Optimal Social Insurance and Health Inequality
In: CEGE Number 302 – February 2017
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In: CEGE Number 302 – February 2017
SSRN
Working paper
In: IZA world of labor: evidence-based policy making
ISSN: 2054-9571
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5604
SSRN
In: Journal of development economics, Band 101, S. 206-215
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 101, S. 206-215
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4235
SSRN
Working paper
In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6317
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Working paper
In: Journal of development economics, Band 95, Heft 1, S. 88-94
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 95, Heft 1, S. 88-94
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Public choice, Band 145, Heft 3-4, S. 547-569
ISSN: 1573-7101
Parties face a trade-off between motivating partisans to participate in the election and appealing to issue-oriented middle-of-the-road voters. We show that, consequently, parties may diverge from the median voters' preferred policy by sending ambiguous messages to voters which include announcements of alternative platforms. Moreover, surprisingly, an increase in the size of a partisan constituency may lead to platform convergence towards the median voters' preferred policy. We identify two conditions for this outcome. First, the electorate is sufficiently divided such that full convergence does not occur and, second, the majority of the non-partisan voters is more inclined to the party with increased support of partisans. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 145, Heft 3, S. 547-570
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 145, Heft 3-4, S. 547-569
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2235
SSRN
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 3366
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Altruistic parents may transfer resources to their offspring by providing education, and by leaving bequests. We show that in the presence of wage taxation, a small bequest tax may improve efficiency in an overlapping-generations framework with only intended bequests, by enhancing incentives of parents to invest in their children's education. This result holds even if the wage tax rate is held constant when introducing bequest taxation. We also calculate an optimal mix of wage and bequest taxes with alternative parameter combinations. In all cases, the optimal wage tax rate is clearly higher than the optimal bequest tax rate, but the latter is generally positive when the required government revenue in the economy is sufficiently high.
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