Suchergebnisse

This article argues that a theory of recognition cannot provide the comprehensive basis for a critical theory or a conception of social justice. In this respect, I agree with Fraser's impulse to include more in such a theory, such as distributive justice and participatory parity. Fraser does not go far enough, to the extent that methodologically she seeks a theory of the same sort as Honneth's. Both Honneth's and Fraser's comprehensive theories cannot account for a central phenomenon of contemporary societies: domination as structural exclusion rather than tyranny or the lack of parity. This phenomenon shows that at the very least freedom (rather than merely justice or recognition) ought to remain central to any critical theory of globalization. Most of all, both theories fail to provide a way to decide whether democratic practices can produce justice. A pluralist and pragmatic form of critical theory is thus superior to any comprehensive normative theory.

I argue that transnational democracy provides the basis for a solution to the problem of the "democratic circle"—that in order for democracy to promote justice, it must already be just—at the international level. Transnational democracy could be a means to global justice. First, I briefly recount my argument for the "democratic minimum." This minimum is freedom from domination, understood in a very specific sense. Employing Hannah Arendt's conception of freedom as "the capacity to begin," the form of nondomination sufficient for the democratic minimum is the capability to initiate deliberation and thus democratic decision-making processes. My point in developing this argument further concerns the political form of a transnational polity: its citizens enjoy the democratic minimum as members of variousdemoi. In the case of the European Union, this leads to a potential for democratic domination. I call this thedemoiproblem, a difficulty that holds for any multilevel polity, for bounded as well as transnational political communities. Second, I argue that such domination is overcome so long as the capacity to initiate deliberation is distributed among various units and various levels. The democratic minimum could fail to obtain not only because individuals or groups are dominated by nondemocratic means, but also because they are dominated democratically to the extent that the demos of one unit lacks the normative power to initiate deliberation and thus is subordinated to others.

The European Union stands before a constitutional moment. While some deny the need for a constitution and others want a familiar federal form, I argue that one of the main goals of the constitutional convention ought to be to make the European Union more democratic. The central question is: what sort of democracy is suggested by some of the more novel aspects of European integration? This question demands a normative standard by which to evaluate the realization of democracy in transnational polities. Along republican lines, the proper standard is nondomination. With this normative framework in mind, the problem that the constitution has to solve is juridification, or the possibility of legal domination where there is no unified sovereignty. The solution to this problem of legal domination requires that the constitution institute a reflexive legal order best realized in a deliberative federalism appropriate to a polycentric and diverse polity. Finally, the institutions of this federalism ought also to be characterized through their distinctive form of inquiry, which, borrowing from Gerald Ruggie, I call 'multiperspectival'. In a transnational polity with multiple demoi, such a democracy is best realized through dispersed and plural forms of authority and in a differentiated institutional structure anchored in a reflexive constitution.

Examines the innovative potential of the Internet for democracy as applied to deliberative transnationalism, asserting, however, that this public sphere requires innovative institutions. Keeping in mind deliberative democracy, a conceptual clarification of the conditions for a public sphere is provided. It is contended that for the public sphere to exist in large & highly differentiated modern societies, technological mediation of public communication is needed; this necessitates finding indirect & mediated alternatives to the public sphere as face-to-face public forum. Dialogue, when it can expand & transform the conditions of communicative interaction, is taken as a key feature of any public sphere. How computer-mediated communication extends the forum is then addressed in terms of how the Internet, with its many-to-many communicative potential, can fulfill the requirements of publicity. The Internet opens a space for a "distributive," ie, a transnational public of publics, rather than unified public sphere with new forms of interaction; the public sphere becomes decentered, where the Internet becomes a public sphere only through agents who engage in reflexive & democratic activity, ie, dialogue, with the defining characteristic that all participants can propose & incur mutual obligations. This reflexive agency would foster the creation of software capable of turning networks into publics using the distributive processes of communication to transcend space & time limitations inherent in national public spheres & state forms. However, some remarks are offered on whether the Internet has the capacity to escape the manner in which state sovereignty organizes space & time, highlighting the thought of Will Kymlicka. The European Union is taken as a case study to explore the democratic deficit of transnational & international institutions, focusing on proposals indicative of how a polycentric form of publicity night allow a more directly deliberative form of governance. Considered in closing is whether the kind of public sphere generated in transnational politics might spur new institutional forms of democracy that confront the problems of time and space concomitant with global democracy, eg, collective identity. 26 References. J. Zendejas