Towards a Natural Law Foundationalist Theory of Universal Human Rights
In: (2014) 5(2) TLT 218–240
935730 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: (2014) 5(2) TLT 218–240
SSRN
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 36-50
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 18, Heft May 90
ISSN: 0090-5917
Argues that despite Aristotle's reputation as a founder of natural right and natural law theory, he does not claim that the nature of things provides an absolutely correct standard of justice. To Aristotle, argument regarding the intrinsic merits of actions is an inescapable and central element of political life. (SJK)
In: Telos: critical theory of the contemporary, Band 2023, Heft 203, S. 40-46
ISSN: 1940-459X
In: Utility and Democracy, S. 51-77
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 153-171
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 469, S. 190-191
ISSN: 0002-7162
In: Cambridge elements. Elements in ethics
In Section 1, I outline the history of natural law theory, covering Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Aquinas. In Section 2, I explore two alternative traditions of natural law, and explain why these constitute rivals to the Aristotelian tradition. In Section 3, I go on to elaborate a via negativa along which natural law norms can be discovered. On this basis, I unpack what I call three 'experiments in being', each of which illustrates the cogency of this method. In Section 4, I investigate and rebut two seminal challenges to natural law methodology, namely, the fact/value distinction in metaethics and Darwinian evolutionary biology. In Section 5, I then outline and criticise the 'new' natural law theory, which is an attempt to revise natural law thought in light of the two challenges above. I conclude, in Section 6, with a summary and some reflections on the prospects for natural law theory.
In: The review of politics, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 441-456
ISSN: 1748-6858
Edmund Burke was at once a chief exponent of the Ciceronian doctrine of natural law and a chief opponent of the "rights of man." In our time, which is experiencing simultaneously a revival of interest in natural-law theory and an enthusiasm for defining "human rights" that is exemplified by the United Nations' lengthy declaration, Burke's view of the natural juridic order deserves close attention.Unlike Bolingbroke and Hume, whose outward politics in some respects resembled the great Whig statesman's, Burke was a pious man. "The most important questions about the human race Burke answered … from the Church of England's catechism." He takes for granted a Christian cosmos, in which a just God has established moral principles for man's salvation. God has given man law, and with that law, rights; such, succinctly, is Burke's premise in all moral and juridical questions.
In: Southern Methodist University studies in jurisprudence 2
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 18, Heft 2
ISSN: 0090-5917
THE AUTHOR PRESENTS AND DEFENDS REINTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL AND CONVENTIONAL RIGHT IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS IN FIRST SECTION OF THE ARTICLE. IN THE SECOND SECTION, HE DISCUSSES OTHER PASSAGES OF HIS WORKS THAT COMMENTATORS HAVE USED TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS THAT ARISTOTLE CONCEIVES OF NATURAL RIGHT AS A HIGHER STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION. IN THE THIRD SECTION OF THE ARTICLE, HE LOOKS AT THE RELATIVELY RARE CASES IN WHICH ARISTOTLE REFERS TO NATURE TO DETERMINE THE JUSTICE OF ACTIONS AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS. ARGUE THERE THAT WE SHOULD NOT IDENTIFY THESE JUDGMENTS - FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT THE NATURALNESS OF SLAVERY, PATERNALISM, AND THE SHARING OF POLITICAL POWER AMONG FREE AND RELATIVELY EQUAL MALES - WITH THE CONCEPTION OF NATURAL RIGHT DEVELOPED IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. THEY REPRESENT, INSTEAD, JUDGEMENTS ABOUT WHICH INDIVIDUALS ARE EQUIPPED BY NATURE TO PARTICIPATE IN, JUDGMENTS ABOUT NATURAL RIGHT. IN THE CONCLUDING SECTION, HE TRIES TO SHOW HOW ARISTOTLE CAN JUSTIFY HIS FREQUENT DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPERLY ENACTED LAWS AS UNJUST WITHOUT INVOKING A HIGHER STANDARD OF NATURAL RIGHT.
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 156-162
ISSN: 1045-7097
This work reflects upon the normative differences that stand behind the dichotomy of natural rights versus social rights, as opposed paradigms, both in the conceptions of human nature and the ethical horizon we should pursue. The natural rights paradigm denies social rights while ignoring the situated reality and its contribution to the achievement of normative purposes such as justice, freedom and equality, all which seem to be the reason to defend, from the political theory angle, a need for social rights to endow substantiality to democracy and citizenship. The urgency of social rights is concluded, due to its situated and supportive character, and its expanding possibility to the formalistic notions of democracy and citizenship. ; El presente trabajo reflexiona sobre las diferencias normativas que están detrás de la dicotomía derechos naturales-derechos sociales, como paradigmas contrapuestos tanto en la concepción de la naturaleza humana como en el horizonte ético al que se debe aspirar. El paradigma de los derechos naturales niega a los derechos sociales, obviando la realidad situada y su contribución a la consecución de fines normativos como justicia, libertad e igualdad. Razón por la cual se defiende desde la teoría política la necesidad de derechos sociales para dotar de sustancialidad a la democracia y a la ciudadanía. Se concluye la urgencia de derechos sociales, debido a su carácter situado y solidario, y a su posibilidad de ampliar las nociones formalistas de democracia y ciudadanía.
BASE
In: Human Rights Quarterly, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 391