Suchergebnisse

Both rights and principles have long existed in EU law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights - made newly binding by the Lisbon Treaty – attempts to draw a distinction between the two types of norm. This article explores in depth the question of whether such a differentiation can easily be made, drawing from both the literature on rights and the Charter, and that on principles (particularly environmental principles). It examines a range of ways in which rights and principles might be thought to differ – including in terms of autonomy, whether they are single- or double-sided in scope, their legal impacts (binding or non-binding), forms of accountability (legal or political), and their jurisprudential nature. Having found that similarities abound rather more than differences, the article concludes by arguing that the weight placed on the distinction by the Charter is untenable.

ABSTRACT: As provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, Article 6 of the European Union is based on the following principles: freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles common to the Member States of the European Union. Fundamental rights are the basis of the principles of law, the observance of which is ensured by the Community judicature. Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission solemnly proclaim the Charter of Fundamental Rights (at the European Council in Nice on 7-11 December 2000). Given that the European Union is stepping up its fight against tax evasion, which is also a cause of the budget deficit and a threat to fair competition, combating tax evasion is a key challenge. KEYWORDS: tax law, the European Union, tax evasion, principles of law, budget deficit

This paper argues that the application of mutual recognition to judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the European Union (EU) imposes a redefinition of the right to liberty to adjust the latter to the peculiarities of the Union legal order. The article emphasizes the important role that the principle of proportionality in EU law can have for improving the protection of the right to liberty. The two main scenarios of this research are analysed against the different understandings of proportionality: on the one hand, the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and the interpretation of the EU Court of Justice; on the other, the three Framework Decisions on transfer of prisoners, probation measures and pre trial measures alternative to detention. The conclusions reveal that, despite the increasing attention paid to proportionality in relation to the right to liberty in mutual recognition, the potential offered by EU law to better protect the right to liberty is still underexploited.

In this article authors focus their attention to one of the key principles of the European Union - the principle of subsidiarity. In introduction they refer to the European Union as a sui generis entity not just speaking in terms of its organizational structure but also in terms of distribution of power within it. In this line they consider the principle of subsidiarity. In the second part of the paper, authors focus their attention to arrangements provided by the Maastricht Treaty - which introduced the principle of subsidiarity, the Amsterdam Treaty, the Draft on the Constitution for Europe and, at last but not at least, to the Lisbon Treaty. Having on mind significant changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty regarding the principle of subsidiarity, this treaty has a special place.

Solidarity, although widely used in EU legislation and the early jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), lacks a clear meaning. It appears as an amorphous concept whose contours change depending on the legal areas and the actors involved, and which generates differing levels of commitment. This article explores the attributes common to the different expressions of solidarity as a binding legal obligation in order to develop European solidarity as an integrated concept. It examines the meaning and boundaries of solidarity by focusing on the reasons that generate solidarity obligations under the EU Treaties and by analysing the case law where the CJEU has drawn on solidarity or could have drawn on it, but decided not to do so. The article concludes that while different aspects of solidarity are embodied in EU legislation, the concept has normative force mainly when it is driven by self-interest in a reciprocal relationship. Although references have been made to its ethical underpinnings, in the absence of a reciprocal return, the normative premises of solidarity have remained weak.