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When Alice in Wonderland wonders which way she should take, the Cheshire Cat responds that it depends on where she wants to go! Researchers and policy-makers considering a country's long-term development path also have to know where they want to go. Typically, they seek to determine the realistic growth potentials for a country's economy and how to reach them, and identify the key assets that could make the country competitive and the economic sectors that should be prioritised to drive structural change. Most critically, they have to find out how to reconcile narrow goals regarding com­petitive­ness and productivity with broader goals related to social inclusive­ness and environmental sustainability. The challenge is to design a methodology for evidence-based anticipation of future competitive advantages that merit industrial policy measures. The sectors that could create viable growth must be understood. Identifying a country's competitive advantage in five to 10 years presents a thorny methodological challenge and a complex set of factors to consider, including: avail­able domestic resources, institutional capabilities, production costs relative to other countries, geographic conditions, the country's position within the global trade and investment system (including expected changes in relevant regulatory regimes), and also long-term shifts towards new technological domains. More often than not, the analytical, conceptual and institutional preconditions for such an exercise exceed the capabilities of developing countries and constitute a core area of advisory services provided by develop­ment cooperation partners. Against this backdrop, we explore three aspects of possible methodologies: 1. The strengths and weaknesses of various contempo­rary methodologies, all of which fail to include im­portant determinants of future competitive ad­van­tages. Since they do shed light on various comple­men­tary aspects, however, we suggest combining them to create a more complete picture of emerging opportunities. 2. The growing role of disruptive structural change. We are already confronted with radical and rapid structural change that impacts virtually all economic sectors and disrupts the prevailing techno-economic trajectory (seemingly the case for both decarboni­sation and digitalisation). What are the method­logical implica­tions for predicting future competitive advantages? We recommend a stronger emphasis on using 'open' qualitative forecasting methods. 3. Evidence-based approaches for measuring compete­tiveness and anticipating its future direction must be embedded into a political economy framework that connects analytical tools to societal objectives and accounts for the different imple­mentation capabilities of various countries. Essentially, we argue that there is no 'silver bullet' method­o­logy for predicting emerging patterns of competitiveness. However, a variety of tools can be used to reduce the number of promising options and inform policy-makers about how to exploit emerging opportunities.

To avoid irreversible damage to global ecosystems, new "green" technologies are needed. Some of those are still far from commercial maturity. In such cases, governments may create temporary rents to make investments "artificially" attractive. The creation of such rents, however, involves risks of misallocation and political capture. This article looks at rent management in the case of India's National Solar Mission. So far, the mission has been remarkably effective in triggering solar investments and keeping the necessary subsidies manageable through a process of competitive reverse bidding for tariffs. Moreover, policy design and implementation showed a good deal of experimentation and learning. Some risks remain, especially regarding the enforceability of renewable energy quotas at the level of Indian states. On the whole, however, first experiences indicate that "green rents" have been managed in a fairly effective way. Tobias Engelmeier is Managing Director of BRIDGE TO INDIA Pvt. Ltd. (http://www.bridgetoindia.com/), a consultancy focused on the Indian solar market.

Many traditional aid recipient countries have recently also become donors of development aid. In particular, anchor countries such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Thailand are increasingly providing aid programs for needier developing countries. In some cases, however, this masks trade and political interests to a greater extent than in the case of donors belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).Various among these New Donors direct inquiries to OECD countries for carrying out joint development projects in third countries or for receiving support in building up their own donor institutions. OECD donors have a clear interest in integrating these New Donors into a democratic and multilateral world order. From this point of view, the assumption of international responsibility displayed by the New Donors through their engagement can only be welcomed. On the other hand, this engagement should also be aligned with the international donor consensus, especially as set forth in the MDG Agenda and the Paris Declaration of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC ) of the OECD. This is currently not the case with all New Donors. Particularly China – which, along with some of the Gulf States, is by far the most important donor outside the DAC – is often criticised both for its unconditional support of countries with bad governance records and for its tied aid.Then how should established DAC donors react to inquiries for trilateral development cooperation made by the New Donors? New Donors who already align their policies with the consensus principles should be invited to joint projects in third countries – provided that the required management costs and efforts remain within reasonable limits for all concerned. An important aim here is to convey good donor standards and experience to the emerging donor institutions.In order to also engage the other New Donors for DAC principles, open dialogue should be upheld and indirect cooperation should be offered.

Viele traditionelle Empfänger von Entwicklungshilfe engagieren sich neuerdings zugleich als Geber. Insbesondere Ankerländer wie China, Indien, Brasilien, Mexiko, Südafrika und Thailand unternehmen zunehmend eigene Anstrengungen zugunsten ärmerer Entwicklungsländer, wobei dieses in einigen Fällen deutlich stärker als bei Gebern der Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) von außenwirtschaftlichen und politischen Eigeninteressen überlagert wird. Viele Neue Geber richten Anfragen an OECD-Partner, um gemeinsam mit diesen Entwicklungsprojekte in Drittländern durchzuführen oder beim Aufbau eigener Geberinstitutionen unterstützt zu werden. OECD-Geber haben ein Interesse daran, die Neuen Geber in die gemeinschaftliche Gestaltung einer demokratischen multilateralen Weltordnung einzubinden. Daher ist die Übernahme internationaler Verantwortung, welche die Neuen Geber durch ihr Engagement zum Ausdruck bringen, zu begrüßen. Allerdings sollte sich dieses am internationalen Geberkonsens, wie er insbesondere in der MDG-Agenda und der " Paris Declaration " des Development Assistance Committees (DAC) der OECD niedergelegt ist, orientieren. Dies ist nicht bei allen Neuen Gebern der Fall. Insbesondere China – neben einigen Golfstaaten der mit Abstand wichtigste Geber außerhalb des DAC – wird wegen seiner unkonditionierten Unterstützung einiger Länder mit schlechter Regierungsführung und seiner Lieferbindung kritisiert. Wie sollen etablierte DAC-Geber auf die Anfragen Neuer Geber reagieren? Denjenigen Neuen Gebern, die sich an den Konsensprinzipien orientieren, sollten gemeinsame Projekte in Drittländern angeboten werden, sofern der Steuerungsaufwand für alle Beteiligten vertretbar ist. Dabei ist ein wichtiges Ziel, den neu entstehenden EZInstitutionen Erfahrungen und bewährte Standards zu vermitteln. Um auch die übrigen Neuen Geber langfristig für die DAC-Prinzipien zu gewinnen, können verschiedene Dialog- und indirekte Kooperationsmaßnahmen angeboten werden.