Suchergebnisse

Turunçgiller yüksek C vitamini içeriği nedeniyle sağlık açısından önem taşıyan, farklı kullanım alanlarına sahip olup severek tüketilen önemli bir meyve grubunu oluşturmaktadır. Dünya'da üretim miktarı çok yüksek olan bu türlerde hasat döneminde görülen meyve dökümleri ciddi ölçüde ürün kayıplarına yol açmaktadır. Ürünün geç dönemde pazara sunulması ve gelirin bu doğrultuda artışını sağlamak amacıyla meyvelerin ağaç üzerinde muhafaza edilmesi yaygın ve pratik uygulama olarak görülmektedir. Ancak bu aşamada, meyve dökümleri ve kalite kayıpları ile ilgili sorunlar ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bazı bitki büyüme düzenleyici maddelerin belirli dönemlerde ve dozlarda ağaçlara uygulanması ile meyve dökümleri önemli derecede azaltılabilmektedir. Böylece kalite özellikleri korunarak daha geç dönemlerde hasat mümkün olabilmektedir. ; Citrus are of an important fruit group consumed with well-liked different uses and importance in terms of health due to its high vitamin C content. in these species, that the production amount is very high in the world, the fruits drop in the harvest period leads to serious product losses. It is common and practical application on-tree storage of fruit in order to present the product to the market in the late period and to increase the income. However, at this stage, problems arise with fruit drop and quality losses. in this context, fruit drops can be reduced significantly by applying some the plant growth regulators to trees at specific periods and doses and it is possible to harvest in later periods with maintaining quality characteristics.

Using U.S. Consumer Expenditure Surveys, we estimate "quality Engel curves" for 66 durable goods based on the extent richer households pay more for each good. The same data show that the average price paid rises faster from 1980 to 1996 for goods with steeper quality Engel curves, as if households are ascending these curves. BLS prices likewise increase more quickly for goods with steeper quality Engel curves, suggesting the BLS does not fully net out the impact of quality upgrading. We estimate that annual quality growth averages 3.7 percent for our goods, with 2.2 percent showing up as higher inflation. (JEL D12, O40, E31)

AbstractUsing a vertically differentiated product model, the paper aims to investigate the effects of economic growth on market provision of product quality. The quality attribute considered is the environmental friendliness of products. Economic growth is modeled as a shift in income distribution. It shows that the effect of economic growth depends on the form it takes. A growth in income that is uniform across consumers improves the cleanup levels adopted by both firms. However, a growth in income that is accompanied by changes in income inequality may result in the lowering of one of the two qualities. More specifically, if the growth in income is accompanied by increased disparities in income distribution, the quality of the (environmentally) inferior variant is reduced. This has serious implications for the poor consumers if the product has safety or health hazards. The paper suggests a regulatory measure to prevent such deterioration in the quality of the inferior variant.

This study empirically examined the relationships between institutional quality and inclusive growth as measured by the real GDP per person employed (RGDPE) in Nigeria. An Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Boundstesting approach to cointegration was employed using annual secondary time series data from 1998 to 2017. The data were sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria's statistical Bulletin, National Bureau of Statistics' final Accounts, IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs). The study concluded that institutional quality had a significant effect on inclusive growth in Nigeria. It is therefore recommended that institutional improvement beyond the present liberal democratic threshold is much needed to effectively harness the human capital resource base. The Nigerian government should adopt a labour-intensive development strategy such that poor active households are comprehensively integrated into productive activities for optimal value-chain finance-growth inclusiveness. This would address the protracted tripartite socio-economic problems of poverty, inequality and unemployment in line with Lin's comparative advantage conforming hypothesis. e. This would enhance formulating and implementing employment growth-oriented policies that are compatible with the society's resources endowment and developmental goals.

We analyze the dynamic interaction between civil society organizations and Government in a representative developing economy. Government favors corruption and so fails to build efficient institutions. On its side, civil society exerts pressure on Government to constrain it to halt corruption. We distinguish between an authoritarian Government and an unrestrictive one: the latter does not repress society's protests while the former implements punishment mechanisms. We demonstrate analytically the existence of a unique stable equilibrium by solving a linear quadratic differential game for three Regimes respectively the optimal control problem, noncooperative and cooperative games. Numerical assessment indicates that civil monitoring always increases as corruption increases, but civil monitoring is low and institutions improve much faster under cooperation. Furthermore, total factor Productivity effects always dominate the detrimental effect of civil monitoring on growth in the first regime, under some restrictions in the second and never in the third. In response to a change in the government's aversion to rent variations in the presence of authoritarian government, total factor productivity effects always dominate under both the noncooperative and cooperative scenario.

We analyze the dynamic interaction between civil society organizations and Government in a representative developing economy. Government favors corruption and so fails to build efficient institutions. On its side, civil society exerts pressure on Government to constrain it to halt corruption. We distinguish between an authoritarian Government and an unrestrictive one: the latter does not repress society's protests while the former implements punishment mechanisms. We demonstrate analytically the existence of a unique stable equilibrium by solving a linear quadratic differential game for three Regimes respectively the optimal control problem, noncooperative and cooperative games. Numerical assessment indicates that civil monitoring always increases as corruption increases, but civil monitoring is low and institutions improve much faster under cooperation. Furthermore, total factor Productivity effects always dominate the detrimental effect of civil monitoring on growth in the first regime, under some restrictions in the second and never in the third. In response to a change in the government's aversion to rent variations in the presence of authoritarian government, total factor productivity effects always dominate under both the noncooperative and cooperative scenario.

There are two innovations in the paper as compared to the previous literature on democracy and growth. First, we consider not only the level of democracy, but also changes in this level in the 1970s-1990s as measured by increments of Freedom House political rights indices. Second, the distinction is made between democracy and law and order (order based on legal rules); the latter is measured by the rule of law, investors' risk and corruption indices. We discuss two interconnected threshold hypotheses: (1) in countries where law and order is strong enough, democratization stimulates economic growth, whereas in countries with poor law and order democratization undermines growth; (2) if democratization occurs under the conditions of poor law and order (so that illiberal democracy emerges), then shadow economy expands, quality of governance worsens, and macroeconomic policy becomes less prudent. We adduce a number of stylized facts to support our hypotheses. However our econometric findings are mixed: we report results that support the hypotheses as well as regressions that contradict them.

The work aims at clarifying how the growth mindset plays a vital role in quality management at the Islamic school. As an active response towards industrial revolution 4.0, an Islamic school is faced with complex external challenges, from the issue of radicalism, anti-multiculturalism to tight competitiveness with the public (general) school. An Islamic school tends to feel satisfied with the output that school graduates are Al-Quran memorizers, while the school seems to ignore the input and process. At the same time, the government has stipulated the regulation dealing with national education standards being followed by educational stakeholders. Eight national educational standards become a reference in Islamic school quality management. The school is urged to provide human resources to meet the requirements. Library research was intensively carried out. Growth mindset becomes an essential basis in Islamic schools in developing quality concern as a total quality management philosophy requires continuous improvement tradition. Without a growth mindset in quality management at Islamic schools, quality improvement and school competitiveness are difficult to reach. This manuscript employed some theoretical references, such as mindset and quality.

The effect of decentralisation on regional economic growth is a hotly debated topic. In theory, decentralisation should entail welfare benefits by bringing government closer to the people. In practice, the benefits of decentralisation have been hard to prove. A problem is that the quality of regional governments is often lacking, or at least varies widely across different regions. Hence, regional governments may not be capable of delivering public goods in an efficient and accountable manner. Previous analyses have, however, neglected how the benefits of decentralisation may depend on the quality of the regional government whose authority is strengthened by such reforms. This paper considers these two dimensions in conjunction, highlighting that the effect of decentralisation on economic performance is highly mediated by the quality of the devolved government. Using panel data for 223 regions in the EU, the results show that the quality of regional government is a better predictor of economic development than decentralisation. Regional government quality also conditions the economic returns to decentralisation, meaning decentralisation works best in regions with a higher quality of government. Accordingly, decentralisation reforms must consider the quality of the regional government to which they would devolve authority. ; Decentralisation, quality of government and economic growth ; publishedVersion

Several factors have often been noted to explain the poor performance of the CEMAC economies. In addition to the traditional factors of economic growth, institutional variables are crucial in explaining the growth of countries. This paper aimed at investigating the relationship between institutional quality and economic growth using neo-institutional theory and neoclassical theory of growth. First difference and system Generalized Method of Moments are applied on the six countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community for the period of 1996 to 2014. All the coefficients of the institutional variables are positive except for the quality of regulation and control of corruption. There is a positive and significant relationship between political stability and economic growth in CEMAC zone. This study recommends that political stability should be reinforced for an increase in the economic growth of the CEMAC zone.