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THE HISTORY OF THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT OF 1817, WHICH LIMITED WARSHIPS ON THE GREAT LAKES, PROVIDES EXAMPLES OF MANY OF THE PROBLEMS THAT CAN OCCUR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES. THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT WAS VIOLATED, SUBJECTED TO PROPORTIONAL RESPONSES, THREATENED WITH UNILATERAL REINTERPRETATION AND ABROGATION, MODIFIED BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, AND VIOLATED AGAIN. ALTHOUGH IT PROVED HARD TO KILL, THESE SUCCESSIVE TRAUMAS COMPROMISED ITS PURPOSE AND VALUE. INDEED, CONTINUAL THREATS AND VIOLATIONS WORSENED THE RANCOR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. TODAY, WHAT INFLUENCE IT HAS FLOWS MAINLY FROM ITS SYMBOLISM; ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENT REMAINS IN FORCE, NONE OF ITS ORIGINAL PROVISIONS IS CURRENTLY OBSERVED.

Canada's international treaty obligations have featured prominently in Privy Council and Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on Parliament's power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada (POGG). How treaties ought properly to be used in determining Parliament's POGG jurisdiction is a constitutionally fraught question. The federal executive cannot be permitted to extend Parliament's legislative jurisdiction by making promises to foreign states. Yet the existence of treaty obligations is undoubtedly relevant to the question of whether a given subject has become a matter of national concern. In the upcoming Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act references, the Supreme Court of Canada will confront this problem again. This article seeks to explain how courts may properly use international agreements in POGG cases. Les obligations du Canada en vertu des traités internationaux ont occupé une place importante dans la jurisprudence du Conseil privé et de la Cour suprême du Canada concernant le pouvoir du Parlement d'adopter des lois pour la paix, l'ordre et le bon gouvernement du Canada. La question de savoir comment les traités doivent être utilisés pour déterminer la compétence du Parlement en ces matières est une question d'ordre constitutionnel. L'exécutif fédéral ne peut être autorisé à étendre la compétence législative du Parlement en faisant des promesses à des États étrangers. Pourtant, l'existence d'obligations conventionnelles est sans aucun doute pertinente pour déterminer si un sujet donné est devenu un sujet d'intérêt national. La Cour suprême du Canada sera à nouveau confrontée à ce problème lors des prochains renvois relatifs à la Loi sur la tarification de la pollution causée par les gaz à effet de serre. Le présent article cherche à expliquer comment les tribunaux peuvent utiliser correctement les accords internationaux dans les affaires relatives aux lois pour la paix, l'ordre et le bon gouvernement.

By virtue of state sovereignty, states exercise authority over all persons and things within their territories. This includes individuals suspected of committing or charged with crimes in foreign states. International law generally imposes no obligation to surrender individuals suspected of or charged with committing crimes in foreign states. Fugitives may only be returned when an agreement exists between the states concerned. As such, states are increasingly ratifying international treaties mandating cooperation to ensure that individuals responsible for certain categories of crimes are brought to justice. It is worth noting that some of these states lack extradition treaties with each other. For example, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) which mandates that they cooperate with each other in ensuring that crimes related to corruption are prosecuted. However, there is no extradition treaty between South Africa and the UAE. In these circumstances, a question arises as to whether they can they rely on the UNCAC to extradite individuals for corruption-related crimes. If they can, what is the nature of the international obligation entrenched under the UNCAC? Overall, what is the standing of international treaty clauses on extradition for states without extradition treaties?

This paper examines countries' free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and, second, countries do not have complete information about other countries' non-compliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own non-compliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries' probability of joining the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries' compliance, and decreasing in the cost of not complying with the initial terms of the agreement. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, however, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]