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This new Handbook offers a wide-ranging, internationally focused overview of the field of civil-military relations. The armed forces are central actors in most societies and are involved in many different roles. Amongst other activities, they engage in peace operations, support the police in fighting crime, support civilian authorities in dealing with natural disasters, and fight against terrorists and in internal conflicts. The existing literature on this subject is limited in its discussion of war-fighting and thus does not do justice to this variety of roles.The Routledge Handbook of Civil-

This copy is the final, peer-reviewed manuscript. ; Since the end of the Cold War, the United States (US) has been supporting Latin America's democracy and security through a series of diplomatic, social and security-related initiatives and programs.1 Fighting gangs has been part of these endeavors since the early 1990s, when the U.S. government became aware of the challenges posed domestically by gangs and enacted numerous anti-gang initiatives. This article examines efforts by the US to counter the gang problem in Central America, including the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Mérida Initiative, as well as recent endeavors pursued by the Obama administration. The article also reviews the changes in Central American government attitudes toward fighting gangs, and assesses the impact (if any) of U.S. policies on the region's security.

The proposal by President Cristina Kirchner to abolish the Secretariat of Intelligence (SI) may make sense, at least to her, in the current political context of the Nisman death, but should be deeply considered before any action is taken. In neighboring Brazil, in 1990 President Fernando Collor de Mello, fulfilling a campaign promise, abolished the National Information Service (SNI) the intelligence service of the military that governed 1964-85, and it was not politically possible to create a new civilian intelligence service, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), until 1999. During that time the government was basically blind to civil unrest caused by the Landless Workers' Movement and to drug lords in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Once the ABIN was created, it was extremely limited in its sphere of action, and is prohibited, for example, from doing intercepts. Most of the scandals that ABIN has been involved in during the past fifteen years are due to its being illegally involved in intercepts, something that any intelligence agency must have access to.

The coup in Bamako, on 22 March 2012 both gave lie to the apparent stability of Mali as a democratic country and resulted in the taking of power of an assortment of armed combatants in the North of the country, which resulted in armed intervention by France. This article is about the coup itself that created the power vacuum allowing the insurrection to grow and ultimately take power in the North. The authors have developed a framework for analyzing civil-military relations they believe is more useful than other available frameworks in understanding the role of the military in politics.

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2011.598784 ; In all democratic systems, intelligence reform is a ''Gordian knot'' that incessantly tests decisionmakers. The onus is on them to develop and maintain intelligence systems that protect democracy and are democratically accountable, while, at the same time, engage in secret operations. This challenge has no clear solution. As experts at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) put it, ''the nature of intelligence is such that the balance between secrecy and democracy will always be a delicate one to strike.''1 In well-established democracies, policymakers have developed mechanisms to tackle the ''democracy–intelligence'' dilemma, yet these mechanisms are relentlessly being revised and reworked. In new democracies, however, decision makers must create these mechanisms from ground zero, and do not always succeed in balancing effectiveness with transparency. In those that do succeed, decision makers face numerous challenges, yet they may, after long and protracted endeavors, eventually manage to accommodate effectiveness and transparency. Both interest and willingness (whether self-initiated or due to outside pressure and=or incentives) on the part of policymakers are paramount in successful intelligence reform.

Uncorrected proof of Book Chapter 45 in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, Edited by Loch K. Johnson, Publication Date: 2010. ; In their path to consolidation, developing democracies strive to ensure the democratic transfer of political power, gain legitimacy with elites and civil society, reform and restructure their legal systems and economy, and, maybe most importantly, develop democratic civil-military relations (CMR)—that is establishing new security institutions (to include intelligence agencies) that are under democratic civilian control, and are effective and effi cient ( Bruneau and Boraz 2007 , 1–24).

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340802362505 ; The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary importance for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the security forces. It attempts to present a conceptualization and framework to help comprehend what security forces actually do and how they interface with democratic governments. The article aims to extend the conceptual breadth of the literature on civil–military relations beyond control to include two further dimensions – effectiveness and efficiency. The research is based on the authors' experience in conducting programmes for officers and civilians throughout the world in line with at least six different roles and missions of security forces. The conceptualization draws on literature in comparative politics, organization theory, and defence economics, as well as civil–military relations, and security sector reform.