Suchergebnisse

What will become the interest rate spreads1 that still prevailed recently between the debts of individual sovereign states of the Economic and Monetary Union? These spreads, well on, will no longer result from exchange rate premiums. However, they could clearly persist. They would then derive partly from liquidity differences in relation to the issues of a reference borrower, surely the German "Bund" or the French Treasury, or a combination of the two (perhaps also with the Dutch government). But obviously spreads may also persist due to the risk of default. Therefore, what will be the extent of these differentials and how far could they increase depending on the risk? This is one of the important issues currently facing economists studying EMU, in particular because of its close link with the concerns underlying the Maastricht Treaty: possible slippage of public debt, risks of monetisation, proclaimed refusal of bail-out. ; What will become of the interest spreads on the debts of different sovereign borrowers under EMU ? Will these always be small and merely reflect differences in liquidity, as they do today, or will they progressively widen and also reflect default risk? Such are the questions posed in this study. We offer a variety of reasons for doubting that the current convergence of interest rates in the euro zone constitutes a permanent situation. Prominent among these is a large set of new data of our own construction concerning the spreads on the debts of lower-level governments, or governments without money-issuing power, for a dozen countries. Those spreads clearly give rise to the suspicion that default-risk premia may reappear in the yields on the debts of different sovereigns in EMU. ; What will become the interest rate spreads1 that still prevailed recently between the debts of individual sovereign states of the Economic and Monetary Union? These spreads, well on, will no longer result from exchange rate premiums. However, they could clearly persist. They would then derive partly from liquidity ...

What will become of the interest spreads on the debts of different sovereign borrowers under EMU ? Will these always be small and merely reflect differences in liquidity, as they do today, or will they progressively widen and also reflect default risk? Such are the questions posed in this study. We offer a variety of reasons for doubting that the current convergence of interest rates in the euro zone constitutes a permanent situation. Prominent among these is a large set of new data of our own construction concerning the spreads on the debts of lower-level governments, or governments without money-issuing power, for a dozen countries. Those spreads clearly give rise to the suspicion that default-risk premia may reappear in the yields on the debts of different sovereigns in EMU. ; Que deviendront les « spreads1 » de taux d'intérêt qui prévalaient encore récemment entre les dettes des différents États souverains de l'Union économique et monétaire? Ces spreads, bien sur, ne résulteront plus des primes de taux de change. Néanmoins, ils pourraient clairement persister. Ils proviendraient alors pour une part des différences de liquidité relativement aux émissions d'un emprunteur de référence, sûrement le « Bund » allemand ou le Trésor public français, ou une combinaison des deux (peut-être aussi avec le gouvernement néerlandais). Mais, de toute évidence, les spreads pourraient également persister en raison du risque de défaut. Dès lors, quelle sera l'ampleur de ces différentiels et jusqu'où pourraient-ils augmenter en fonction du risque ? Telle est l'une des questions importantes que se posent actuellement les économistes qui étudient l'UEM, en raison notamment de son lien étroit avec les préoccupations sous-jacentes au traité de Maastricht : dérapage possible des dettes publiques, risques de monétisation, refus proclamé du « bail-out » (renflouement).

What will become of the interest spreads on the debts of different sovereign borrowers under EMU ? Will these always be small and merely reflect differences in liquidity, as they do today, or will they progressively widen and also reflect default risk? Such are the questions posed in this study. We offer a variety of reasons for doubting that the current convergence of interest rates in the euro zone constitutes a permanent situation. Prominent among these is a large set of new data of our own construction concerning the spreads on the debts of lower-level governments, or governments without money-issuing power, for a dozen countries. Those spreads clearly give rise to the suspicion that default-risk premia may reappear in the yields on the debts of different sovereigns in EMU. ; Que deviendront les « spreads1 » de taux d'intérêt qui prévalaient encore récemment entre les dettes des différents États souverains de l'Union économique et monétaire? Ces spreads, bien sur, ne résulteront plus des primes de taux de change. Néanmoins, ils pourraient clairement persister. Ils proviendraient alors pour une part des différences de liquidité relativement aux émissions d'un emprunteur de référence, sûrement le « Bund » allemand ou le Trésor public français, ou une combinaison des deux (peut-être aussi avec le gouvernement néerlandais). Mais, de toute évidence, les spreads pourraient également persister en raison du risque de défaut. Dès lors, quelle sera l'ampleur de ces différentiels et jusqu'où pourraient-ils augmenter en fonction du risque ? Telle est l'une des questions importantes que se posent actuellement les économistes qui étudient l'UEM, en raison notamment de son lien étroit avec les préoccupations sous-jacentes au traité de Maastricht : dérapage possible des dettes publiques, risques de monétisation, refus proclamé du « bail-out » (renflouement).

The starting point of this project is the question of whether the macroeconomics of the German political establishment does indeed differ, as it often seems to do, from standard textbook macroeconomics: in particular, the former appears to neglect demand management (although it may be quite interventionist in other ways), to reject debt relief and to emphasise structural reform designed to improve competitiveness as the (only) key to economic growth. How far is this true? How much of whatever difference exists is due to a well worked out set of ideas in the form of Ordoliberalism? How does it relate to Germany's own experiences in different periods? How far is this the result of political preferences and how much do the idiosyncrasies of these German views matter, for the development of the Eurozone and indeed the health of the German economy?