Suchergebnisse

Abstract Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties' chances of winning an election, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens' preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes and consequences of PECs in Finland where elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form joint lists. We present descriptive evidence showing that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. PECs increase small parties' chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. They can thus enable a broader representation of citizens' policy preferences.

AbstractPre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties' chances of winning an election, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens' preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes and consequences of PECs in Finland where elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form joint lists. We present descriptive evidence showing that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. PECs increase small parties' chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. They can thus enable a broader representation of citizens' policy preferences.

We evaluate the causes and consequences of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). In Finland, local elections use a proportional representation system with open lists, and parties may form joint lists. We document that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using both difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs we document that voters punish coalescing parties, especially if they are ideologically diverse, and also respond to PECs by targeting personal votes strategically within the PECs. Moreover, small parties become more likely to acquire political leadership positions. Finally, PECs seem to be formed also with the particular purpose of influencing the overall distribution of political power: they lead to more dispersed seat distributions and prevent absolute majorities in close elections. Thus, voter ideology and electoral rules create natural boundaries for the parties, but the party formateurs also consider wider impacts.

AbstractThis article explores the question of why coalition partners negotiate and publish coalition agreements before entering into a cabinet and why the content of these agreements varies so widely. Some scholars suggest that coalition partners draft agreements for electoral purposes, while others suggest that coalition agreements can be used to commit to policy negotiations. Although both sides of the debate have uncovered supportive evidence, the literature remains in disagreement. This article provides new organisation of previous work on agreements and develops two alternative theoretical arguments about the crafting of coalition agreements. It is argued here that coalition partners consider both electoral and policy motivations during the drafting of agreements and that the dominance of one of these motivations is conditional on the degree of issue saliency and division between partners. Empirical support is found for the theoretical argument that coalition partners include low saliency issues in the coalition agreement on policy dimensions on which they are less divided, and that coalition partners include high saliency issues in the coalition agreement on policy dimensions on which they are more divided.

International audience ; The proliferation of mixed-member electoral systems has progressively led scholars to abandon the dichotomy between majoritarian and proportional systems. Among these numerous variants of these mixed systems, electoral systems with majority bonus remain overlooked and not well understood, not least because of the absence of systematic empirical comparison between them. France and Italy offer are among the few countries which have implemented mixed-member electoral systems with majority bonus at several levels of elections. In a preliminary empirical investigation on mixed-member electoral systems with majority bonuses, this study deals with the recent regional elections in France and Italy, in which such systems are used, focusing specifically on the matter of pre-electoral coalition formation, and on the political consequences of these systems. Two main aspects are studied. Firstly, what are the effects of the bonus arrangements on the probability and on the configuration of pre-electoral coalitions among parties? Secondly, what are the types of agreements reached in case of coalition formation? Does the well known 'Gamson law' of proportional sharing hold in such a context? It appears that these pre-electoral coalitions in such systems tend to lead to surplus coalitions in order to secure the bonus, and to a fairly proportional distribution of seats compared to votes, regardless of competitiveness or of the size of the larger parties. Levels of fragmentation are somehow linked to the constestability of the election both in France and Italy.

International audience ; The proliferation of mixed-member electoral systems has progressively led scholars to abandon the dichotomy between majoritarian and proportional systems. Among these numerous variants of these mixed systems, electoral systems with majority bonus remain overlooked and not well understood, not least because of the absence of systematic empirical comparison between them. France and Italy offer are among the few countries which have implemented mixed-member electoral systems with majority bonus at several levels of elections. In a preliminary empirical investigation on mixed-member electoral systems with majority bonuses, this study deals with the recent regional elections in France and Italy, in which such systems are used, focusing specifically on the matter of pre-electoral coalition formation, and on the political consequences of these systems. Two main aspects are studied. Firstly, what are the effects of the bonus arrangements on the probability and on the configuration of pre-electoral coalitions among parties? Secondly, what are the types of agreements reached in case of coalition formation? Does the well known 'Gamson law' of proportional sharing hold in such a context? It appears that these pre-electoral coalitions in such systems tend to lead to surplus coalitions in order to secure the bonus, and to a fairly proportional distribution of seats compared to votes, regardless of competitiveness or of the size of the larger parties. Levels of fragmentation are somehow linked to the constestability of the election both in France and Italy.