Information Management in Incentive Problems
In: Journal of political economy, Band 105, Heft 4, S. 796
ISSN: 0022-3808
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 105, Heft 4, S. 796
ISSN: 0022-3808
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 346
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 343
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 370
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Economics & politics, Band 2, Heft 3, S. 223-240
ISSN: 1468-0343
In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for the government. We then consider why quota auctions should be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or immediately opening trade and compensating people with income transfers. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies.
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 405
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Journal of political economy, Band 91, Heft 1, S. 154-167
ISSN: 1537-534X
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 319-340
ISSN: 1540-5982
In this paper we examine the setting of optimal legal standards to simultaneously induce parties to invest in care and to motivate law enforcers to detect violators of the law. The strategic interaction between care providers and law enforcers determines the degree of efficiency achieved by the standards. Our principal finding is that some divergence between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of providing care is required to control enforcement costs. Further, the setting of standards may effectively substitute for the setting of fines when penalties for violation are fixed. In particular, maximal fines may be welfare reducing when standards are set optimally.Nous considérons dans cet article la détermination, en information incomplète, de normes légales optimales pour à la fois inciter les citoyens à faire preuve de diligence (prévention) et motiver les agents de la paix à veiller au respect des lois. L'interaction stratégique entre citoyens et agents de la paix détermine l'efficacité des normes choisies. Notre résultat principal est à l'effet qu'un écart entre bénéfices marginaux et coûts marginaux de la diligence est nécessaire afin de réduire les coûts d'application des lois. De plus, les normes peuvent être un substitut aux amendes lorsque les pénalités pour infraction sont fixes. Des amendes maximales peuvent en particulier être contre‐indiquées lorsque les normes sont optimalement déterminées.
In: Journal of international economics, Band 38, Heft 3-4, S. 275-295
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Information economics and policy, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 57-73
ISSN: 0167-6245