Suchergebnisse

The nature of tradeoffs among jobs, economic growth, & environmental quality is examined. A case study of Wisc's innovative attempt for dealing with its air pollution problems provides important insights into why particular policy instruments are selected in balancing economic & environmental objectives. The analysis reveals that there is a marked tendency for the political process to resist market mechanisms for rationing scarce environmental resources. Different policy options are evaluated, & emerging themes in the policy process discussed. 1 Table, 24 References. Modified HA

The command & control approach to government regulation of pollution is clearly not working for many problems. While the theoretical case for applying market mechanisms to control pollution as an alternative is persuasive, there are several stumbling blocks. Some key implementation issues that must be addressed in designing a marketable permit scheme are examined. The issues are brought into focus by considering a particular example -- the control of sulfur oxides emission in Los Angeles, Calif. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 11 References. HA.

AbstractWe know relatively little about the economic effects of "insignificant" rules because they are not typically analyzed. Yet, these rules could be cumulatively important. We provide an economic analysis of one proposed rule to control hazardous air pollutants, which is not considered to be economically significant. This rule is of particular interest because it is one of the first in a long series of rules that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will consider for limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions. Our analysis suggests that the proposed controls that EPA has considered are not likely to pass a benefit–cost test. We recommend that an agency base its decision to allocate additional resources to benefit–cost analysis on the expected value of the improved information. In addition, agencies should consider applying a rule of thumb that would specify a threshold level of risk reduction that needs to be achieved before some kinds of regulation are considered.

Traces the 1990-2005 history of mercury regulation to shed light on the politics and economics of environmental regulation. Highlighted is a cost-benefit analysis of power plant mercury regulation using IQ gains as measure of benefits. The 1990 amendments to the federal Clean Air Act of the George H. W. Bush administration are examined; analyses of the George W. Bush administration's EPA "cap-and-trade" proposal of 2003 indicate that costs outstrip the benefits of the regulation. The politics behind calls for mercury regulation and risk assessment are then addressed; the lack of economic efficiency in the strategic use of courts to yield outcomes is noted. In considering the cap-and trade regulation of mercury, six broad lessons are outlined; eg, framing policies too narrowly risks suboptimal responses. It is concluded that neither a command-and-control or market-based regulatory regime produce more benefits than costs.