Suchergebnisse

Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both the roll-call level and congress level. Our findings contribute to an expanding literature explaining why a single dimension could explain most of the variance in voting data, even if latent ideology is multidimensional. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

In recent years, judicial nominations to lower federal courts have been blocked privately by negative blue slips returned by home state senators. We examine the conditions under which senators return negative blue slips and discover two results. First, consistent with existing work, ideology plays a strong role in blue slipping. Second, and more important, we find that nominee qualifications mitigate ideological extremism—but only for district court nominees. That is, in the past, presidents could use legal credentials to prop up district court and circuit court nominees who shared his views. Today, in a Senate marked by high polarization and few moderates,the president cannot.

In this article, we take advantage of a new source of data providing updates from the Majority Leader's Office that signal the leadership's positions on floor votes. We offer a more nuanced explanation of voting in the U.S. House as our findings suggest that not all procedural votes are created equal. While the most liberal members of the party vote with the leadership on procedural votes at high rates and nearly 100 percent of the time when signaled by the majority leader, moderate members are significantly less likely to support the party and are not responsive to these signals.

Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both the roll-call level and congress level. Our findings contribute to an expanding literature explaining why a single dimension could explain most of the variance in voting data, even if latent ideology is multidimensional.

Senators increasingly use obstructive tactics to stall or kill legislation. Unfortunately, because senators can obstruct privately, scholars have little understanding of the conditions under which they do so. Using previously unreleased data from 2001-2009, we examine Senate obstruction by focusing on blue slipping behavior. We find that extreme members who do not belong to the president's party are most likely to employ negative blue slips. Thus, as moderate senators continue to be replaced by more extreme members, senators will increasingly use obstructive tactics. Adapted from the source document.

Objective We seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intraparty coordination influenced observed levels of party unity in the U.S. Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Methods First, we examine Congress at the vote level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be classified as 'party unity votes' before and after the establishment of the policy committees. Second, we employ a micro-level analysis by examining individual senators' procedural party support scores. Results We find that members of the majority party were more likely to have higher levels of procedural unity after the adoption of policy committees. Conclusion The establishment of party policy committees in the Senate played a role in helping party leaders coordinate activities, advance a legislative agenda, and maintain high levels of party unity on the floor by better structuring procedural votes. Adapted from the source document.

ObjectiveWe seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intraparty coordination influenced observed levels of party unity in the U.S. Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.MethodsFirst, we examine Congress at the vote level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be classified as "party unity votes" before and after the establishment of the policy committees. Second, we employ a micro‐level analysis by examining individual senators' procedural party support scores.ResultsWe find that members of the majority party were more likely to have higher levels of procedural unity after the adoption of policy committees.ConclusionThe establishment of party policy committees in the Senate played a role in helping party leaders coordinate activities, advance a legislative agenda, and maintain high levels of party unity on the floor by better structuring procedural votes.