La politique influence-t-elle les décisions publiques locales ? Analyse empirique des budgets communaux de 1977 à 2001
In: Politiques et management public: PMP, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 79-100
ISSN: 0758-1726, 2119-4831
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In: Politiques et management public: PMP, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 79-100
ISSN: 0758-1726, 2119-4831
In: Politiques et management public: PMP, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 79-100
ISSN: 0758-1726
This article aims at evaluating the influence of campaign spending on legislative vote share within a new French campaign finance law. From an empirical analysis derived from the 1997 French legislative election, we show that the electoral outcomes are sensitive to campaign spending. Using ols and 2SLS methods and taking into account the bias of endogeneity, we demonstrate that the spending of incumbent candidates have a direct and positive effect whereas the spending of their challengers have an indirect and negative effect. In the context of the implementation of a new campaign finance regulation (characterized by both spending ceiling and public repayment), this result means that financial barriers to entry into political market are not entirely reduced. In conclusion, the return of French campaign spending is not quite different from those empirically verified within the American electoral process. ; L'objet de cet article est de déterminer l'influence des dépenses de campagne sur les résultats électoraux en France. À partir d'une étude empirique fondée sur les élections législatives de 1997, nous montrons que les résultats électoraux français sont sensibles aux dépenses électorales engagées par les candidats. En effet, une fois pris en compte le biais d'endogénéité de la dépense du candidat sortant à l'aide de la méthode des doubles moindres carrés, nous montrons que les suffrages d'un député sortant sont positivement influencés par sa dépense, et négativement par la dépense des autres candidats. Ce résultat est à mettre en perspective de la nouvelle réglementation des campagnes électorales visant à réduire les barrières financières à l'entrée du marché politique. Enfin, ce résultat confirme les travaux empiriques menés aux États-Unis sur le rendement positif de l'argent dans le processus électoral.
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In: Revue économique, Band 56, Heft 5, S. 1125
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: European journal of political economy, Band 67, S. 101962
ISSN: 1873-5703
The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress
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The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
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In: Public choice, Band 176, Heft 3-4, S. 405-440
ISSN: 1573-7101
Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that institutional distance increases perceived corruption. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relation is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. It is not reducible to geographical distance. We observe similar results in other countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
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Few studies have tried to assess the empirical impact of transport cost on electoral turnout. Unfortunately, these researches suffer from different limits, especially limites related to the endogeneity of the voting station localization. Our study, based on French data, overcomes the main usual empirical difficulties. In particular, the French case provides a very valuable opportunity for testing the impact of transport cost on individual decision of turnout, because voters can be registered in another municipality than their residential municipality. As such, some of them have to travel important distance in order to cast their ballot. And this distance is totally exogenous to the electoral manipulation of places of voting location potentially made by local administration. So, we show that distance, and in fine cost of voting, have a highly significant impact on electoral turnout: at average distance (122 km) a 1% increase of distance induces a 0.05% decrease at the first round of 2012 presidential election and 0.04% at the second round. This result is robust to many tests: if we change the empirical method carried out or the election studied or if we control for the weight of the largest distance, the results remain the same. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
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In: Public choice, Band 162, Heft 1, S. 183-199
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 162, Heft 1-2, S. 183-199
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: French politics, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 69-76
ISSN: 1476-3427
International audience ; Le texte évalue les conséquences du changement de la réglementation française de 2001en ce qui concerne le cumul des mandats, qui a limité la possibilité de tenir simultanément plusieurs mandats électifs. La comparaison avant et après la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle loi permet de conclure que (i) les candidats aux élections législatives se sont adaptés aux nouvelles règles en réduisant les mandats locaux détenus; (ii) les candidats ont également montré une tendance à changer la nature des mandats exercés. Ces résultats mettent en lumière les modalités d'application de la loi qui lui donneront toute son efficacité.
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In: French politics, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 69-76
ISSN: 1476-3419
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