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AbstractThis contribution starts by presenting the three main approaches that political scientists use to analyze labor market vulnerability. We proceed to discuss various operationalizations of labor market vulnerability. We examine how they relate to the three theoretical approaches and we evaluate the consistency between theory and measurement. Finally, we recommend three measures that political scientists should deploy when analyzing the effect of labor market vulnerability on political preferences. We point out what each of these variables captures and what methodological challenges should be taken into account when using them.

Labour market segmentation currently is at the forefront of national and European policy debates. While the European Commission and the OECD try to promote what they see as more inclusive policies, academic observers remain skeptical. Particularly the dualisation literature points to stable political economy equilibria that stack the cards against overcoming divisions between labour market insiders and outsiders. Other contributions point to a more dynamic political setting, in which negative feedback effects tend to challenge any 'dualisation consensus'. Against this background, this paper traces recent reform trajectories in a diverse group of European countries that are characterised by a high share of temporary employment: France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Our case studies show that recent reforms of employment regulation are characterised by much more dynamism than one would expect based on the experiences of the two preceding decades - or based on dualisation or insider-outsider theory. The reform trajectories are characterised by rather contradictory approaches, sometimes in close succession. This even includes, in several cases, substantive deregulation of dismissal protection for open-ended contracts.

What is the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and vote choice? The literature on this question is fragmented and points to motivations based on welfare policy, immigration policy or anti‐establishment sentiments. To test which of these motives explains differences in voting behaviour between classes, a conjoint experiment in which fictitious candidates present randomly assigned positions was designed. The experiment evaluated the relative importance of the position on welfare, immigration and anti‐establishment as well as candidates' occupational background. By splitting the analyses into lower, middle‐ and upper class voters, it was found that lower class voters are most distinct from other voters in their preferences for anti‐establishment candidates. Strikingly, lower class voters even support welfare retrenchment, as long as it is an anti‐establishment candidate proposing it. The experiment also found a general tendency to vote against career politicians across classes and remarkably few differences regarding immigration preferences.

AbstractThere is growing interest in political inequality across income groups. This article contributes to this debate with two arguments about political involvement: poverty depresses internal political efficacy by undermining cognitive and emotional resources; and dissent in the party system reduces the efficacy gap to higher incomes. Specifically, conflict is to be expected between anti‐elite and mainstream parties to simplify political decisions and stimulate political attention among poor voters. These arguments are supported with comparative and experimental analyses. Comparative survey data shows that the income gap in efficacy varies with a novel measure of the anti‐elite salience in the party system. The causal impact of anti‐elite rhetoric is established though a representative survey experiment. Finally, the article investigates how these mechanisms affect both electoral and other forms of political participation.

Germany is widely seen as a "dualized" economy driven by a powerful and stable "insider" coalition in the manufacturing sectors. In this article, that picture is challenged. An examination of the political economy of the outsider-friendly 2014 Minimum Wage Act, using public opinion data, document analysis, and qualitative interviews, shows how earlier dualizing reforms led to unintended negative feedback effects: First, public opinion reacted negatively to increasing inequality in the years preceding the introduction of the minimum wage. Second, a remarkable shift is found among trade unions toward support of a minimum wage, even in manufacturing. Although the threat of low-wage competition and flexibilization did play a role, trade union solidarity was at least as important. Those endogenous dynamics came together in a self-undermining process unfolding over a relatively short period of time. Potential alternative explanations are explored, including classical partisan politics, party competition, and employer preferences.

Labour market policies are multi-dimensional: their design depends on factors such as generosity, coverage, the combination of active and passive elements, and overall cost. Political conflict on one dimension often hides agreement on others, and social groups possibly care about different aspects of policies. However, most empirical studies treat policy preferences as unidimensional. This article utilizes a novel experimental conjoint design to assess how five dimensions affect support for labour market policies in Spain. It also assesses if individuals' self-interest and ideology affect the importance of each dimension for support for a policy. We find that individuals' support depends mostly on the generosity of policies for the most destitute and on funding. We also find that ideology shapes which dimensions of policy citizens care most about, but economic self-interest does not. Importantly, our experimental design can be applied to study preferences for different social policies.

Germany is widely seen as a "dualized" economy driven by a powerful and stable "insider" coalition in the manufacturing sectors. In this article, that picture is challenged. An examination of the political economy of the outsider-friendly 2014 Minimum Wage Act, using public opinion data, document analysis, and qualitative interviews, shows how earlier dualizing reforms led to unintended negative feedback effects: First, public opinion reacted negatively to increasing inequality in the years preceding the introduction of the minimum wage. Second, a remarkable shift is found among trade unions toward support of a minimum wage, even in manufacturing. Although the threat of low-wage competition and flexibilization did play a role, trade union solidarity was at least as important. Those endogenous dynamics came together in a self-undermining process unfolding over a relatively short period of time. Potential alternative explanations are explored, including classical partisan politics, party competition, and employer preferences.

How do economic downturns affect citizens' support for welfare state retrenchment? Existing observational studies fail to isolate the effect of economic conditions and the effect of elite framing of these conditions. We therefore designed a survey experiment to evaluate how economic change in conjunction with different elite frames impact citizens' support for welfare state retrenchment. We hypothesise and demonstrate that the effects of these frames differ by income group and partisanship. Our survey experiment – carried out in the United Kingdom – demonstrates that poor economic prospects generally motivate support for unemployment benefits vis-à-vis deficit reduction. Emphasis on inequality does not change this picture. Emphasis on government debt and deficits increases support for retrenchment compared with objective information. We find support for the hypothesis that partisans are less responsive to the economy than independents. However, income differences are a surprisingly weak moderator of our treatments. We derive two main conclusions: first, elite frames significantly influence the effect of economic change on welfare state preferences. Second, party identification is crucial to understand individual differences in welfare state preferences and should receive more attention in future research.

How do economic downturns affect citizens' support for welfare state retrenchment? Existing observational studies fail to isolate the effect of economic conditions and the effect of elite framing of these conditions. We therefore designed a survey experiment to evaluate how economic change in conjunction with different elite frames impact citizens' support for welfare state retrenchment. We hypothesise and demonstrate that the effects of these frames differ by income group and partisanship. Our survey experiment – carried out in the United Kingdom – demonstrates that poor economic prospects generally motivate support for unemployment benefits vis-à-vis deficit reduction. Emphasis on inequality does not change this picture. Emphasis on government debt and deficits increases support for retrenchment compared with objective information. We find support for the hypothesis that partisans are less responsive to the economy than independents. However, income differences are a surprisingly weak moderator of our treatments. We derive two main conclusions: first, elite frames significantly influence the effect of economic change on welfare state preferences. Second, party identification is crucial to understand individual differences in welfare state preferences and should receive more attention in future research.

An unresolved question in political science is how economic downturns affect citizens' economic left-right preferences. Existing observational studies fail to isolate the effect of economic conditions and the effect of elite framing of these conditions. We therefore designed a survey experiment to evaluate how economic change in conjunction with different elite frames impact on citizens' preferences for economic policies. We hypothesise and demonstrate that the effects of these frames differ by income group and partisanship. Our survey experiment – carried out in the UK – demonstrates that poor economic prospects motivate support for unemployment benefits vis-à-vis deficit reduction. Emphasis on government debt and deficits increases support for the latter policy option. Also, we find support for the hypothesis that partisans are less responsive to the economy than independents.