. ; Peer reviewed

We analyze the career profiles of Italian legislators in the post-war period. Using a unique, newly collected dataset that contains detailed information on all the politicians who have been elected to the Italian Parliament between 1948 and 2008, we address a number of important issues that pertain to their career paths prior to election to Parliament, their parliamentary careers, and their post-Parliament employment. Our data span two institutional regimes: Italy's First Republic (1948-1994) and the Second Republic (1994-present), characterized by different electoral rules and party structures. We first present a brief overview of the Italian political system. We then provide a comprehensive view of the career profiles of Italian legislators over the entire sample period, and highlight the major differences between the First and the Second Republic. We also compare the profiles of Italian legislators to those of the members of the United States Congress. We then use our data to address a number of questions that pertain to the selection of Italian politicians, their labor market, and their overall quality. We also draw some general conclusions that contribute to the debate about the relative efficacy and desirability of alternative policies regarding the selection and the compensation of elected representatives.

We analyze the career profiles of Italian legislators in the post-war period. Using a unique, newly collected dataset that contains detailed information on all the politicians who have been elected to the Italian Parliament between 1948 and 2008, we address a number of important issues that pertain to their career paths prior to election to Parliament, their parliamentary careers, and their post-Parliament employment. Our data span two institutional regimes: Italy's First Republic (1948-1994) and the Second Republic (1994-present), characterized by different electoral rules and party structures. We first present a brief overview of the Italian political system. We then provide a comprehensive view of the career profiles of Italian legislators over the entire sample period, and highlight the major differences between the First and the Second Republic. We also compare the profiles of Italian legislators to those of the members of the United States Congress. We then use our data to address a number of questions that pertain to the selection of Italian politicians, their labor market, and their overall quality. We also draw some general conclusions that contribute to the debate about the relative efficacy and desirability of alternative policies regarding the selection and the compensation of elected representatives.