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The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons grew by 24 per cent between 2002-2006 and 2007-11. The five largest suppliers in 2007-11 -- the USA, Russia, Germany, France and the UK -- accounted for three-quarters of the volume of exports. Outside the five largest arms suppliers, China and Spain recorded significant increases in the volume of deliveries during 2007-11. While China's exports are likely to continue to grow, Spain's order book for ships -- which account for the bulk of its exports -- indicates that it will not maintain its volume of exports. States in Asia and Oceania received nearly half of all imports of major conventional weapons in 2007-11. Moreover, the five largest recipients of major conventional weapons -- India, South Korea, Pakistan, China and Singapore -- were all located in the region. Major importers are taking advantage of the competitive arms market to seek attractive deals in terms of financing, offset arrangements and the transfer of technology. India, which received 10 per cent of all imports in 2007-11, is likely to remain the largest recipient of major conventional weapons in the coming years. Adapted from the source document.

The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons in 2006-10 was 24 per cent higher than in 2001-2005, continuing the upward trend. The United States and Russia were the largest exporters of major conventional weapons in 2006-10, accounting for 53 per cent of the volume of exports. Countries in Asia were their largest recipients. Economic and foreign policy considerations continued to play a central role in their respective decisions on arms exports. The US Administration has made proposals to reform its export controls to prevent arms and technology from reaching adversaries and to better facilitate transfers to allies. Russia's decision in 2010 to cancel the delivery of S-300 air defence systems to Iran is significant for its reputation as a 'reliable' supplier. The major recipient region in 2006-10 was Asia and Oceania (accounting for 43 per cent of imports of major conventional weapons), followed by Europe (21 per cent) and the Middle East (17 per cent). India was the largest recipient of major conventional weapons in 2006-10, pushing China into second place. South Korea (6 per cent), Pakistan (5 per cent) and Greece (4 per cent) were the other largest recipients. Although India and Pakistan have both imported large quantities of weapons to counter external security threats, internal security challenges are currently the most pressing issue for Pakistan and also a source of much concern in India. India is the target of intense supplier competition for billion-dollar deals, in particular for combat aircraft and submarines. Pakistan relies on US military aid and Chinese soft loans for most of its acquisitions. Both countries are likely to remain major recipients in the coming years. Member states of the European Union are obliged to apply criteria relating to conflict prevention when making decisions on export licence applications. A framework has been elaborated for EU members to harmonize interpretation of these criteria, along with those applying to human rights and economic development. However, during 2006-10 divisions among EU member states on the interpretation of criteria relating to conflict prevention have been particularly evident with regard to Israel, Georgia and Russia. Differences between EU members relate in large part to the long-standing arms trade and security ties with certain states, as well as national security and economic interests more generally. Adapted from the source document.

Holtom, P.: ...: International arms tranfers. - S. [285]-305 The suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons, 2005-2009. - S. [306]-318 Bromley, M.: The financial value of arms trade, 1999-2008. - S. [319]-321 Bromley, M.; Holtom, P.: Transparency in arms transfers. - S. [322]-332

The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons continues to increase. The average annual level for the period 2005-2009 was 22 per cent higher than the annual average for 2000-2004. The United States and Russia remained by far the largest exporters, followed by Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Together these five countries accounted for 76 per cent of the volume of exports for 2005-2009. Although the dominant position of the first-tier suppliers, the USA and Russia, is unlikely to be challenged in the near future, the second-tier of arms suppliers is growing in number. The major recipient region for the period 2005-2009 was Asia and Oceania, followed by Europe and the Middle East. The major recipient countries for 2005-2009 were China, India, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Greece. Asian and Middle Eastern countries are expected to remain among the world's largest importers Israel, Singapore and Algeria were not among the 10 largest arms importers for the period 2000-2004 but ranked sixth, seventh and ninth for 2005-2009. Recent arms acquisitions by certain states in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa and South East Asia suggest that a pattern of reactive arms acquisitions is emerging, that could develop into regional arms races. In recent years concerns have been expressed that regional rivals Algeria and Morocco are engaged in an 'arms race'. SIPRI data shows that the overwhelming majority of arms transfers to North Africa for the period 2005-2009 were destined for Algeria. However, in recent years Morocco has placed significant orders for combat aircraft, missiles and naval vessels. Although it is unlikely that these acquisitions in themselves will lead to conflict, they do not help to improve relations between the two countries. Furthermore, their acquisitions are likely to influence Libyan plans. Iraq continues to rely on the USA for the provision of equipment to rebuild its armed forces, but has also received arms from Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Turkey. Its ambitious procurement plans have been hit by the economic crisis and declining oil prices. Nevertheless, the timetable for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq lends a sense of urgency to international efforts to provide Iraq with the arms and military equipment it seeks to meet its perceived internal and external security needs. Adapted from the source document.

There has been an almost 50% increase in the volume of major conventional arms transfers over the past four years, reversing a downward trend after 1997. The USA and Russia were the largest suppliers in the five-year period 2002-2006, each accounting for around 30% of global deliveries. Exports from European Union (EU) members to non-EU countries accounted for just over 20% of global deliveries. Because of its very limited internal market, the Russian arms industry remains heavily dependent on exports -- most newly produced weapons in Russia are exported -- to maintain an arms industry and fund development of new weapons and technology. This limits the possibility that Russia will exercise restraint in its arms exports. The arms industries of the USA and EU members are in general far less export dependent. China and India remained the largest arms importers in the world. Also among the top 10 importers were five Middle Eastern countries. While much media attention was given to arms deliveries to Iran, mainly from Russia, deliveries from the USA and European countries to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were significantly larger. Especially worrisome are deliveries of long-range conventional strike systems to these states and the effects this may have on regional stability. Because the development of large weapon systems is becoming increasingly costly, nearly all countries have become or soon will become dependent on other countries for weapons or weapon technology. This could lead to mutual dependency -- as in US-Europe relations -- or to one-sided dependency, as is the case for most developing countries. Some countries may be unwilling to accept dependency or be unable to access arms and technology. They may try, at high economic cost, to become autonomous in arms production or may focus on relatively cheap alternative weapons such as weapons of mass destruction, or war-fighting strategies such as terrorism and IT warfare. The problem of controlling state supplies of weapons to rebel groups, while not new, was highlighted in 2006 by the arsenal acquired by Hezbollah from Iran and used in its war with Israel, and by serious breaches by state actors of the UN arms embargo on Somalia. Transparency in arms transfers, which in the 1990s saw significant improvement, with more and better national export reports, has remained stagnant in the past few years. Adapted from the source document.

Governments are increasingly aware that controlling flows of conventional arms and items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes -- dual-use items -- is a complex process involving regulation of exports and associated brokering, transit, trans-shipment and financing activities. This complexity requires effort and cooperation from countries around the world. States, therefore, engage in various multilateral mechanisms and continually create or adapt instruments to address these challenges. Adapted from the source document.

With the exception of some promising progress in South America and in South Eastern Europe, in 2011 most developments in conventional arms control were discouraging as states were not willing to modify national positions in order to facilitate agreement, either globally or regionally. Three factors have contributed to the difficulty of developing conventional arms control. First, the huge and sustained investment that the USA has made in its military power has made it impossible to find solutions based on balance. Second, technological developments have blurred the picture of which capabilities will confer military power now and in the future. Third, the lack of agreed rules about the use of force -- which may be for ostensibly constructive purposes and not only a defensive response to aggression -- makes countries reluctant to give up military capabilities even if there is a humanitarian argument in favour of restraint. Adapted from the source document.

Transparency is commonly understood as the release of information by governments. A review of the availability of quantitative data on a multinational level about the arms life cycle 'from development to destruction', shows that government openness is not sufficient to provide the information required by representative institutions, the media and the public at large. Such openness is a prerequisite for democratic control and for the accountability of government actions at the national and international levels. However, transparency is relative. The value of information depends on features such as availability, reliability, comprehensiveness, comparability and disaggregation. Data rarely meet all these requirements for each phase of the acquisition cycle. There are variations between countries in the definitions that determine what they include and exclude in their reported data. The problem of definition is increasing, while the activities of arms producers remain partly beyond the control of the citizens of the countries where they operate. The dual-use nature of many current innovations in science and technology is making it both more important and harder to pin down and compare the financial commitment to specifically military research and development. The lack of internationally agreed definitions, or adherence to existing definitions, poses obvious problems for international comparisons. There is no systematic, reliable, valid and global -- or in most cases, even regional -- set of quantitative data on the arms life cycle. Persistent government preferences for secrecy are part of the explanation, as illustrated by the limited transparency in national arms inventories in general and in nuclear and biological weapons in particular. Although some progress has been made since the late 1960s towards greater transparency in nuclear arsenals, there remain large uncertainties about global inventories of nuclear weapons and weapon -- usable fissile material. For biological weapons, transparency could even be decreasing. More positive trends have been noted regarding data on chemical weapons, military expenditure and arms transfers. Destroyed chemical weapons as well as remaining stockpiles are reported as part of multinational agreements. Increasing transparency in arms transfers is partly the result of public demand and of governments' willingness to release more and better data. Data on military expenditure -- an important share of public finance in many countries -- have become, among other things, part of the policy debate about development assistance, and the changing character of threats and armed conflicts has also increased the demand for data on internal security expenditure and on the balance between expenditure for internal and external security. Such demands come not only from governments and their development assistance agencies, but also from foreign investors and non-governmental organizations. The Small Arms Survey illustrates the increasing political relevance of small arms and light weapons. However, the existence of national forces and stocks of weapons abroad, as well as access to foreign bases, makes it hard to keep track of the exact size and deployment of national inventories at a given time, let alone to assess operational military capability in a particular regional setting. Making the whole life cycle 'from development to destruction' transparent will call for major additional resources. Meeting that demand is a challenge to all governments and other organizations that count public transparency among their highest aims. Adapted from the source document.