Suchergebnisse

The liberal international order has been under heavy strain in recent years. From Brexit to Trump's presidency, its tenacity is being put to the test. The resultant commotion should be a window of opportunity for China to materially revise the existing order or establish an alternative order under its leadership. However, the puzzle that is unfolding but not yet significantly examined is that China is seemingly not taking advantage of the upheaval in the liberal international order to substantially revise the order or set up a new one. Premised on the metaphor of "following the flow," this paper argues that there is understandable rationale as to why China is appearing to ignore the opportunity to establish a China-led global order. It then explores the approach in China's posture as protector of globalization and the liberal international order. ; Peer reviewed

Discourse analysis of different languages of newspapers in Kazakhstan reveals that Kazakhstanis' views toward China and the Chinese are divided. The official discourse in both state-sponsored Russian and Kazakh newspapers is in accordance with the country's policy toward further engagement with their rising Chinese neighbor. However, negative stereotypes of China and the Chinese, as well as sinophobia, are pervasive in private Kazakh language newspapers. Private Russian newspapers have a more nuanced view toward China, with a hidden inclination toward being critical of that country and its people. Although the majority of these societal voices do not have a direct impact on changing the national policies of Kazakhstan, they are important in the sense that Kazakhstan's ruling elite must continue to gauge social views and to placate differences in order to secure the stability and legitimacy of the regime. ; Peer reviewed

The increase of Sino-African interactions in trade, aid and investments has attracted Chinese tourists to Africa. The Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) outlines China's cultural diplomacy in Africa, delineating a number of areas of cultural cooperation: education; press, publishing and media; and tourism and people-to-people exchange programs in academia and think tanks among young people, women and athletes. Though scholars of International relations (IR) have detected that tourism is one way of manifesting soft power, they do not feel comfortable nor ready to place the promotion of tourism into standard IR discourse. This is in contrast to scholars of tourism studies who have recognized the political nature of China's outbound tourism, particularly to less-developed areas such as Africa. In this paper, we have argued that the Chinese government uses outbound tourism to perform its perceived relationship with African countries; that is, Beijing aspires to be seen as a benign rising power willing to help weaker countries develop and establish harmonious ties. It is hard to separate the economic and cultural functions of outbound tourism, each of which reinforces the other, although not without limits. We find that not all African countries' national tourism policies are capable of, or willing to prioritize, attracting Chinese tourists. Moreover, we find that South Africa is most active in working with public relations companies in China to promote South Africa as a tourist destination.

This review article summarises the literature on the relations between states and their diaspora. Policy makers are struggling to know how best to respond to and possibly harness the potential of kindred communities abroad. The article outlines a wide spectrum of policy initiatives and categorises them into three groups: economic, political and socio-cultural. Five economic, four political and two social-cultural factors are discussed as are the wide variety of implementation strategy evident in different jurisdictions. Though the concentration is on Asia, examples are chosen worldwide. Academically, the article identifies empirical and conceptual deficiencies in studies on diaspora strategies. ; Non peer reviewed

With the problems of doping in sport becoming more serious, the World Anti-Doping Code was drafted by the World Anti-Doping Agency in 2003 and became effective one year later. Since its passage, the Code has been renewed four times, with the fourth and latest version promulgated in January 2015. The Code was intended to tackle the problems of doping in sports through cooperation with governments to ensure fair competition as well as the health of athletes. To understand China's strategies for managing compliance with the Code and also the implications behind those strategies, this study borrows ideas from theories of compliance. China's high levels of performance in sport, judged by medal success, have undoubtedly placed the country near the top of the global sports field. Therefore, how China acts in relation to international organizations, and especially how it responds to the World Anti-Doping Agency, is highly significant for the future of elite sport and for the world anti-doping regime. Through painstaking efforts, the researchers visited Beijing to conduct field research four times and interviewed a total of 22 key sports personnel, including officials at the General Administration of Sports of China, the China Anti-Doping Agency, and individual sport associations, as well as sport scholars and leading officials of China's professional sports leagues. In response to the World Anti-Doping Agency, China developed strategies related to seven institutional factors: 'monitoring', 'verification', 'horizontal linkages', 'nesting', 'capacity building', 'national concern' and 'institutional profile'. As for the implications, the Chinese government is willing and able to comply with the World Anti-Doping Agency Code. In other words, the Chinese government is willing to pay a high price in terms of money, manpower and material resources so that it can recover from the disgrace suffered as a result of doping scandals in the 1990s. The government wants to ensure that China's prospects as a participant, bidder and host of mega sporting events are not compromised, especially as the host of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing.

This paper was published in the journal International Review for the Sociology of Sport and the definitive published version is available at https://doi.org/10.1177/1012690218805402. ; With the problems of doping in sport becoming more serious, the World Anti-Doping Code was drafted by the World Anti-Doping Agency in 2003 and became effective one year later. Since its passage, the Code has been renewed four times, with the fourth and latest version promulgated in January 2015. The Code was intended to tackle the problems of doping in sports through cooperation with governments to ensure fair competition as well as the health of athletes. To understand China's strategies for managing compliance with the Code and also the implications behind those strategies, this study borrows ideas from theories of compliance. China's high levels of performance in sport, judged by medal success, have undoubtedly placed the country near the top of the global sports field. Therefore, how China acts in relation to international organizations, and especially how it responds to the World Anti-Doping Agency, is highly significant for the future of elite sport and for the world anti-doping regime. Through painstaking efforts, the researchers visited Beijing to conduct field research four times and interviewed a total of 22 key sports personnel, including officials at the General Administration of Sports of China, the China Anti-Doping Agency, and individual sport associations, as well as sport scholars and leading officials of China's professional sports leagues. In response to the World Anti-Doping Agency, China developed strategies related to seven institutional factors: 'monitoring', 'verification', 'horizontal linkages', 'nesting', 'capacity building', 'national concern' and 'institutional profile'. As for the implications, the Chinese government is willing and able to comply with the World Anti-Doping Agency Code. In other words, the Chinese government is willing to pay a high price in terms of money, manpower and material resources so that it can recover from the disgrace suffered as a result of doping scandals in the 1990s. The government wants to ensure that China's prospects as a participant, bidder and host of mega sporting events are not compromised, especially as the host of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing.

Tianditu is China's first state-sponsored web mapping service. Beijing considers Tianditu part and parcel of its burgeoning endeavor to build a 'digital China'. The Chinese state created Tianditu to regain some of the ground lost when its monopoly on geographic information was effectively broken. This effort goes hand in hand with Beijing's intention to compete with and shrink the space occupied by Google mapping services (Google Maps, Google Earth, etc.). Although Tianditu does bestow a certain degree of power on civilian users to interact with and explore geographic data, for political and social reasons the Chinese state tightly controls Tianditu. It is a tool that the regime uses to maintain political power and push ideologies it supports. This type of top-down reinforcement of static geographic knowledge is a far cry from the concept of civilian empowerment as understood in liberal democracies.

AbstractThis article reveals that the pan-blue camp has traditionally enjoyed a stable regional stronghold in eastern and certain parts of northern Taiwan. The pan-green camp was scattered but grew to form a considerable southern bloc from 1998 to 2000. Ethnic distribution can partially explain this geographical variation.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the History of Sport on 17 Oct 2016, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2016.1243103 ; Football is among the world's most popular sports. It is also one which China has sought to develop in the field of global professional sport. Nevertheless, the professionalization of football in China has not to date actually improved China's Olympic achievement in the sport. In stark contrast to the glory of being the country that won most gold medals at the 2008 Olympics, China's poor football performance has been troublesome for the country's leader. In 2009, newly elected Xi Jin-Ping made a public statement about promoting elite football and expressed his personal hope that China would be capable of both qualifying for the final stages and winning the FIFA World Cup. With such concern on the part of the state leader, attention turned to football, with many private enterprises beginning to echo government policy by demonstrating a willingness to promote elite football. In addition, to accelerate football development, the Chinese government promised to take action on the separation of government and football associations. Research on this process was based on the theoretical framework of state corporatism derived from the work of Schmitter (1974). Semi-structured interviews were conducted as the method of data collection aimed at helping us understand how Chinese government either integrated or controlled relevant stakeholders such as NGOs and private enterprises, and further, to discuss the interactions between them.

This study explores issues on post-adoption services in intercountry adoptions based on the perspectives of adoption professionals from Taiwan and Australia. Findings revealed that both birth and adoptive families identify service needs for material and emotional support and connection after the adoption process is finalized. However, the current lack of government funding for post-adoption services result in gaps in service delivery. Adoption agencies experience challenges in funding and balancing the interests of the child and the two families. Implications for practice and policy are discussed to enhance the quality of post-adoption services and improve the well-being of the adoption triad.