Suchergebnisse

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, good corporate governance (CG) practices among UK publicly listed firms and consequently ascertain whether board characteristics and ownership structure variables can explain observable differences in the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses one of the largest data sets to-date on compliance and disclosure of CG practices from 2008 to 2013 containing 120 CG provisions drawn from the 2010 UK Combined Code relating to 100 UK listed firms to conduct multiple regression analyses of the determinants of voluntary CG disclosures. A number of additional estimations, including two stage least squares, fixed-effects and lagged structures, are conducted to address the potential endogeneity issue and test the robustness of the findings.FindingsThe results suggest that there is a substantial variation in the levels of compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices among the sampled UK firms. The authors also find that firms with larger board size, more independent outside directors and greater director diversity tend to disclose more CG information voluntarily, whereas the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure is insignificantly related to the existence of a separate CG committee and institutional ownership. Additionally, the results indicate that block ownership and managerial ownership negatively affect voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The findings are fairly robust across a number of econometric models that sufficiently address various endogeneity problems and alternative CG indices. Overall, the findings are generally consistent with the predictions of neo-institutional theory.Originality/valueThis study extends, as well as contributes to, the extant CG literature by offering new evidence on compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG recommendations contained in the 2010 UK Combined Code following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This study also advances the existing literature by offering new insights from a neo-institutional theoretical perspective of the impact of board and ownership mechanisms on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: South Africa (SA) has pursued distinctive corporate governance (CG) disclosure policy reforms in the form of the King Reports, which require firms to disclose a set of recommended good CG practices on both shareholders and stakeholders. This paper investigates the effect of the new shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosure rules on firm value, as well as the relative value relevance of disclosing good CG practices on shareholders versus stakeholders.Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 2007, we find that disclosing good CG practices on both shareholders and stakeholders impacts positively on firm value, with the latter evidence providing new explicit support for the resource dependence theory. However, we provide additional new evidence, which suggests that disclosing shareholder CG practices contributes significantly more to firm value than stakeholder ones. Our results are robust to controlling for different types of endogeneities.Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper generally contributes to the literature on the association between disclosure of CG practices and firm value by specifically modeling the relationship within a unique institutional and CG environment. Specifically, we make two new contributions to the extant literature. First, we show how stakeholder CG disclosure practices impact on firm value. Second, we provide evidence on the relative value relevance of disclosing shareholder and stakeholder CG practices.Practical/Policy Implications: Our results have important policy and regulatory implications, especially for authorities in other developing countries facing socio‐economic problems that are currently contemplating or pursuing CG disclosure policy reforms. Since our evidence indicates that additional value can be created for firms that provide more transparent information on stakeholder CG practices, it provides authorities in other emerging countries currently planning or pursing CG reforms with a strong motivation to formally extend CG disclosure rules to cover both shareholder and stakeholder provisions.