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The 2014 Party reform aimed to modernise the CCP. The Politburo passed the "Action Plan for Deepening Party-building Institutional Reforms", outlining 26 concrete reforms in four key areas to be completed by 2017. Notable departures include the re-emphasis on ideological unity, the rollback on intra-party democracy, the renewed emphasis on intra-party legislation and the control on the growth of the Party's size. However there are inherent dilemmas in building a Leninist party in a globalised market economy.

The present 'honeymoon' between China and Russia is a temporary alignment of interests between them as a result of the Ukraine crisis to the west and America's 'Asian pivot' to the east of the Eurasian Continent. Such alignment does not erase their fundamental differences, but there is a danger that the West may push the two into more permanent alliance. For now, however, both are playing strategically to maximise their options and opportunities.

The powerful Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms faces three main challenges: overcome resistance from status quo interests, establish the "new norm" and make the Chinese Communist Party rule compatible with new reality. The reform package enacted at the Third Plenum will need broadbased support and active participation from the entire cadre corps. These however may not be forthcoming since these reforms tend to undermine their interests.

The new foreign policy team is more professional and with an Asian focus than its older counterpart. Although still fragmented, it may have stronger leadership and better coordination. This is critically important because China is at a defining moment as to its international role. Xi Jinping's closer ties with the military and his hands-on style may encourage assertive nationalism and more active role of the military in foreign affairs.

Has Chinese elite politics attained a level of institutionalisation that long-term stability can be expected? This article explains the six-phased cadre performance evaluation system widely adopted at local power succession process and analyses the ways in which this system was selectively used in the making of the 18th Party Central Committee. Despite the various loopholes, the system does impose some constraints on arbitrary power; its wide adoption at the lower levels and the flatter power distribution enhance its legitimacy and promotes its institutionalisation.

The spectacular fall of Bo Xilai is widely interpreted as the demise of the Chongqing model. This conclusion is however premature: it fails to see that the model is rooted in the current political system, derived from the CCP's traditions and identity, and has tremendous appeal among the poor masses given the prevalence of inequality and social injustice. Fundamental political reforms are necessary to prevent the resurgence of Maoism.

An increasing number of top executives of China's giant state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have become provincial leaders through a scheme of cadre grooming by rotating their positions. Overall, SOE executives constitute a valuable pool of human resources from which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can draw upon to promote local economic development. These CEO-turned provincial leaders inject fresh blood into the CCP's cadre corps but they also provide the bridge for state intervention in the marketplace.