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ABSTRACT
This article provides a theoretical framework to understand the tendency of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to cluster and the circumstances under which such clustering is socially undesirable. NGOs compete through fundraising for donations and choose issues to focus their projects on. Donors have latent willingness-to-give that may differ across issues, but they need to be 'awakened' to give. Raising funds focusing on the same issue creates positive informational spillovers across NGOs. Each NGO chooses whether to compete in the same market (clustering) with spillovers, or to face weaker competition under issue specialisation. We show that equilibrium clustering is more likely to occur when the share of multiple-issue donors is relatively large, and when the fundraising technology is sufficiently efficient. Moreover, this situation is socially inefficient when the cost of fundraising takes intermediate values and the motivation for donors' giving is relatively high. We illustrate the mechanisms of the model with several case studies.

ABSTRACTDespite the fact that nonprofit organizations play a large role in the production and distribution of goods and services in modern economies, and the rising role of non‐governmental organizations in carrying out projects in developing countries, our knowledge of their governance, and of its' implications for their behaviour and performance, is limited. This special issue tries to uncover some of the mechanisms and institutions that characterize the governance of non‐profits and NGOs, as well as its implications. In particular, the papers focus on: (i) the determinants of NGO governance and its implications for reducing poverty in developing countries, (ii) the governance of non‐profit organizations, (iii) the impact of governance characteristics on the performance of non‐profit organizations, and (iv) the effect of non‐profit governance on the interaction between the non‐profit and for‐profit sectors.

We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.

AbstractThis special issue features 14 new research papers investigating the role of farmers' organizations (e.g., collective action, self‐help groups, producer companies/organizations, and cooperatives) in supporting sustainable development. The key findings include: (1) farmer groups and cooperatives promote farmers' adoption of good farm management practices, new agricultural technologies and sustainable farming practices, although not substantially improving farm yield; (2) outsourcing services provided by agricultural cooperatives help to increase the technical efficiency of crop production; (3) cooperative membership enhances members' bargaining power and enables them to sell their products at higher prices; (4) cooperatives motivate rural laborers to work in off‐farm sectors, while self‐help groups empower rural women in decision‐making; (5) internet use improves agricultural cooperatives' economic, social, and innovative performances; (6) direct administrative intervention supporting cooperative development may lead to the emergence of shell cooperatives; (7) participation in forest farmer organizations enables wood value chain upgrading; (8) increasing the cooperative size in terms of income, equity, and assets increases the profitability of savings and credit cooperatives; and (9) creating cross‐border cooperation between cooperatives generates benefits for all parties involved. These findings can inspire the design of policies aimed to support farmers' organizations in achieving sustainable development goals.

AbstractWe study how the supply of environmentalism, which is defined by psychic benefits (costs) associated with the purchase of high-environmental (low-environmental) qualities, affects the way firms choose their prices and products and the ensuing consequences for the global level of pollution. Contrary to general belief, a high supply of environmentalism does not necessarily give rise to a better environmental outcome because it endows the green firms with more market power which they use to charge higher prices. Nonetheless, environmentalism can be used to effectively complement more traditional policy instruments such as a minimum environmental standard.