Privacy, Voyeurism, and Statutory Interpretation
In: Criminal Law Quarterly, Forthcoming
1873 Ergebnisse
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In: Criminal Law Quarterly, Forthcoming
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In: Idaho Law Review, Band 54, Heft 1
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In: 37 Seattle University Law Review 939
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In: UCLA Law Review, Band 66, Heft 2
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We are moving ever more surely and deeply these days into an age of legislation. In the past, judge-made law was the dominant feature, as it was also the matrix, the fundamental and pervasive stuff, of our legal system. Statutes were scattered islands in the ocean of common law. For some time they were regarded by the courts as peculiar incursions on the system, troubling the harmony of caselaw patterns. A legislative enactment was seen, in the words of the late Chief Justice Stone, as an "alien intruder in the house of the common law." But change has come and is currently at work at an astonishing pace. The islands of legislation have become much more numerous; they have become archipelagoes in some areas. The islands have grown in size; some are almost continents. What once seemed a peculiar incursion has become normal and pervasive. Statutes can no longer be regarded as intruders. As more and more common law is displaced, overlaid or supplemented, the system is becoming legislative in character.
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We are moving ever more surely and deeply these days into an age of legislation. In the past, judge-made law was the dominant feature, as it was also the matrix, the fundamental and pervasive stuff, of our legal system. Statutes were scattered islands in the ocean of common law. For some time they were regarded by the courts as peculiar incursions on the system, troubling the harmony of caselaw patterns. A legislative enactment was seen, in the words of the late Chief Justice Stone, as an "alien intruder in the house of the common law." But change has come and is currently at work at an astonishing pace. The islands of legislation have become much more numerous; they have become archipelagoes in some areas. The islands have grown in size; some are almost continents. What once seemed a peculiar incursion has become normal and pervasive. Statutes can no longer be regarded as intruders. As more and more common law is displaced, overlaid or supplemented, the system is becoming legislative in character.
BASE
We are moving ever more surely and deeply these days into an age of legislation. In the past, judge-made law was the dominant feature, as it was also the matrix, the fundamental and pervasive stuff, of our legal system. Statutes were scattered islands in the ocean of common law. For some time they were regarded by the courts as peculiar incursions on the system, troubling the harmony of caselaw patterns. A legislative enactment was seen, in the words of the late Chief Justice Stone, as an "alien intruder in the house of the common law." But change has come and is currently at work at an astonishing pace. The islands of legislation have become much more numerous; they have become archipelagoes in some areas. The islands have grown in size; some are almost continents. What once seemed a peculiar incursion has become normal and pervasive. Statutes can no longer be regarded as intruders. As more and more common law is displaced, overlaid or supplemented, the system is becoming legislative in character.
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In: 122 Columbia Law Review 213 (2022)
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In: University of Chicago Law Review, Band 79, S. 1215
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Statutory interpretation involves the reconstruction of the meaning of a legal statement when it cannot be considered as accepted or granted. This phenomenon needs to be considered not only from the legal and linguistic perspective, but also from the argumentative one - which focuses on the strategies for defending a controversial or doubtful viewpoint. This book draws upon linguistics, legal theory, computing, and dialectics to present an argumentation-based approach to statutory interpretation. By translating and summarizing the existing legal interpretative canons into eleven patterns of natural arguments - called argumentation schemes - the authors offer a system of argumentation strategies for developing, defending, assessing, and attacking an interpretation. Illustrated through major cases from both common and civil law, this methodology is summarized in diagrams and maps for application to computer sciences. These visuals help make the structures, strategies, and vulnerabilities of legal reasoning accessible to both legal professionals and laypeople
Statutory interpretation involves the reconstruction of the meaning of a legal statement when it cannot be considered as accepted or granted. This phenomenon needs to be considered not only from the legal and linguistic perspective, but also from the argumentative one - which focuses on the strategies for defending a controversial or doubtful viewpoint. This book draws upon linguistics, legal theory, computing, and dialectics to present an argumentation-based approach to statutory interpretation. By translating and summarizing the existing legal interpretative canons into eleven patterns of natural arguments - called argumentation schemes - the authors offer a system of argumentation strategies for developing, defending, assessing, and attacking an interpretation. Illustrated through major cases from both common and civil law, this methodology is summarized in diagrams and maps for application to computer sciences. These visuals help make the structures, strategies, and vulnerabilities of legal reasoning accessible to both legal professionals and laypeople.
In: East European quarterly, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 465-488
ISSN: 0012-8449
Foundations -- The modern principle -- Textual meaning -- Contextual meaning -- Legislative history and intent -- Purpose -- Temporal applications -- Administrative decision-making and judicial review (by Matthew Lewans) -- Canadian constitutional interpretation (by Eric M. Adams).
In: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/246176
Considers whether UK legislation that is identified as being "constitutional" should be interpreted in a special way and, if so, what interpretative techniques should be used. Discusses the approaches used to interpret ordinary legislation and how constitutional provisions are interpreted in other jurisdictions. Examines the House of Lords judgment in Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the correct interpretation of the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 on the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly. ; This is the author's accepted manuscript and will be under embargo until the 30th of June 2015. The final version is published by Sweet & Maxwell in Law Quarterly Review (http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?productid=7116&recordid=473).
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