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Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-254) and indexes. ; Mode of access: Internet.

An overview of criticisms levied against the spatial model of politics, in which voters choose the candidates closest to them in weighted Euclidean distance, & candidates seek to compete by positioning & repositioning themselves in an n-dimensional policy space. Since those critiques retain the character of the original model, a more radical alternative is offered: an explicity neo-Downsian spatial model of ideology specifying the linkage between ideological messages & policy positions. After indicating the importance of ideology as a theory, a formal depiction is offered & an illustrative application provided, drawing on a survey of 40 students at the U of Texas. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 53 References. Adapted from the source document.

In the spatial model of politics voters choose the candidates closest to them in weighted Euclidean distance, and candidates seek to compete by positioning and repositioning themselves in and n-dimensional policy space. This model has recently come under attack from a number of scholars who assert its depiction of politics is unrealistic. Still these critiques retain the character of the original model. We offer a more radical alternative: an explicitly neo-Downsian spatial model of ideology specifying the linkage between ideological messages and policy positions. After indicating the importance of ideology as a theory, a formula depiction is offered and an illustrative empirical application is provided.

When issues (i.e., dimensions) are voted on one at a time, a voter whose preferences are not separable across issues must forecast the outcome of later issues in order to know how to vote in the present. This is the problem of expectations. In this article, we develop a general theory designed to handle this problem. Assuming that voters are risk averse and maximize expected utility, we demonstrate that a random variable forecast of how later issues will be decided reduces to a point forecast, which is the mean of the multidimensional random variable. We also show that single-peaked preferences are induced on each issue, and consequently there exists an equilibrium across issues.