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The goal of this original and relevant book is to provide a complete overview, exposition, and evaluation of the interplay among bank behavior, market structure, and regulation. It also considers implications for a variety of public policy issues.

Morality indicates what is the 'right' and what is the 'wrong' way to behave. It is one of the most popular areas of research in contemporary social psychology, driven in part by recent political-economic crises and the behavioral patterns they exposed. In the past, work on morality tended to highlight individual concerns and moral principles, but more recently researchers have started to address the group context of moral behavior. In Morality and the Regulation of Social Behaviour: Groups as moral anchors Naomi Ellemers builds on her extensive research experience to draw together a wide range of insights and findings on morality. She offers an essential integrative summary of the social functions of moral phenomena, examines how social groups contribute to moral values, and explains how groups act as 'moral anchors'. Her analysis suggests that intra-group dynamics and the desire to establish a distinct group identity are highly relevant to understanding the implications of morality for the regulation of individual behaviour. Yet, this group-level context has not been systematically taken into account in research on morality, nor is it used as a matter of course to inform attempts to influence moral behavior. Building on social identity and self-categorization principles, this unique book explicitly considers social groups as an important source of moral values, and examines how this impacts on individual decision making as well as collective behaviours and relations between groups in society.

This book provides an evaluation of the industrial organization of banking with a focus on the interrelationship among bank behavior, market structure, and regulation. It addresses a wide range of public policy topics, including bank competition and risk, international banking, antitrust issues, and capital regulation. New to this edition, which has been updated throughout, is a broadened consideration of alternative theories of competition among banks, which includes discussions of such issues as the implications of large increases in bank reserve holdings in recent years, effects of nonprice competition through quality rivalry, analysis of mixed market structures involving both large and small banks, and international interactions of banks and policymakers. The intent of the book is to serve as a learning tool and reference for graduate students, academics, bankers, and policymakers seeking to better understand the industrial organization of the banking sector and the effects of banking regulations.

The Guangdong Province Regulation to Reward and Protect Persons of Courageous Behavior emerged after the Foshan hit-and-run incident in 2011. This translation serves as a source of reference on the newly enacted legislation. The regulation was enacted on November 29, 2012 and is now in effect as of January 1, 2013. This translation is based on Bulletin No. 89 issued December 20, 2012 by the 11th Standing Committee of the People's Congress of Guangdong Province.

The Beijing Municipal Regulation to Reward and Protect Persons of Courageous Behavior was enacted on April 21, 2000, and has been in force since August 1, 2000. This translation serves as a source of reference for context on the similar emerging legislation in Guangdong province. The translation is based on Beijing Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee Bulletin No. 21.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony provides information on two important tools state insurance regulators use to oversee the market activities of insurance companies--market analysis and market conduct examinations. Market analysis is generallly done in the state insurance departments. It consists of gathering and integrating information about insurance companies' operations in order to monitor market behavior and identify potential problems at an early stage. Market conduct examinations, which are generally done on site, are a review of an insurer's marketplace practices. The examination is an opportunity to verify data provided to the department by the insurer and to confirm that companies' internal controls and operational processes result in compliance with state laws and regulations. Specifically, this testimony focuses on (1) the states' use of market analysis and examinations in market regulation, and (2) the effectiveness of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) efforts to improve these oversight tools and encourage the states to use them."

Motivation: This article studies the behavior of the Czech Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) Committee during the years between 2013–2018. This institution assesses RIAs of new laws and regulations which are in the process of ratification. Aim: The main aim was to find if the legislative change of February 3, 2016 had a direct impact on the decision-making of the Committee. Further, we ask whether there are other distinct patterns in the behavior of Czech RIA Committee members. Specifically, do the RIA Committee's verdicts become more negative with time? We also investigate the level of independence of the Committee. In our analysis we used basic statistics: Chi-Square test of independence and regression analysis. To complete our study, we used data from a questionnaire which was distributed among RIA Committee members. Results: In our analysis we found that the legislative change did not have a direct immediate effect on the RIA Committee of the Czech Republic. However, we discovered that the RIA Committee has lost most of its independence and power in the six years of its existence. This change was gradual and most likely catalyzed by pressure from politicians. Further, voting per rollam yielded more positive results. We also discovered an institution whose RIA Committee verdicts differed significantly. Based on the findings of our research, we offer recommendations to the RIA Committee and other institutions with a similar purpose.

Motivation: This article studies the behavior of the Czech Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) Committee during the years between 2013–2018. This institution assesses RIAs of new laws and regulations which are in the process of ratification. Aim: The main aim was to find if the legislative change of February 3, 2016 had a direct impact on the decision-making of the Committee. Further, we ask whether there are other distinct patterns in the behavior of Czech RIA Committee members. Specifically, do the RIA Committee's verdicts become more negative with time? We also investigate the level of independence of the Committee. In our analysis we used basic statistics: Chi-Square test of independence and regression analysis. To complete our study, we used data from a questionnaire which was distributed among RIA Committee members. Results: In our analysis we found that the legislative change did not have a direct immediate effect on the RIA Committee of the Czech Republic. However, we discovered that the RIA Committee has lost most of its independence and power in the six years of its existence. This change was gradual and most likely catalyzed by pressure from politicians. Further, voting per rollam yielded more positive results. We also discovered an institution whose RIA Committee verdicts differed significantly. Based on the findings of our research, we offer recommendations to the RIA Committee and other institutions with a similar purpose.

A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares. A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered to explain shareholder passivity. According to a new "political" theory of corporate governance, financial institutions in the United States are not naturally apathetic but rather have been regulated into submission by legal rules that – sometimes intentionally, sometimes inadvertently – hobble American institutions and raise the costs of participation in corporate governance.

Legislators in developed countries are loss‐averse and hesitant to make regulatory changes to accommodate new technologies, fearing destruction of a system that works.