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The paper suggests a method to distinguish between various possible motivations (e.g. political vs economic) underlying policy implementation such as public investments. The true motivation can be revealed by modelling each policy goal, as the focus of the optimization anchoring a data envelopment analysis of the efficiency of the observed implementation. The approach is tested on Spain's land transport infrastructure policy since it is argued by many observers to be driven more by political than economic concerns. The method clearly shows that investments have generally been more consistent with a political objective (the centralization of economic power) than with an economic objective (maximizing mobility). ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms,but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms.A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) orcorruption (moral hazard). Information could improve, if independent experts assess achievementsas compared to commitments, allowing independent judges to investigate possible corruption.We find that while good experts are always beneficial as they increase transparency,the impact of the quality of judges is ambiguous. Above a threshold, with risk-averse socialplanners, good judges increase the incentive-compatible punishment of politicians, at the costof possible judiciary mistakes. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper shows how high bargaining power for firms and search costs in the labor market can impede a switch towards new, more competitive economic activities. This is because search costs drive the quality of the horizontal matching between worker types and the old and new sectors of the economy. The high bargaining power of firms pushes wages down, so that small search costs are enough for young workers or workers with new skills to give up looking for jobs in the new sector. Employers end up giving up offering these jobs as well. Politically popular labor policies protecting a dominating old sector and old workers, fail to address the mismatches and increase unemployment. Simply switching support to the new sector may cut jobs for the older workers and thus create other welfare losses. A more effective modernization policy, for both jobs and products, is to link wages to output. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

ABSTRACT***:  To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices.

This paper provides an overview of the major current debates on infrastructure policy. It reviews the evidence on the macroeconomic significance of the sector in terms of growth and poverty alleviation. It also discusses the major institutional debates, including the relative comparative advantage of the public and the private sector in the various stages of infrastructure service delivery as well as the main options for changes in the role of government (i.e. regulation and decentralization).

Für die von Entwicklungländern verfolgte Wirtschaftspolitik sind Erfahrungen anderer Drittweltländer von großer Bedeutung. Am Beispiel einiger Länder Lateinamerikas wird nachgewiesen, dass das wirtschaftliche Wachstumspotential eines Landes - neben der generell notwendigen Deregulierung - ganz entscheidend vom Zustand seiner infrastrukturellen Ausstattung abhängt. In diesem Zusammenhang wird geschätzt, dass 1% Wachstum Investitionen von 1% des BIP in die Infrastruktur der Bereiche Energie, Transport, Telekommunikation, Wasser und sanitäre Einrichtungen voraussetzt. Die Autoren legen dar, wie im Hinblick auf diese Indikatoren die Entwicklung in einigen lateinamerikanischen Staaten verlaufen ist. (DÜI-Hlb)

The main purpose of this chapter is to argue that the optimal design of regulation of water and sanitation monopolies should be the outcome of a detailed diagnostic of the institutional constraints impacting the ability of the operator - whether public or private - to deliver the services.Tailoring the regulatory processes and instruments to account for institutional and informational weaknesses stands a better chance of improving the performance of the sector than the adoption of imported standardized or pre-packaged regulatory tools. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published