Suchergebnisse

Executive Summary The US Department of State (DOS) reports that as of November 2018, nearly 3.7 million persons had been found by US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to have a close family relationship to a US citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) that qualified them for a visa, but were on "the waiting list in the various numerically-limited immigrant categories" ( DOS 2018 ). These backlogs in family-based "preference" (numerically capped) categories represent one of the most egregious examples of the dysfunction of the US immigration system. They consign family members of US citizens and LPRs that potentially qualify for a visa and that avail themselves of US legal procedures to years of insecurity, frustration, and (often) separation from their families. Often criticized in the public sphere for jumping the visa queue, it would be more accurate to say that this population, in large part, comprises the queue. While they wait for their visa priority date to become current, those without immigration status are subject to removal. In addition, most cannot adjust to LPR status in the United States, but must leave the country for consular processing and, when they do, face three- or 10-year bars on readmission, depending on the duration of their unlawful presence in the United States. This population will also be negatively affected by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) proposed rule to expand the public charge ground of inadmissibility ( Kerwin, Warren, and Nicholson 2018 ). In addition, persons languishing in backlogs enjoy few prospects in the short term for executive or legislative relief, given political gridlock over immigration reform and the Trump administration's support for reduced family-based immigration.

This paper presents the results of a study by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) on potential beneficiaries of the DREAM Act of 2017 (the "DREAM Act" or "Act"). The study reveals a long-term, highly productive population, with deep ties to the United States. In particular, it finds that: • More than 2.2 million US residents would qualify for conditional residence under the DREAM Act. • An additional 929,000 — who are now age 18 and over — arrived when they were under 18, but have not graduated from high school and are not enrolled in school and, thus, would not currently qualify for status under the Act. • The DREAM Act-eligible can be found in large numbers (5,000 or more) in 41 states and more than 30 counties, metropolitan areas, and cities. • Potential DREAM Act recipients have lived in the United States for an average of 14 years. • Sixty-five percent (age 16 and above) participate in the labor force, with far higher rates in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Utah, Arkansas, Illinois, Tennessee, and Oregon. • This population works heavily in sales and related occupations; food preparation and serving; construction and extracting; office and administrative support; production; transportation and material moving; and building/grounds cleaning and maintenance. • Many of the DREAM Act-eligible are highly skilled and credentialed. • 70,500 are self-employed. • Eighty-eight percent speaks English exclusively, very well, or well. • 392,500 have US-citizen children, and more than 100,000 are married to a US citizen or lawful permanent resident. • Twenty-nine percent has attended college or received a college degree. • The DREAM Act-eligible include 50,700 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras, 45 percent of whom live in the Miami metro area, Los Angeles County, the Washington, DC area, Houston, New York City, the San Francisco metro area, and the City of Dallas. The study also underscores the immense investment — $150 billion — that states and localities have already made in educating these young Americans. It argues that over time and with a path to citizenship the return on this investment will increase by virtually every indicia of integration — education levels, employment rates, self-employment numbers, US family members, and English language proficiency.

The Trump administration has made the construction of an "impregnable" 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: • Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; • Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other "vanishing points" (Kerwin 2016); • Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); • Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); • Its inability to meet the administration's goal of securing "operational control" of the border, defined as "the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States" (White House 2017); • Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and • Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: • In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. • Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. • Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. • Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one-third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. • California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). • Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). • The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.

The conventional wisdom holds that the only point of consensus in the fractious US immigration debate is that the system is broken. Yet, the US public has consistently expressed a desire for a legal and orderly immigration system that serves compelling national interests. This paper describes how to create such a system. It focuses on the cornerstone of immigration reform,1 the legal immigration system,2 and addresses the widespread belief that broad reform will incentivize illegal migration and ultimately lead to another large undocumented population. The paper begins with an analysis of presidential signing statements on seminal immigration legislation over nearly a century. These statements reveal broad consensus on the interests and values that the United States seeks to advance through its immigration and refugee policies. They constitute additional common ground in the immigration debate. To serve these interests, immigration and refugee considerations must be "mainstreamed" into other policy processes. In addition, its policies will be more successful if they are seen to benefit or, at least, not to discriminate against migrant-sending states. Not surprisingly, the US immigration system does not reflect the vast, mostly unanticipated changes in the nation and the world since Congress last meaningfully reformed this system (27 years ago) and last overhauled the law (52 years ago). The paper does not detail the well-documented ways that US immigration laws fall short of serving the nation's economic, family, humanitarian, and rule of law objectives. Nor does it propose specific changes in categories and levels of admission. Rather, it describes how a legal immigration system might be broadly structured to deliver on its promises. In particular, it makes the case that Congress should create a flexible system that serves compelling national interests, allows for real time adjustments in admission based on evidence and independent analysis, and vests the executive with appropriate discretion in administering the law. The paper also argues that the United States should anticipate and accommodate the needs of persons compelled to migrate by its military, trade, development, and other commitments. In addition, the US immigration system needs to be able to distinguish between undocumented immigrants, and refugees and asylum seekers, and to treat these two populations differently. The paper assumes that there will be continued bipartisan support for immigration enforcement. However, even with a strong enforcement apparatus in place and an adaptable, coherent, evidence-based legal immigration system that closely aligns with US interests, some (reduced) level of illegal migration will persist. The paper offers a sweeping, historical analysis of how this population emerged, why it has grown and contracted, and how estimates of its size have been politically exploited. Legalization is often viewed as the third rail of immigration reform. Yet, Congress has regularly legalized discrete undocumented populations, and the combination of a well-structured legalization program, strengthened legal immigration system, and strong enforcement policies can prevent the reemergence of a large-scale undocumented population. In contrast, the immense US enforcement apparatus will work at cross-purposes to US interests and values, absent broader reform. The paper ends with a series of recommendations to reform the legal immigration system, downsize the current undocumented population, and ensure its permanent reduction. It proposes that the United States "reissue" (or reuse) the visas of persons who emigrate, as a way to promote legal immigration reform without significantly increasing annual visa numbers.

Executive Summary1 This report presents detailed statistical information on the US Temporary Protected Status (TPS) populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti. TPS can be granted to noncitizens from designated nations who are unable to return to their countries because of armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions. In January 2017, an estimated 325,000 migrants from 13 TPS-designated countries resided in the United States. This statistical portrait of TPS beneficiaries from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti reveals hardworking populations with strong family and other ties to the United States. In addition, high percentages have lived in the United States for 20 years or more, arrived as children, and have US citizen children. The paper finds that: • The labor force participation rate of the TPS population from the three nations ranges from 81 to 88 percent, which is well above the rate for the total US population (63 percent) and the foreign-born population (66 percent). • The five leading industries in which TPS beneficiaries from these countries work are: construction (51,700), restaurants and other food services (32,400), landscaping services (15,800), child day care services (10,000), and grocery stores (9,200). • TPS recipients from these countries live in 206,000 households: 61,000 of these households (about 30 percent) have mortgages. • About 68,000, or 22 percent, of the TPS population from these nations arrived as children under the age of 16.

Executive Summary1 This paper provides a statistical portrait of the US undocumented population, with an emphasis on the social and economic condition of mixed-status households - that is, households that contain a US citizen and an undocumented resident. It is based primarily on data compiled by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS). Major findings include the following: • There were 3.3 million mixed-status households in the United States in 2014. • 6.6 million US-born citizens share 3 million households with undocumented residents (mostly their parents). Of these US-born citizens, 5.7 million are children (under age 18). • 2.9 million undocumented residents were 14 years old or younger when they were brought to the United States. • Three-quarters of a million undocumented residents are self-employed, having created their own jobs and in the process, creating jobs for many others. • A total of 1.3 million, or 13 percent of the undocumented over age 18, have college degrees. • Of those with college degrees, two-thirds, or 855,000, have degrees in four fields: engineering, business, communications, and social sciences. • Six million undocumented residents, or 55 percent of the total, speak English well, very well, or only English. • The unemployment rate for the undocumented was 6.6 percent, the same as the national rate in January 2014.2 • Seventy-three percent had incomes at or above the poverty level. • Sixty-two percent have lived in the United States for 10 years or more. • Their median household income was $41,000, about $12,700 lower than the national figure of $53,700 in 2014 (US Census Bureau 2015). Based on this profile, a massive deportation program can be expected to have the following major consequences: • Removing undocumented residents from mixed-status households would reduce median household income from $41,300 to $22,000, a drop of $19,300, or 47 percent, which would plunge millions of US families into poverty. • If just one-third of the US-born children of undocumented residents remained in the United States following a mass deportation program, which is a very low estimate, the cost of raising those children through their minority would total $118 billion. • The nation's housing market would be jeopardized because a high percentage of the 1.2 million mortgages held by households with undocumented immigrants would be in peril. • Gross domestic product (GDP) would be reduced by 1.4 percent in the first year, and cumulative GDP would be reduced by $4.7 trillion over 10 years. CMS derived its population estimates for 2014 using a series of statistical procedures that involved the analysis of data collected by the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). The privacy of all respondents in the survey is legally mandated, and, for the reasons listed in the Appendix, the identity of undocumented residents cannot be derived from the data. A detailed description of the methodology used to develop the estimates is available at the CMS website.3

The Obama administration has developed two broad programs to defer immigration enforcement actions against undocumented persons living in the United States: (1) Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA); and (2) Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The DACA program, which began in August 2012, was expanded on November 20, 2014. DAPA and the DACA expansion (hereinafter referred to as "DACA-plus") are currently under review by the US Supreme Court and subject to an active injunction. This paper offers a statistical portrait of the intended direct beneficiaries of DAPA, DACA, and DACA-plus. It finds that potential DAPA, DACA, and DACA-plus recipients are deeply embedded in US society, with high employment rates, extensive US family ties, long tenure, and substantial rates of English-language proficiency. The paper also notes various groups that would benefit indirectly from the full implementation of DAPA and DACA or, conversely, would suffer from the removal of potential beneficiaries of these programs. For example, all those who would rely on the retirement programs of the US government will benefit from the high employment rates and relative youth of the DACA population, while many US citizens who rely on the income of a DAPA-eligible parent would fall into poverty or extreme poverty should that parent be removed from the United States. This paper offers an analysis of potential DAPA and DACA beneficiaries. In an earlier study, the authors made the case for immigration reform based on long-term trends related to the US undocumented population, including potential DAPA and DACA beneficiaries (Warren and Kerwin 2015). By contrast, this paper details the degree to which these populations have become embedded in US society. It also compares persons eligible for the original DACA program with those eligible for DACA-plus. As stated, the great majority of potential DAPA and DACA recipients enjoy strong family ties, long tenure, and high employment rates in the United States. Nearly one-half of the DAPA population and far higher percentages of the two DACA populations speak English well, very well, or exclusively. An unknown, albeit not insubstantial percentage of both the DAPA- and DACA-eligible may already qualify for an immigration benefit or relief that would put them on a path to permanent residency and US citizenship. These mostly low-wage populations have relatively high rates of poverty and low rates of health insurance. Not surprisingly, the educational attainment, school enrollment rates, and English-language proficiency of the DACA-eligible substantially exceed those of the DAPA-eligible. Both populations enjoy high levels of computer and Internet access. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) derived its estimates on the DAPA- and DACA-eligible from statistics on the foreign-born population collected in the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS), as described in Warren (2016). It first derived detailed estimates for all undocumented residents, and then used the characteristics of this population (e.g., year of entry, age at entry, etc.) to tabulate the numbers of those who would be eligible for DAPA and DACA in 2014, which is the most recent year available.

In December 2014, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) released a paper that provides new estimates of the US unauthorized resident population (Warren 2014). The paper describes the development of a new dataset which has detailed information about unauthorized residents, derived from data collected in the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). The dataset will be useful to scholars, researchers, service-providers, and government officials in crafting, implementing, and evaluating programs that serve noncitizens, including the unauthorized. In addition, the new estimates provide an opportunity to examine the dramatic changes in unauthorized immigration in the past two decades and the assumptions that have shaped US policies and public opinion. The new dataset, recent estimates of the unauthorized (Warren and Warren 2013) and statistics on the noncitizen population from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles et al. 2010) highlight several trends related to the decline in the unauthorized population, particularly from Mexico, and the increasing salience of visa overstays in constituting this population. Some trends defy conventional wisdom and all of them have public policy consequences. In particular, we find that: • The unauthorized resident population was about a million lower in 2013 than in 2007. • The "Great Recession" was not the principal cause of population decline. • Annual arrivals into the unauthorized population increased to more than one million in 2000, then began to drop steadily, and have now reached their lowest levels since the early 1980s. • From 2000 to 2012, arrivals from Mexico fell by about 80 percent. • Between 2010 and 2013, the total unauthorized population from Mexico declined by eight percent. • In 2006, the number of arrivals from Mexico fell below the total number of arrivals from all other countries (combined) for the first time. • The number who stayed beyond the period authorized by their temporary visas (overstays) exceeded the number who entered across the southern land border without inspection (EWIs) in each year from 2008 to 2012. While the CMS estimates are based on sample data and assumptions that are subject to error, these trends are consistent with the best empirical information available. In November 2014 the Obama Administration announced an unprecedented set of executive action initiatives. At this writing, the Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) program and the expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which would provide work authorization and temporary reprieve from removal to eligible persons, have been preliminarily enjoined. The temporary injunction, which the US Department of Justice plans to appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, comes in response to a legal challenge to the two programs by 26 states under Article II, section 3 of the US Constitution which requires the president to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In addition, the Republican majorities of the 114th Congress have vowed to prevent the implementation of these programs. However, the administration has expressed confidence that it will ultimately prevail in court and in its battle with Congress over these programs. Meanwhile, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), and others continue to plan intensively for the DAPA and DACA programs, as well as for other executive action initiatives. This paper provides estimates of those who are potentially eligible for DAPA and DACA. However, it also looks beyond DAPA and DACA to make the case for broad legislative reform in light of long-term trends in unauthorized migration to the United States and the unauthorized resident population. In particular, it argues that substantial declines in the unauthorized population—a goal shared by partisans on both sides of the immigration debate—will require reform of the legal immigration system, legalization of a substantial percentage of the unauthorized, and a more effective response to nonimmigrant visa overstays.

Naturalization has long been recognized as a crucial step in the full integration of immigrants into US society. Yet until now, sufficient information on the naturalization-eligible has not been available that would allow the federal government, states, localities, and non-governmental service providers to develop targeted strategies on a local level to assist this population to naturalize and to overcome barriers to eligibility. This paper remedies that deficiency by providing detailed estimates on the naturalization-eligible from data collected in the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). Naturalization rates have traditionally been calculated by dividing the naturalized or the "naturalization eligible" populations by all foreign-born persons; i.e., the naturalized, legal non-citizens, and undocumented residents. By including the unauthorized in this calculation, naturalization rates have appeared misleadingly low for populations that can naturalize. By contrast, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) provides "naturalization eligibility" rates, which it calculates by dividing the "naturalization eligible" by the foreign-born population, minus undocumented residents and legal residents who arrived after mid-2008. The paper reports that 8.6 million US residents were eligible to naturalize in 2013. This figure approximates the 8.8 million estimate of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Mexican nationals constitute the largest naturalization-eligible population at 2.7 million, followed by Indian (337,000), Chinese (320,000), Cuban (316,000), and Canadian (313,000) nationals. Fifty countries have 25,000 or more naturalization-eligible persons. The large number of legally resident Mexican nationals and this population's high naturalization eligibility rate mean that US states with large Mexican populations have relatively high percentages of legal foreign-born residents who can naturalize. The overall "naturalization eligibility" rate was 31 percent in 2013, including 48 percent for Mexican nationals. Nine of the 25 largest US naturalization-eligible populations by source country have naturalization eligibility rates in excess of 40 percent, including Mexico (48 percent), Canada (45 percent), El Salvador (42 percent), the United Kingdom (41 percent), Guatemala (44 percent), Japan (56 percent), Honduras (48 percent), and Brazil (41 percent). On a state level, California, Texas, New York, and Florida contain roughly five million of the US naturalization-eligible or about 58 percent of the total population. The paper finds that a large number of naturalization-eligible immigrants may have difficulty meeting the naturalization requirements or may need intensive support to do so. This population likely includes substantial percentages of the 2.87 million naturalization-eligible who have lived in the United States for more than 25 years; 1.16 million who do not speak English; 3.0 million with less than a high school education; and the 1.8 million with incomes below the poverty level. On the other hand, high percentages of eligible immigrants would seem to be well-situated to naturalize, including those who have lived in the United States for more than 10 years (78 percent); are age 35 or older (74 percent); are married (64 percent); speak English well, very well, or only English (65 percent); have access to both a computer and the internet (74 percent); earn income above the poverty level (79 percent); and have health insurance (72 percent).

Executive Summary The International Organization of Migration has characterized the US-Mexico border as the world's deadliest land migration route. By August 2024, a minimum of 5,405 persons had died or gone missing along this border since 2014, with record high numbers since 2021. Migrant deaths occur despite decades of: US Border Patrol search and rescue initiatives; public education campaigns targeting potential migrants on the dangers of irregular migration; dozens of academic publications and reports highlighting the root causes of these deaths; efforts by consular officials, local communities, and humanitarian agencies to locate, identify, and repatriate human remains; and desperate attempts by families to learn the fate of their missing loved ones. This paper introduces a special edition of the Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS), which draws on original research and the expertise of medical examiners, forensic anthropologists, social scientists, and humanitarian organizations to examine this persistent human tragedy. Many of the authors investigate migrant deaths in their professional capacities. They identify the dead, return remains to family members, and champion reforms to prevent deaths and better account for the dead and missing. This JMHS special edition represents a collaboration between the University of Arizona's Binational Migration Institute, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMSNY), and the Working Group on Mapping Migrant Deaths along the US Southwest Border. The Working Group includes scholars and practitioners from California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and New York who have met monthly since October of 2021. The special edition examines in granular detail the causes of migrant deaths, US border enforcement strategies and tactics, migrant death statistics, and the resource and capacity challenges faced by US counties along and leading from the US-Mexico border in investigating these deaths. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and many public officials attribute the deaths to the predations of human smugglers, the victims' ignorance or assumption of risk, and the harsh "natural" conditions to which migrants finally succumb. This special issue also documents the underlying non-natural causes of this enduring tragedy, and offers both overarching and more targeted solutions to preventing and minimizing migrant deaths. The issue builds upon and extends seminal research on migrant deaths first featured in CMSNY publications more than two decades ago. Section I introduces the issue of migrant deaths by posing the question: Why should we care? Section II describes the genesis of "prevention through deterrence"—a border enforcement theory and strategy—and its evolution through subsequent Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Border Patrol strategic plans. It describes the immense enforcement infrastructure built around this idea by successive administrations and Congresses, and it explains why it has failed to stem irregular migration and how it has contributed to migrant deaths. Section III reviews the main causes of migrant deaths—forced migration, the combined effects of prevention through deterrence and border enforcement tactics, the denial of access to asylum, the border wall, the "naturalization" of migrant deaths, and the dominant vision of the border as a site of danger and exclusion. Section IV reviews the legislative standards for identifying, investigating, and reporting on migrant decedents. It also details the deficiencies of Border Patrol and county-level sources of data on deaths, and it outlines ways to strengthen data collection. Section V discusses the burdens placed on communities along and leading from the border in investigating deaths and their need for greater resources and capacity to address this problem. Section VI outlines the anomalies and challenges related to the Border Patrol's migrant rescue program. Section VII describes international legal standards to guide the investigation of migrant deaths and two model programs. Section VIII sets forth policy recommendations to prevent migrant deaths and to honor and account for the dead.

This paper offers estimates of US foreign-born populations that are eligible for special legal status programs and those that would be eligible for permanent residence (legalization) under pending bills. It seeks to provide policymakers, government agencies, community-based organizations (CBOs), researchers, and others with a unique tool to assess the potential impact, implement, and analyze the success of these programs. It views timely, comprehensive data on targeted immigrant populations as an essential pillar of legalization preparedness, implementation, and evaluation. The paper and the exhaustive estimates that underlie it, represent the first attempt to provide a detailed statistical profile of beneficiaries of proposed major US legalization programs and special, large-scale legal status programs. The paper offers the following top-line findings: Fifty-eight percent of the 10.35 million US undocumented residents had lived in the United States for 10 years or more as of 2019; 37 percent lived in homes with mortgages; 33 percent arrived at age 17 or younger; 32 percent lived in households with US citizens (the overwhelming majority of them children); and 96 percent in the labor force were employed. The Citizenship for Essential Workers Act would establish the largest population-specific legalization program discussed in the paper. 7.2 million (70 percent) of the total undocumented population would be eligible for legalization under the Act. Approximately two-thirds of undocumented essential workers reside in 20 metropolitan areas. The populations eligible for the original Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and for permanent residence on a conditional basis and removal of the conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 are not only ready to integrate successfully, but in most cases have already done so. A high percentage are long-term residents, virtually all have completed high school (or attend school), a third to one-half have attended college, and the overwhelming majority live in households with incomes above the poverty level. The median household income of California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey residents that are eligible for the original DACA program is higher than the US median household income. New York and New Jersey residents that are eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 also have median incomes above the US median household income. The total eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 have median household incomes that are 99 percent of the US median income. Unlike populations eligible for most special legal status and population-specific legalization programs, childhood arrivals can be found in significant numbers and concentrations in communities throughout the United States, particularly in metropolitan areas. More than 1.8 million persons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras would be eligible for TPS if the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated Guatemala for TPS and re-designated El Salvador and Honduras. Local communities can best prepare for legalization by collaborating on: (1) the hard work of assisting individual immigrants to meet their immigration needs; (2) dividing labor, integrating services, screening the undocumented for status, and building legal capacity; and (3) implementation of special legal status programs. This collective work should be viewed as a legalization program in its own right. The populations eligible for legalization and legal status under the programs analyzed in the paper have overlapping needs and large numbers of immigrants would be eligible for more than one program. However, substantial differences between these populations in size, geography, length of residency, education, socio-economic attainment, and English language proficiency argue for distinct preparedness and implementation strategies for each population. The paper also makes several broad policy recommendations regarding legalization bills, special legal status programs, and community-based preparedness and implementation efforts. In particular, it recommends that: Congress should pass broad immigration reform legislation that includes a general legalization program or, in the alternative, a series of population-specific programs for essential workers, childhood arrivals, agricultural workers, persons eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), and long-term residents. In the interim, the Biden administration should also designate and re-designate additional countries for TPS. Immigration reform legislation should allow the great majority of US undocumented residents to legalize, should reform the underlying legal immigration system, and should provide for the legalization of future long-term undocumented residents through a rolling registry program. Congress, the relevant federal agencies, and advocates should ensure that any legalization program be properly structured and sufficiently funded, particularly the work of CBOs, states, and localities. Local communities should continue to build the necessary partnerships, capacities, skills, and resources to implement a legalization program. They should do so, in part, by collaborating on special legal status programs such as DACA, TPS, and naturalization campaigns, as well as through the steady-state work of assisting immigrants in their individual immigration cases and funding their representation as necessary in removal proceedings. Section I of the paper describes the populations that would be eligible for legalization under pending bills and that are potentially eligible for special legal status programs. Section II presents top-line findings based on the Center for Migration Studies' (CMS's) estimates and profiles of these populations. The report offers estimates of each population by characteristics — such as length of time in the country, English language proficiency, education, household income, health insurance, and homeownership — that are relevant to preparedness and implementation activities. Section III makes the case for immigration reform and a broad legalization program. Section IV offers detailed recommendations on the substance, structure, and implementation of these programs.

This paper proposes that the United States treat naturalization not as the culmination of a long and uncertain individual process, but as an organizing principle of the US immigration system and its expectation for new Americans. It comes at a historic inflection point, following the chaotic departure of one of the most nativist administrations in US history and in the early months of a new administration whose executive orders, administrative actions, and legislative proposals augur a different view of immigrants and immigration. The paper examines two main ways that the Biden–Harris administration can realize its immigration, naturalization and integration goals: i.e., by expanding access to permanent residence and by increasing naturalization numbers and rates. First, it proposes administrative and, to a lesser degree, legislative measures that would expand the pool of eligible-to-naturalize immigrants. Second, it identifies three underlying factors—financial resources, English language proficiency, and education—that strongly influence naturalization rates. These factors must be addressed, in large part, outside of and prior to the naturalization process. In addition, it provides detailed estimates of populations with large eligible-to-naturalize numbers, populations that naturalize at low rates, and populations with increasing naturalization rates. It argues that the administration's immigration strategy should prioritize all three groups for naturalization. The paper endorses the provisions of the US Citizenship Act that would place undocumented and temporary residents on a path to permanent residence and citizenship, would reduce family- and employment-based visa backlogs, and would eliminate disincentives and barriers to permanent residence. It supports the Biden-Harris administration's early executive actions and proposes additional measures to increase access to permanent residence and naturalization. It also endorses and seeks to inform the administration's plan to improve and expedite the naturalization process and to promote naturalization. The paper's major findings regarding the eligible-to-naturalize population include the following: In 2019, about 74 percent, or 23.1 million, of the 31.2 million immigrants (that were eligible for naturalization) had naturalized. Three states—Indiana, Arizona, and Texas—had naturalization rates of 67 percent, well below the national average of 74 percent. Fresno, California had the lowest naturalization rate (58 percent) of the 25 metropolitan (metro) areas with the largest eligible-to-naturalize populations, followed by Phoenix at 66 percent and San Antonio and Austin at 67 percent. Four cities in California had rates of 52–58 percent—Salinas, Bakersfield, Fresno, and Santa Maria-Santa Barbara. McAllen, Laredo, and Brownsville had the lowest naturalization rates in Texas. Immigrants from Japan had the lowest naturalization rate (47 percent) by country of origin, followed by four countries in the 60–63 percent range—Mexico, Canada, Honduras, and the United Kingdom. Guatemala and El Salvador each had rates of 67 percent. Median household income was $25,800, or 27 percent, higher for the naturalized population, compared to the population that had not naturalized (after an average of 23 years in the United States for both groups). In the past 10 years, naturalization rates for China and India have fallen, and rates for Mexico and Central America have increased (keeping duration of residence constant). In short, the paper provides a roadmap of policy measures to expand the eligible-to-naturalize population, and the factors and populations that the Biden–Harris administration should prioritize to increase naturalization rates, as a prerequisite to the full integration and participation of immigrants, their families, and their descendants in the nation's life.