The Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part 2—Effect of Damage Caps
In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 639-669
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In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 639-669
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In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 612-638
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In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 173-216
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A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares. A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered to explain shareholder passivity. According to a new "political" theory of corporate governance, financial institutions in the United States are not naturally apathetic but rather have been regulated into submission by legal rules that – sometimes intentionally, sometimes inadvertently – hobble American institutions and raise the costs of participation in corporate governance.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 15392
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In: Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper Forthcoming
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Working paper
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Working paper
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Working paper
In: International Review of Law and Economics, 2019
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Working paper
In: International review of law and economics, Band 42, S. 203-218
ISSN: 0144-8188
In: Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-19
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In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 605-656
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In: As published in 2012 Columbia Business Law Review, pp. 427-501
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 162, Heft 1, S. 5
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of Public Economics, Band 229
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