Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe rational choice model of politics, which construes important political processes as a series of choices taken by self-interested political actors, has dominated theorizing on the subject of policy instruments in Canada. While useful, this approach is nonetheless limited by its narrow conception of rationality and its inattention to the context of instrument choice. As an alternative, the neo-institutional approach offers a perspective on political choice that takes better account of contextual and organizational factors. In this article, the logic of both approaches is used to explain the policy process in the case of automobile insurance in Ontario. The purpose of this exercise is exploratory, not confirmatory. Both approaches do, in fact, offer plausible explanations for the creation of a rate review board, the retention of fault-liability as the basis of compensation and the apparent rejection of public automobile insurance. However, the study concludes that it is essential that research strategies in the realm of instrument choice incorporate insights from the neo-institutional approach.

ABSTRACT. THE RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL OF POLITICS, WHICH CONSTRUES IMPORTANT POLITICAL PROCESSES AS A SERIES OF CHOICES TAKEN BY SELF-INTERESTED POLITICAL ACTORS, HAS DOMINATED THEORIZING ON THE SUBJECT OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN CANADA. WHILE USEFUL, THIS APPROACH IS NONETHELESS LIMITED BY ITS NARROW CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY AND ITS INATTENTION TO THE CONTEXT OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, THE NEO-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH OFFERS A PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL CHOICE THAT TAKES BETTER ACCOUNT OF CONTEXTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS. IN THIS ARTICLE, THE LOGIC OF BOTH APPROACHES IS USED TO EXPLAIN THE POLICY PROCESS IN THE CASE OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN ONTARIO. THE STUDY CONCLUDES THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT RESEARCH STRATEGIES IN THE REALM OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE INCORPORATE INSIGHTS FROM THE NEO-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH.

AbstractDo we need a code of conduct for politicians, or are the existing unwritten rules a sufficient safeguard against acts of political malfeasance? Based on interviews with 84 backbench MPs, this article examines politicians' informal codes of conduct. The study reveals considerable disagreement in assessments of particular acts, notably those involving conflicts of interest and constituency service. Differences among MPs are related to a number of factors including partisanship, political experience and spatial cleavages. Such divisions of opinion belie the presence of a single elite political culture of corruption and underline the need for a code of conduct to clarify and augment such unwritten rules as presently exist.

Is a code of conduct for politicians needed in Canada, or are the existing unwritten rules a sufficient safeguard against acts of political malfeasance? Based on interviews with 84 backbench members of parliament (MPs), politicians' informal codes of conduct are examined. The data reveal considerable disagreement in assessments of particular acts, notably those involving conflicts of interest & constituency service. Differences among MPs are related to a number of factors including partisanship, political experience & spatial cleavages. Such divisions of opinion belie the presence of a single elite political culture of corruption & underline the need for a code of conduct to clarify & augment such unwritten rules as presently exist. 4 Tables. HA

Based on a survey of 84 Canadian members of parliament, on whether the existing unwritten rules are a sufficient safeguard against acts of political malfeasance. Reviews some of the difficulties involved in evaluating political corruption; presents a set of allegedly corrupt acts, ranked by degree of corruptness; compares responses of MPs to this ranking.

Preface -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: political institutions and public policy -- Industrial policy options in a changing global context -- Industry structure, business dominance, and industrial policy -- State tradition, bureaucratic culture, and industrial policy -- Policy networks and sector strategies -- The political economy of international expansion: telecommunications manufacturing -- The political economy of domestic expansion: pharmaceuticals -- The political economy of transition: petrochemicals and meat processing -- The political economy of retrenchment: textiles, clothing, and dairy products -- Conclusion: the state and policy options -- Appendix.

AbstractIt has been argued that rapid membership turnover in the Canadian House of Commons robs the institution of a dedicated and experienced group of MPs and produces a Parliament stocked with political amateurs. Both electoral defeat and voluntary retirement have been seen to play a role in the amateurism phenomenon. The authors explore the roots of amateurism and critically examine the argument that a frustrating career structure in the House of Commons encourages voluntary vacancies. Using a random sample of former MPs, the authors find support for both a "frustration" and an "exhaustion" model of career choice. The article concludes that while amateurism—in the sense of short political careers—may be problematic, not all MPs are amateurs and the problem of amateurism cannot be addressed simply by satisfying frustrated ambition.