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Some people, we may call them realists, endorse the priority thesis. This thesis says political reasons (distinct from moral, prudential, aesthetic, economic, and other kinds of reason) have normative priority whenever we assess political situations. Any putative political reasons, I argue, must satisfy an autonomy condition and an identity condition. I argue that no realist account of political reasons shows such reasons are distinct and autonomous as of yet. One account, the practice-based account, may have the wherewithal to show political reasons are distinct. I also say some things about the relations between identity, autonomy, and priority.

In the recent study of international relations, political realism has, apparently, had as many supporters as detractors. Nonetheless, there seems to be a growing tendency to treat the categories of political realism as if they were passing the way of all flesh, destined to be replaced by system theory, transnationalism, Marxist structuralism, critical theory or whatever. One difficulty with this judgement is that political realism is not a single theoretical entity which can be refuted by single disconfirming instances. Nor is it an understanding of the subject rooted in the views of such well-known exponents of this school as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson, Martin Wight, Sir Herbert Butterfield, E. H. Carr or Raymond Aron. On the contrary, political realism is a conception of politics which stretches back to the great Indian thinker Kautilya and in fact constitutes a many-mansioned tradition of thought about international relations. Three aspects of that tradition are examined in this essay: Common-sense Realism, Concessional Realism and neo-Aristotelian Realism. These reflections are only very tangentially related to the debates in the 1950s and 1960s concerning realism. This essay focuses, rather, on certain neglected features of contrasting philosophies of science. The article concludes, somewhat tentatively, that neo-Aristotelian Realism is coherent and cogent and superior in important respects to what scientific empiricism has to offer.

ALTHOUGH POLITICAL REALISM IS OFTEN UNDERSTOOD AS A MORE OR LESS HOMOGENEOUS TRADITION FIXED ON CERTAIN ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS, JOHN HERZ'S PROVOCATIVE PIECE PROMPTS AN ATTEMPT TO EXAMINE REALIST SCHOLARSHIP IN A WAY THAT REVEALS SOME DEEP ANTINOMIES: SOME INTERNAL TENSIONS THAT MAKE REALIST SCHOLARSHIP AN OPEN-ENDED DIALOGUE.

Political realism is frequently criticised as a theoretical tradition that amounts to little more than a rationalisation of the status quo and an apology for power. This paper responds to this criticism by defending three connected claims. First, it acknowledges the moral seriousness of rationalisation, but argues that the problem is hardly particular to political realists. Second, it argues that classical International Relations realists like EH Carr and Hans Morgenthau have a profound awareness of the corrupting effects of rationalisation and see realism as an antidote to this problem. Third, it proposes that Carr and Morgenthau can help us to recognise the particular ways in which realist arguments may nonetheless rationalise existing power relations and affirm the status quo by default, if not by design.

A full understanding of political realism is needed, Kenneth Thompson writes in the preface of his recent study, "if American statesmen and scholars are to advance public understanding and awareness of the realities of international life and close the gap between what leaders feel and do and what the people imagine they do. Therefore the central aim I have had in mind is a careful explication, first, of the origins of political realism as an approach to American foreign policy, and, secondly, of its implications for the major unsolved problems of America's relations with the rest of the world" (p. vii).

This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. We defend the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory's groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem, we combine insights from theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Critical Theory, and analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology and social construction. The upshot is an account of realism as empirically informed critique of social and political phenomena. We reject a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so provide an alternative to the anti-empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.

Abstract
Despite often being condemned for having a paradigmatically unrealistic or dangerous conception of power, Plato expends much effort in constructing his distinctive conception of power. In the wake of Socrates' trial and execution, Plato writes (in Gorgias and Republic I) about conventional (Polus', Polemarchus'), elitist (Callicles'), and radically unethical (Thrasymachus') conceptions of power only to 'refute' them on behalf of a favoured conception of power allied with justice. Are his arguments as pathetic or wrong-headed as many theorists make them out to be – from Machiavelli to contemporary political realists, from 'political' critics of Plato ranging from Popper to Arendt? And if not, has our understanding of power been impoverished? This question has been surprisingly unasked, and it is one I address by asking Plato and his critics: What are the dialectical moves Plato makes in refuting Socrates's opponents and constructing his own conception of legitimate (i.e., just) power? Exactly how does he interweave his conception of power with a kind of ethics? How does it compare to recent conceptions of political realism and the power-politics/ethics relationship – e.g., after Marx and Foucault? While addressing these questions I also attend to the issue of Plato's historicity: to what extent do the limits of his language and world affect our reading of Plato and his political critics? Ultimately, I argue that and how Plato's conception of power and its political dimensions realistically have much to teach us that we have not learned.

THIS SECTION DISCUSSES THE NON-CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF THE POLITICAL IDEA OF A COMMON SECURITY AMONG NATIONS. THE IDEA DECLARES THAT NATIONS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE MUST BE GIVEN A HIGHER PRIORITY THAN THE ASSERTION OF IDEOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL POSITIONS. PROPONENTS OF COMMON SECURITY ARE LOOKING FOR A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN POLITICAL REALISM AND POLITICAL IDEALISM. COMMON SECURITY WILL NEED A DUAL STRATEGY OF WAYS TO REGULATE POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND ARMS CONTROL.