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This article analyses the dramatic electoral decline of German social democracy since 2003. It argues that the SPD's decision, under the leadership of former Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, € to engage in welfare state retrenchment and labour market deregulation during the 'Hartz reforms' (2003–05) demoralised the SPD electorate. The SPD subsequently lost half of its former electoral coalition, namely blue-collar voters and socially disadvantaged groups, while efforts to gain access to centrist and middle-class voters have failed to produce any compensating gains. While the SPD's decline from a large to a mid-sized party is part of a larger transformation of the German party system, no political recovery is possible for social democracy without a fundamental change of strategy, namely efforts to regain former voters by offering credible social welfare and redistributive policies. The SPD will not be able to delegate such policies in a 'convoy model' to other parties, such as the Left Party; nor will a modest 'correction' of the earlier course, such as has been attempted since 2009 under the leadership of current party chairman Sigmar Gabriel, be sufficient to recover lost electoral ground.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Geschichte des geopolitischen Denkens in Deutschland zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (1919-1933). Im ersten Abschnitt werden einige geopolitische Grundkonzepte vorgestellt. Der zweite Teil analysiert Halford Mackinders einflussreichen Artikel (1904) über den geographischen Drehund Angelpunkt der Geschichte in Eurasien. In der dritten Sektion werden die geopolitischen Ideen von Karl Haushofer und Erich Obst als Hauptherausgebern der "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik", der wichtigsten deutschsprachigen geopolitischen Publikation der Weimarer Jahre, diskutiert. Haushofer vertrat seit 1913 das Konzept eines "ost-eurasiatischen Zukunftsblocks", d. h. einer geopolitischen Allianz Deutschlands mit Russland, Japan und möglicherweise auch China. Durch ein solches Bündnis wollte er die angelsächsischen Seemächte aus Eurasien fernhalten. Obst besaß dagegen ein negatives Russland-Bild und sah keine Perspektive für eine deutsche Ostorientierung. Diese Gegensätze in der deutschen Eurasien-Debatte der Weimarer Zeit werden dann im vierten Abschnitt am Beispiel der in der Zeitschrift für Geopolitik zwischen 1924 und 1932 veröffentlichten Beiträgen näher untersucht. Die dabei vorgebrachten Ideen, insbesondere das gegensätzliche Russlandbild der Diskussionsteilnehmer, sind auch für die Gegenwart von Bedeutung, zumal Interessengegensätze zwischen Landund Seemächten auch im 21. Jahrhundert fortbestehen. ; This study examines the history of geopolitical thinking in Germany during the Weimar Republic period (1919-1933). The first section introduces some basic geopolitical concepts. The second part analyzes Halford Mackinder's influential article 'The geographical pivot of history' (1904) in the context of his vision of Eurasian history. The third section scrutinizes geopolitical concepts of two main editors of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, namely Karl Haushofer and Erich Obst, who both edited this most significant German-language geopolitical journal during the Weimar era. Since 1913, Haushofer advocated for his strategic concept of an 'East-Eurasian bloc of the future', based on a suggested geopolitical alliance of Germany, Russia, Japan, and potentially including China. This alliance was intended to block access of the Anglo-Saxon maritime powers to the Eurasian landmass. In contrast to Haushofer, Obst advanced a negative interpretation of Russian history.He did not believe that a German geopolitical alliance with the eastern powers was promising. These conflicting views in Weimar German debates on Eurasia are further examined in the fourth part based on a case study of relevant articles published in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik between 1924 and 1932. The ideas voiced during these debates – especially major differences in the interpretation of Russian history and statehood–still have contemporary significance, not least in terms of ongoing conflicts of interest between land powers and sea powers in the 21st century. ; 이 글은 바이마르공화국 시대에 독일에서 전개된 지정학적 사고의 역사를 연구한다. 논의의 순서에 대해 말하자면, 우선 몇 가지 지정학적 기본개념을 소개한다. 이어서 유라시아에 놓여 있는 역사의 지리적 중심점에 대한 마킨더의 영향력 있는 논문(1904)을 분석한다. 그 다음 바이마르 시대에 가장 중요한 독일어권 지정학 관련 정기간행물인 "지정학논총"의 주요 발행인이었던 하우스호퍼와 옵스트의 지정학적 아이디어에 관해 논의한다. 하우스호퍼는 1913년 이래 '동․유라시아 미래블록'이라는 개념을 주장하였다. 이 개념은 러시아․일본과의 동맹을 함축하고 있었으며, 아마도 중국과의 지정학적 동맹도 역시 포함하고 있었다. 그러한 동맹을 통하여 그는 앵글로색슨 해상강국을 유라시아에서 격리시키고자 하였다. 이와는 대조적으로 옵스트는 러시아에 대하여 부정적인 견해를 갖고 있었으며 동쪽에 대한 독일의 지향에 별 다른 전망이 없다고 보았다. 그 다음 부분에서는 1924-1932년 동안 지정학논총에 게재되었던 여러 기고문을 보기로 하여 독일의 유라시아 토론에서 나타난 이와 같은 대립적인 입장에 대해 더 자세하게 논의한다. 거기서 제시된 아이디어, 특히 토의 참여자들이 러시아에 대해 갖고 있던 대립적인 심상은 오늘날에도 역시 유의미하고 중요한 것으로 보인다. 왜냐하면 21세기에도 해상강국 사이에서 이해관계의 대립이 계속 존속하고 있기 때문이다.

This article analyzes the geopolitical interests and strategy of the United States (US) in the Middle East region. The focus is placed on a case study of Syria, a state that has been outside of the US sphere of influence since the mid-1950s. Long term, mid term, and short term factors of US conduct in the region and with regard to Syria are jointly discussed. It is argued that the geopolitical writings of Nicholas J. Spykman inspired the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which suggested that the US should assume the role of single external balancer in the Middle East. This aspiration explains why US policymakers have intervened in the Syrian conflict since March 2011 using regional proxies and covert action. Such intervention points to continuity in US efforts to balance regional powers such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey against each other in order to strengthen the US geopolitical role.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Geschichte des geopolitischen Denkens in Deutschland zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (1919-1933). Im ersten Abschnitt werden einige geopolitische Grundkonzepte vorgestellt. Der zweite Teil analysiert Halford Mackinders einflussreichen Artikel (1904) über den geographischen Dreh- und Angelpunkt der Geschichte in Eurasien. In der dritten Sektion werden die geopolitischen Ideen von Karl Haushofer und Erich Obst als Hauptherausgebern der "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik", der wichtigsten deutschsprachigen geopolitischen Publikation der Weimarer Jahre, diskutiert. Haushofer vertrat seit 1913 das Konzept eines "ost-eurasiatischen Zukunftsblocks", d.h. einer geopolitischen Allianz Deutschlands mit Russland, Japan und möglicherweise auch China. Durch ein solches Bündnis wollte er die angelsächsischen Seemächte aus Eurasien fernhalten. Obst besaß dagegen ein negatives Russland-Bild und sah keine Perspektive für eine deutsche Ostorientierung. Diese Gegensätze in der deutschen Eurasien-Debatte der Weimarer Zeit werden dann im vierten Abschnitt am Beispiel der in der Zeitschrift für Geopolitik zwischen 1924 und 1932 veröffentlichten Beiträgen näher untersucht. Die dabei vorgebrachten Ideen, insbesondere das gegensätzliche Russlandbild der Diskussionsteilnehmer, sind auch für die Gegenwart von Bedeutung, zumal Interessengegensätze zwischen Land- und Seemächten auch im 21. Jahrhundert fortbestehen.

AbstractThis article outlines the rise and fall of the 'Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West' (Pegida), a right‐wing populist street movement that originated in the city of Dresden in October 2014 and peaked in January 2015. The Pegida movement combined fear of 'Islamisation' with general criticism of Germany's political class and the mainstream media. This ambivalent and largely undefined political profile proved its strength in mobilising a significant minority of right‐wing citizens in the local context of Dresden and the federal state of Saxony, but generally failed to spill over to other parts of Germany. The social profile of the Pegida movement, which included 'ordinary citizens' with centre‐right to far‐right attitudes, points to significant overlap between general disenchantment of the political centre ground in Germany with the political system, as outlined in recent sociological research, and the ability of a largely leaderless populism to mobilise in the streets.

This paper reconstructs the political history of the Syrian Arab Republic from the time of the country's emergence as an independent state in 1946 to the merger with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. Two main sources of documentary evidence are brought to add to this analysis: firstly, declassified British government sources are utilized; secondly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms exports to the Middle East is used to back up the descriptive analysis of Western strategic interests in the Middle East during the early Cold War period with some relevant quantitative data. From the beginning, Syria faced geopolitical challenges, which worked to undermine the country's political stability. Apart from intra-Arab conflicts and the issue of Zionist colonization in Palestine, Syria quickly developed into a focal point of the Cold War between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. This was due to the refusal of the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) governments to support Syria's statehood in economic and military terms. The Western rejection of substantial assistance to Syria, largely motivated by efforts to back up Israel and fully unrelated to the question of whether or not Syria was governed by democratic or authoritarian rulers, explains the country's shift toward the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s. Next, UK and US attempts to unseat Syrian governments through covert action (especially in 1949 and 1956-1957) are examined. It is shown that these events pushed Syria's leaders to opt for merger with Nasser's Egypt and military assistance from the Soviet Union in order to avoid further destabilization. The paper concludes that Western failure to welcome Syria as an independent actor in the Middle East, which was due to the existence of previous strategic alignment with competing states in the region, opened the door for the Soviet Union to emerge as the long-term patron of the Syrian state.International Relations

This paper reconstructs the political history of the Syrian Arab Republic from the time of the country's emergence as an independent state in 1946 to the merger with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. Two main sources of documentary evidence are brought to add to this analysis: firstly, declassified British government sources are utilized; secondly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms exports to the Middle East is used to back up the descriptive analysis of Western strategic interests in the Middle East during the early Cold War period with some relevant quantitative data. From the beginning, Syria faced geopolitical challenges, which worked to undermine the country's political stability. Apart from intra-Arab conflicts and the issue of Zionist colonization in Palestine, Syria quickly developed into a focal point of the Cold War between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. This was due to the refusal of the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) governments to support Syria's statehood in economic and military terms. The Western rejection of substantial assistance to Syria, largely motivated by efforts to back up Israel and fully unrelated to the question of whether or not Syria was governed by democratic or authoritarian rulers, explains the country's shift toward the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s. Next, UK and US attempts to unseat Syrian governments through covert action (especially in 1949 and 1956-1957) are examined. It is shown that these events pushed Syria's leaders to opt for merger with Nasser's Egypt and military assistance from the Soviet Union in order to avoid further destabilization. The paper concludes that Western failure to welcome Syria as an independent actor in the Middle East, which was due to the existence of previous strategic alignment with competing states in the region, opened the door for the Soviet Union to emerge as the long-term patron of the Syrian state.International Relations

Issue title: tribes & neighborhoods: the dynamics of subtlety ; This article contributes to the discussion about opportunities for and barriers to domestically-driven political reform in the Syrian Arab Republic. The argument is put forward in five sections. In the first section, relevant political science approaches analyzing the Syrian case from a domestic and global perspective are briefly discussed. The second section sketches the early political history of Syria between 1920 and 1970, while the third section explains how the regime led by Hafiz al-Assad was able to use the period after 1970 to consolidate Syrian statehood, establish a national security state, and emerge as a strong regional geopolitical player. Section four analyzes the period of the Presidency of Bashar al-Assad before the current crisis (from 2000 until March 2011). Lastly, section five discusses the recent escalation of the Syrian domestic crisis toward the largest armed conflict in the country's history. Section five also scrutinizes the domestic political reform program as advanced by the Syrian government since April 2011 (essentially the new 2012 Syrian constitution and the new multiparty system). A conclusion sums up both the theoretical and empirical arguments. ; Publisher PDF

This article outlines the rise and fall of the 'Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West' (Pegida), a right‐wing populist street movement that originated in the city of Dresden in October 2014 and peaked in January 2015. The Pegida movement combined fear of 'Islamisation' with general criticism of Germany's political class and the mainstream media. This ambivalent and largely undefined political profile proved its strength in mobilising a significant minority of right‐wing citizens in the local context of Dresden and the federal state of Saxony, but generally failed to spill over to other parts of Germany. The social profile of the Pegida movement, which included 'ordinary citizens' with centre‐right to far‐right attitudes, points to significant overlap between general disenchantment of the political centre ground in Germany with the political system, as outlined in recent sociological research, and the ability of a largely leaderless populism to mobilise in the streets.

This paper reconstructs the political history of the Syrian Arab Republic from the time of
the country's emergence as an independent state in 1946 to the merger with Egypt to form
the United Arab Republic in 1958. Two main sources of documentary evidence are brought
to add to this analysis: firstly, declassified British government sources are utilized;
secondly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms
exports to the Middle East is used to back up the descriptive analysis of Western strategic
interests in the Middle East during the early Cold War period with some relevant
quantitative data.
From the beginning, Syria faced geopolitical challenges, which worked to undermine the
country's political stability. Apart from intra-Arab conflicts and the issue of Zionist
colonization in Palestine, Syria quickly developed into a focal point of the Cold War
between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. This was due to the refusal of the
United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) governments to support Syria's statehood in
economic and military terms. The Western rejection of substantial assistance to Syria,
largely motivated by efforts to back up Israel and fully unrelated to the question of whether
or not Syria was governed by democratic or authoritarian rulers, explains the country's
shift toward the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s.
Next, UK and US attempts to unseat Syrian governments through covert action (especially
in 1949 and 1956-1957) are examined. It is shown that these events pushed Syria's leaders
to opt for merger with Nasser's Egypt and military assistance from the Soviet Union in
order to avoid further destabilization. The paper concludes that Western failure to welcome
Syria as an independent actor in the Middle East, which was due to the existence of
previous strategic alignment with competing states in the region, opened the door for the
Soviet Union to emerge as the long-term patron of the Syrian state.

This article contributes to the discussion about opportunities for and barriers to domestically-driven political reform in the Syrian Arab Republic. The argument is put forward in five sections. In the first section, relevant political science approaches analyzing the Syrian case from a domestic and global perspective are briefly discussed. The second section sketches the early political history of Syria between 1920 and 1970, while the third section explains how the regime led by Hafiz al-Assad was able to use the period after 1970 to consolidate Syrian statehood, establish a national security state, and emerge as a strong regional geopolitical player. Section four analyzes the period of the Presidency of Bashar al-Assad before the current crisis (from 2000 until March 2011). Lastly, section five discusses the recent escalation of the Syrian domestic crisis toward the largest armed conflict in the country's history. Section five also scrutinizes the domestic political reform program as advanced by the Syrian government since April 2011 (essentially the new 2012 Syrian constitution and the new multiparty system). A conclusion sums up both the theoretical and empirical arguments.