Suchergebnisse

The Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 offered Germany the first serious prospect of ending the two-front war dilemma. General Erich Ludendorff, anticipating resultant cessation of major military operations in the East, decided to seek a military victory in the West. But the ensuing peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk revealed basic policy differences within the German camp. Richard Kühlmann, state secretary of the Foreign Office, felt that the Bolshevik victory had sufficiently crippled Russia's armed might and had thereby eased the military burden in the East. Kühlmann as well as his successor, Admiral Paul von Hintze, successfully opposed all proposals to oust the Bolsheviks. Because they both believed that Bolshevik rule would assure long-term chaos in Russia, they sought a compromise peace in the East. The Foreign Office, through the first German ambassadors to Moscow, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harff and Karl Helfferich, even extended financial aid to the Bolsheviks in order to keep them out of the Entente camp. In short, Germany's diplomats possessed a clear conception of their policies regarding the Bolsheviks and were consistent in them, desiring no armed conflict in the East but rather a concentration of military might in the West. The Army Supreme Command, and especially Ludendorff, rejected any compromise formula in the East, despite the decision of November 1917 to seek a military victory in the West. Ludendorff sought to end the war with either victory or defeat. Nonetheless, in the summer of 1918 he proved willing temporarily to accept the plan of the Foreign Office to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and "use" them to attain German goals, a decision that paralleled his original agreement in April 1917 to transport the Bolshevik leaders in Switzerland to Russia.