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AbstractObjectiveThis article estimates the causal effect of corruption reform on economic growth across a sample of 122 countries from 1980 to 2015.MethodsWe first identify countries that experienced large and sustained increases in corruption control, we refer this group as the treatment group. We then utilize two empirical estimation techniques to estimate the causal effect of corruption on economic growth—matching methods and a doubly robust, difference‐in‐difference, event study model.ResultsWe find that sustained corruption reform leads to dramatic increases in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Across a variety of methods, the effect at 10 years after reform is on the order of a 20 percent to 25 percent increase in average living standards.ConclusionsEven though corruption is often cited as a fundamental obstacle to economic development, lasting anti‐corruption reform is relatively rare. We find, however, that the benefits of this type of reform might be significantly higher than policymakers believe. Thus, successful reform brings a win–win outcome of less corruption and higher average incomes.

While the allocation of interest group monies to specific politicians has been extensively studied, little is known about the factors that determine of the overall level of political activity across groups. We study total contributions by corporate political action committees at the industry level. We create a large data set on industry political activity, covering 124 industries across five election cycles from 1978 to 1986 and sketch out a simple benefit-cost model to predict total corporate PAC contributions in each industry. The few previous studies of this phenomenon use relatively small samples and employ statistical techniques that are either biased or impose untested restrictions. The selectivity-corrected regression technique used here solves these problems. We find that industries with greater potential benefits from government assistance contribute systematically more but that the ability to realize these benefits is constrained by collective action problems facing firms in each industry.

Die Rolle des Geldes in der Politik, ausgegeben von unternehmerischen politischen Aktionskomitees (PACs), wird hier erneut auf der Basis von 124 politischen Aktionskomitees und deren Aktivitäten im Verlauf von mehreren Wahlzyklen (1978 - 1986) untersucht. Die Ergebnisse, offen sowohl im Definitorischen (was konstituiert ein Unternehmen), beschränkt z.T. im Methodischen und entsprechend noch zu ergänzen im Empirischen, sind insofern eindeutig, als die untersuchten Industrien Ziele verfolgen, die mit ihren Investitionsabsichten zusammenhängen, und als sie Geld nur insoweit politisch investieren, als ihnen die Politik in Richtung Investitionen günstig sein kann. Kosten und Nutzen der Political Action Committees und ihrer Ausgaben hängen zugleich davon ab, welchen Aufwands es bedarf, allgemeinen und öffentlichen Einfluß für ihre Ziele zu mobilisieren. (AuD-Nar)