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MANY RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE DECLINE OF PARTY ARE PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE DUVERGER/SOCIALIST MASS-PARTY MODEL IS THE ONLY MODEL FOR PARTIES. THE AUTHORS CONTEND THAT THIS ASSUMPTION IS MISCONCEIVED, THAT THE MASS-PARTY MODEL IS ONLY ONE, TEMPORALLY LIMITED AND CONTINGENT MODEL, AND THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DIFFERENTIATE NOTIONS OF ADAPTATION AND CHANGE FROM NOTIONS OF DECLINE OR FAILURE. FOLLOWING AN ANALYSIS OF HOW VARIOUS MODELS OF PARTY CAN BE LOCATED IN TERMS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE, THE AUTHORS CONTEND THAT THE RECENT PERIOD HAS WITNESSED THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MODEL OF PARTY, THE CARTEL PARTY, IN WHICH COLLUDING PARTIES BECOME AGENTS OF THE STATE AND EMPLOY THE RESOURCES OF THE STATE (THE PARTY STATE) TO ENSURE THEIR OWN COLLECTIVE SURVIVAL. FINALLY, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT THE RECENT CHALLENGE TO PARTY IS IN FACT A CHALLENGE TO THE CARTEL THAT THE ESTABLISHED PARTIES HAVE CREATED FOR THEMSELVES.

Almost thirty years ago Nicholas Mansergh concluded that the political parties in Northern Ireland did not fulfill the needs of the political system: that (to put his statement in more contemporary terms) the input functions, particularly that of political socialization, were enfeebled to the extent that one party constituted a permanent government while the other became an equally permanent opposition. What is more, underlying the party system and within the political society itself there existed no consensus on fundamentals: "There is no residue of political beliefs—as in Great Britain and the Free State—acceptable to both parties."

Many recent discussions of the decline of party are predicated on the assumption that the Duverger/socialist mass-party model is the only model for parties. We contend that this assumption is misconceived, that the mass-party model is only one, temporally limited and contingent model, and that it is necessary to differentiate notions of adaptation and change from notions of decline or failure. Following an analysis of how various models of party can be located in terms of the relationship between civil society and the state, we contend that the recent period has witnessed the emergence of a new model of party, the cartel party, in which colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival. Finally, we suggest that the recent challenge to party is in fact a challenge to the cartel that the established parties have created for themselves.

Political discontent appears to be growing across the aging democratic world, with an increase in popular support in many nations for niche or populist parties. Although often connected to this declining support for mainstream parties and the rise of these competitors, it is unclear precisely what is contributing to this diminishing political trust across varying electorates. This dissertation suggests that political discontent may be driven by parties failing to represent voters, a possibly long standing behavior, first envisaged by Katz and Mair (1995) in the form of the cartel party theory. The cartel party theory suggests that as party systems mature, party behavior ultimately undermines representative connections with voters, with parties becoming increasingly reliant on their relationship with the state and their rivals to maintain their positions in government. If cartelistic behaviors have emerged, it is expected that parties will show broken voter-party linkages and increased collusive relationships with rival parties, thus limiting competition, while undermining representation. Furthermore, the issues that are presented to voters across elections should show signs of manipulation, meaning that parties should fail to respond to voters while coordinating to manipulate their issue positions with their rivals. These two central expectations have guided the following research, testing whether parties appear to be colluding with their rivals and disregarding voter sentiments and if the issue spaces that are presented to voters remains representative or manipulated, as suggested by the cartel party theory. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), this work tests whether voter-party linkages appear intact across the left/right issue dimension, multidimensional issues, and party types. The findings suggest that mainstream parties are colluding with their rivals to limit inter-party competition, while ...

Procedural cartel theory states that the majority party exerts influence over legislative outcomes through agenda control. This research tests predictions from the party cartel theory in five state legislatures. I assess party influence through comparison of term‐limited and nonterm‐limited legislators. I argue that term‐limited legislators (who are not seeking elective office) are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means to determine the existence of party influence. The results demonstrate that party influence is present in these legislatures. I find that party influence is magnified on the procedural, rather than final‐passage, voting record which is precisely where procedural cartel theory predicts. I find lower levels of ideological consistency and party discipline among members for whom the party leadership offers the least—those leaving elective office. These results provide support for party cartel theory, demonstrating further evidence of how parties matter in modern democracies.

AbstractThis article argues that the cartel party thesis is not supported by empirical evidence in the Canadian case. Even though Canadian parties at the federal level colluded to provide themselves with funding and to hinder the entry of new parties into the system, they were not transformed into cartel patties. Canadian parties have not become primarily reliant on state resources, and the specific formulas for delivery of public funding do not remove or greatly diminish parties' incentives to solicit support from the public. Parties' ties to civil society consequently remain intact. There is little evidence for the consequent diminution of party competition or increased interpenetration of state and society posited by the cartel thesis. The article argues that the cartel model is largely inapplicable to anglo-american political systems because it fails to take into account the effect of specific forms of state funding.

This article presents some theoretical contours for the study of party finance and its consequences. Two broad issues are explored. First, the article develops an account of changes in patterns of party finance, and in particular the move away from the 'mass party' model of funding towards 'elite party' and 'cartel party' models. Party finance is conceptualized as a collective action problem, and four 'post-mass party' financial strategies are identified. Second, the article addresses normative issues, assessing how these four financial models perform in terms of 'liberal' and 'populist' theories of democracy. It is concluded that the mass party model remains closest to the 'democratic' ideal, while the state-financed ('cartel') model is a reasonable pragmatic response to the decline in party membership.

This article try to observe if some concepts which was used in order to explain the changes in the western party systems can be use for the Romanian case too. We concentrate our analyze on the concept of "cartel party" and his emergence in the Romanian political space. The Democratic Party was chose as a study case because we think that this political organization illustrate very well our hypothesis that in the last years, in Romania we pass from a model of mass parties to catch-all parties and cartel parties. We must clarified that this concept of "cartel party" can be understood only if we have in mind that the hole party system is subjected to the same cartelization logic. The author focuses his analysis on the evolution of the Democratic Party between the two electoral moments of 2000 and 2004, whit a special attention on the modalities for establishing the lists of candidates, the discussion about the internal reforms and organization. An important part of the article is dedicated to the political migration of the members of Democratic Party, a very often practice for the Romanian political system.