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The purpose of this paper is to address and test two assumptions on which csQCA is based, namely that csQCA will generate contradictions and low consistency scores if models are ill-specified. The first part of the paper introduces csQCA in general and as a stepwise approach. In a second part a real-life example is introduced with the purpose of illustrating how csQCA operates and as an input for a simulation in the subsequent part. The third part introduces contradictions, consistency, their interrelatedness and the assumptions which are made with regard to contradictions and consistency. Subsequently the assumptions are tested via a simulation on the basis of a csQCA analysis of over 5 million random datasets. The paper argues that researchers cannot always assume that csQCA will generate contradictions or low consistency scores when models are ill-specified. Such an assumption is only justified when csQCA applications take limitations with regard to model specification (the number of conditions and the number of cases) into account. Benchmark tables for model specification purposes are developed. Since these tables are based on a probability value of 0.5 the paper also tests the results for contradictions and consistency for the probabilities which were present in a real-life example. This test shows that the 0.5 probability generates an appropriate measure for the occurrence of contradictions and consistency indicating that the benchmark tables can be used for different applications with different distributions of 0's and 1's in the conditions and outcomes. The paper ends with a conclusion.

This open access book is an outcome of the EU's Horizon 2020 project 'Financial and Institutional Reforms for an Entrepreneurial Society' (FIRES). Building on historical, economic and legal analysis, and combining methods and data across disciplines, the authors provide policymakers, stakeholders and scholars with valuable new tools for assessing and improving Europe's entrepreneurial ecosystems. Then experts from Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom discuss tailored strategies for introducing entrepreneurial policy reforms in their respective countries.

Over the last decades, transparency has featured prominently among the European Union's (EU) efforts to democratize and legitimize its governance. This shift toward transparency has taken many forms and, as the contributions to this thematic issue show, these different forms have evolved significantly over time. Yet, initiatives to enhance transparency have often been blamed for limiting the efficiency of the decision-making process or leading to suboptimal policy outcomes. Consequently, the debate has shifted to whether transparency would be excessive in that it would undermine the EU's capacity to deliver through political arrangements. This editorial presents this transparency–efficiency dilemma, which the different contributions to this thematic issue analyse further.

<p>The EU trade policy is increasingly confronted with demands for more transparency. This article aims to investigate how transparency takes shape in EU trade policy. First, we operationalize the concept of transparency along two dimensions: a process dimension and an actor dimension. We then apply this framework to analysis of EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). After analyzing transparency in relation to FTAs from the perspective of the institutional actors (Commission, Council and Parliament), the different instruments and policies that grant the public actors (civil society and citizens) access to information and documents about EU FTAs are explored by discussing Regulation 1049/2001, which provides for public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, and the role of the European Ombudsman. The article is based on an analysis of official documents, assessments in the academic literature and case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The ultimate aim is to assess current initiatives and identify relevant gaps in the EU's transparency policies. This article argues that the EU has made significant progress in fostering transparency in the negotiation phase of FTAs, but less in the implementation phase.</p>

The EU trade policy is increasingly confronted with demands for more transparency. This article aims to investigate how transparency takes shape in EU trade policy. First, we operationalize the concept of transparency along two dimensions: a process dimension and an actor dimension. We then apply this framework to analysis of EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). After analyzing transparency in relation to FTAs from the perspective of the institutional actors (Commission, Council and Parliament), the different instruments and policies that grant the public actors (civil society and citizens) access to information and documents about EU FTAs are explored by discussing Regulation 1049/2001, which provides for public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, and the role of the European Ombudsman. The article is based on an analysis of official documents, assessments in the academic literature and case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The ultimate aim is to assess current initiatives and identify relevant gaps in the EU's transparency policies. This article argues that the EU has made significant progress in fostering transparency in the negotiation phase of FTAs, but less in the implementation phase.

Over the last decades, transparency has featured prominently among the European Union's (EU) efforts to democratize and legitimize its governance. This shift toward transparency has taken many forms and, as the contributions to this thematic issue show, these different forms have evolved significantly over time. Yet, initiatives to enhance transparency have often been blamed for limiting the efficiency of the decision-making process or leading to suboptimal policy outcomes. Consequently, the debate has shifted to whether transparency would be excessive in that it would undermine the EU's capacity to deliver through political arrangements. This editorial presents this transparency–efficiency dilemma, which the different contributions to this thematic issue analyse further.

This open access book is an outcome of the EU's Horizon 2020 project 'Financial and Institutional Reforms for an Entrepreneurial Society' (FIRES). Building on historical, economic and legal analysis, and combining methods and data across disciplines, the authors provide policymakers, stakeholders and scholars with valuable new tools for assessing and improving Europe's entrepreneurial ecosystems. Then experts from Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom discuss tailored strategies for introducing entrepreneurial policy reforms in their respective countries.

While labour provisions have been inserted in a number of EU free trade agreements (FTAs), extant clauses are widely perceived as ineffective. This article argues that there is a need to rethink the dispute settlement mechanisms related to labour provisions if their effectiveness is to be increased. It proceeds in three steps. First, we look at the current state of the art of labour provisions in EU FTAs in terms of legal design and practice and argue that the current arrangements are ill-equipped to foster compliance with labour standards. Second, we explore avenues to enhance the design of FTA labour provisions by reconsidering basic elements of the dispute settlement structure. Examining US FTA labour provisions, we highlight the importance of a formal complaint mechanism, on the one hand, and the availability of economic sanctions, on the other. Based on a review of existing practice, we contend, however, that these elements alone are not sufficient to effectively enforce FTA labour provisions. We argue that for FTA labour provisions to be effective, the current state-to-state model of dispute settlement needs to be complemented by a third-party-state dimension and that, additionally, there are good reasons to consider a third party–third party dispute settlement component. We ground these reflections in experiences with already existing instruments in other areas, namely investor-state dispute settlement and voluntary sustainability standards. Thirdly, we discuss options to better connect the dispute settlement mechanisms of FTA labour provisions to other international instruments for labour standards protection with a view to creating synergies and avoiding fragmentation between the different regimes. The focus here is on the International Labour Organization's supervisory mechanism and the framework of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

AbstractSupply chains have more and more become global supply chains, due to which it becomes increasingly more difficult for states to monitor whether the production process of goods entering the territory has been free of labour rights abuses. States are less able to hold corporate entities accountable that are knowingly or unknowingly benefiting from labour rights abuses. Transparency measures have been suggested as a way to close this accountability gap and circumvent traditional issues of enforcement when production and consumption of goods takes place in different jurisdictions. This paper discusses whether transparency measures live up to these expectations by assessing the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (California Act). We analyse whether the Act does indeed contribute to greater accountability by filling the existing information gap between companies and consumers. The workings of the Act, as well as its impact on primary stakeholders will be determined. The paper discusses action taken by companies, consumers and non‐governmental organizations by looking at the degree to which the new California Act generated differences in behaviour and practices of these affected parties. Based on this information the question is answered which possibilities and limitations are connected to the use of transparency measures in combatting the abuse of labour rights in the global supply chain. It is discussed which lessons can be learned from the California Act and which policy implications this could have for future transparency measures.