Suchergebnisse

The "war on terrorism" dates to the early 1990s & escalated with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, & Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Clinton administration retaliated with missile attacks on targets in Sudan & Afghanistan thought to be affiliated with the al Qaeda network. Toward the end of President Bill Clinton's second term, al Qaeda struck again, launching a suicide mission against the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration of George W. Bush launched a global campaign against Osama Bin Laden & the al Qaeda network.

Observes the lasting impact of NATO's Deliberate Force, a two-and-a-half week air campaign in September 1995 that helped to end the Bosnian War. While controversial at the time, the campaign brought lasting benefits to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and likely contributed to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO's post-Cold War transformation, and setting the foundation for a large range of non-Article 5 missions to which the Alliance is currently contributing.

Much has been written on the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its military actions in Bosnia in 1995. Very little research, however, examines the role of NATO's political leader, the secretary general, in shaping this evolution, and more specifically, on Secretary General Willy Claes' role in NATO's military strikes in Bosnia. Using a new analytical leadership model, this research maintains that Claes played a critical role, especially within NATO's North Atlantic Council and through his relations with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, to help the alliance succeed in Bosnia, and more generally, in helping NATO transform itself into an organization with new missions in transatlantic security.

Explores the legacy of Manfred Worner, NATO's seventh Secretary General since his death while in office ten years ago. Worner pursued three policy areas that are an ongoing: (1) transitioning of NATO from its Cold War policies; (2) engagement with the Soviet Union and later Russia; and (3) acceptance of new military missions beyond Alliance territory.

Much research addresses the possibility of "diversionary uses of force" by American presidents. Nearly all of it employs aggreated time-series data sets, testing for the relevance of factors such as the domestic economy's strength, public approaval ratings for the president, perceptions of the levels of "international tension," or the partisan makeup of Congress when a president uses force. Many believed that President Bill Clinton used force on Usama Bin Laden and on Iraq in 1998 to distract the public from his personal problems. In a new case study approach, this article explores four propositions regarding diversionary uses of force to examine these two Clinton military strikes. Analysis of them suggests that it is unlikely, especially in the strikes on Usama Bin Laden, that force was used for diversionary purposes.