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Drawing on recent liberal peace and Asian security research, this article assesses the relevance of prominent "Kantian" hypotheses for understanding the international politics of Asia. While many regional analysts' expectations about the general efficacy of international organizations for reducing conflict in Asia are confirmed, specific assertions about ASEAN and other well-known organizations do not find strong support. Although the role of regime type is often ignored in discussions of international security in Asia, there is qualified evidence for a democratic peace effect in Asia. The third leg of the Kantian triangle, international economic interdependence, does not seem consistently important for reducing conflict in Asia, even though there is a high level of trade interdependence among Asian states. In fact, higher levels of trade with China tend to increase conflict among Asian dyads including China. Asian states' relations with states outside the region conform well to liberal expectations. While the findings support the idea that Asia is to some extent "different," they also show that general Kantian and realist theories are relevant, and that common assumptions of specialists on the region are not always in accord with the regularities of conflict and peace in Asia.

Drawing on recent liberal peace and Asian security research, this article assesses the relevance of prominent "Kantian" hypotheses for understanding the international politics of Asia. While many regional analysts' expectations about the general efficacy of international organizations for reducing conflict in Asia are confirmed, specific assertions about ASEAN and other well-known organizations do not find strong support. Although the role of regime type is often ignored in discussions of international security in Asia, there is qualified evidence for a democratic peace effect in Asia. The third leg of the Kantian triangle, international economic interdependence, does not seem consistently important for reducing conflict in Asia, even though there is a high level of trade interdependence among Asian states. In fact, higher levels of trade with China tend to increase conflict among Asian dyads including China. Asian states' relations with states outside the region conform well to liberal expectations. While the findings support the idea that Asia is to some extent "different," they also show that general Kantian and realist theories are relevant, and that common assumptions of specialists on the region are not always in accord with the regularities of conflict and peace in Asia.

Competing hypotheses are tested on an extensive set of defense-burden data to determine the general factors that influence states' levels of military spending. Results provide some clear answers to longstanding questions and supply new findings that beg further investigation. When controls are introduced for domestic political and economic factors, several international factors, including alliances and rivalries, lose statistical significance. Consistent with liberal theory, regime type has a robust effect: democracies spend proportionately less on defense than other states. As implied by realism, under conditions of economic growth or high levels of wealth, "extra" resources are diverted disproportionately to the military.

Scholars and practitioners often argue that the United States' identity as a democracy contributes to the effectiveness and endurance of US military alliances. One way to test this claim is to ask: what would happen if citizens of allied countries came to perceive US democracy as severely flawed or diminished? In the context of now well-documented Russian interference in recent US elections, we examine whether Russia's election interference and its perceived impact on American democracy damage foreign public opinion about the United States. The results of our survey experiment fielded in Japan suggest that information about successful Russian election interference—that is, interference that had an impact on the election outcome—reduces foreign citizens' faith in the United States as an ally. This pattern most clearly manifests in reduced belief in the US capacity to defend Japan. Our study sheds light on the connections between the image of the United States, both as a trustworthy and effective state, and the foreign public's attitudes toward US alliances, with theoretical and practical implications.