Tax competition, tax coordination and tax harmonization: the effects of EMU
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In: Diskussionsbeiträge
In: Serie 2 283
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 11087
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We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high state and hence of receiving the bonus, whereas firms and governments are not. When governments maximize tax revenues, we show that overconfidence unambiguously reduces the bonus tax rate that governments set in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium, while increasing tax revenues. When the government objective incorporates the welfare of resident managers, however, bonus taxes also serve a corrective role and may rise in equilibrium when overconfidence is increased.
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In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 1811-1841
ISSN: 1540-5982
AbstractA core question regarding the increasing share of international trade in financial services is whether this causes banks to take more or fewer risks. We study this issue in a setting where two multinational banks engage in duopoly competition for their lending in two regional markets. Each bank affiliate can choose both the lending volume and the level of monitoring, and hence risk‐taking, where the risk of bank failure is partly borne by taxpayers in the bank affiliate's host country. Governments choose minimum capital requirements to optimally solve the trade‐off between higher lending volumes and consumer surplus, and the expected tax losses faced by taxpayers. In this setting, we consider two types of financial integration. A reduction in the transaction costs of cross‐border banking increases risk‐taking by banks, harming taxpayers and potentially overall welfare. In contrast, a reduction in the costs of screening foreign firms reduces banks' risk‐taking and is beneficial for consumers and taxpayers alike.
A core question regarding the increasing share of international trade in financial services is whether this causes banks to take more or fewer risks. We study this issue in a setting where two multinational banks engage in duopoly competition for their lending in two regional markets. Each bank affiliate can choose both the lending volume and the level of monitoring, and hence risk-taking, where the risk of bank failure is partly borne by taxpayers in the bank affiliate's host country. Governments choose minimum capital requirements to optimally solve the trade-off between higher lending volumes and consumer surplus, and the expected tax losses faced by taxpayers. In this setting we consider two types of financial integration. A reduction in the transaction costs of cross-border banking increases risk-taking by banks, harming taxpayers and potentially overall welfare. In contrast, a reduction in the costs of screening foreign firms reduces banks' risk-taking and is beneficial for consumers and taxpayers alike.
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8450
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8550
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8640
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Working paper
We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high state and hence of receiving the bonus, whereas firms and governments are not. In this setting we show that overconfidence (i) unambiguously increases the bonus component in the managers' compensation package and (ii) it reduces the bonus tax rate that governments set in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium. Hence overconfidence can contribute to explaining both the increasing role of bonus contracts and the fall in marginal tax rates for high-income earners.
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We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout guarantees. In this setting the international competition in bonus taxes may feature a \'race to the bottom\' or a \'race to the top\', depending on whether bankers are a source of net positive tax revenue or inflict net fiscal losses on taxpayers as a result of incentive pay. A \'race to the top\' becomes more likely when governments\' impose only lax capital requirements on banks, whereas a \'race to the bottom\' is more likely when bank losses are partly collectivized in a banking union.
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Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, which is inconsistent with the 'race to the bottom' in capital standards found in the literature. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give loans to firms that produce output in an integrated market. In this setting capital requirements change the pool quality of banks in each country and inflict negative externalities on neighboring jurisdictions by shifting risks to foreign taxpayers and by reducing total credit supply and output. Non-cooperatively set capital standards are higher than coordinated ones and a 'race to the top' occurs when governments care equally about bank profits, taxpayers, and consumers.
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We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout guarantees. In this setting the international competition in bonus taxes may feature a 'race to the bottom' or a 'race to the top', depending on whether bankers are a source of net positive tax revenue or inflict net fiscal losses on taxpayers as a result of incentive pay. A 'race to the top' becomes more likely when governments' impose only lax capital requirements on banks, whereas a 'race to the bottom' is more likely when bank losses are partly collectivized in a banking union.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6495
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Working paper
This paper analyzes the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Bonus taxes make incentive pay more costly for national banks and lead to an outflow of managers, lower effort and less risk-taking in equilibrium. The international competition in bonus taxes may feature a `race to the bottom', or a `race to the top', depending on whether bankers exert a positive or a negative fiscal value on their home government. The latter can arise when governments bail out banks in the case of default, and bankers take excessive risks as a result of incentive pay.
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