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AbstractWith the imminent global water crisis, it is imperative to revolutionize how water as a commodity is managed. Currently, there is a disconnect between how various sectors of the society withdraw and consume water especially in hydrocarbon‐rich, water scarce regions such as the Middle East. This study proposes a multi‐criteria, multidisciplinary decision analysis model for integrated technology development across private and public sectors in such regions. The increasing water stress provides the oil and gas industry an opportunity to play a pivotal role in harnessing its technologies to sustainably support the water demand. The proposed concept is supported with case studies highlighting challenges and innovative solutions applied across the globe. This study builds a case for a framework on the basis of a step‐change opportunity to manage water needs and effectively plan technology, investment, and regulatory requirements for sustainable access to future sustainable freshwater management.

The publication contains the retrospection of management and the development of water transport on the Odra river in the historical aspect. In fact, XVII century is the beginning of constructing frames of homogenous river-shipping administration on the Odra, the rules of which were established by the government that managed waters and shipping on the Odra. And so, in the space of years, depending on the manager, the Odra river transport developed in various ways. The best time of development was in 1873-1919 when they created the centralized local river-shipping administration, managed by superpresident of the Silesia province. A new conception of the river management appeared that presumed that the responsibilities connected with river regulation form the area owners will be taken over by the government (depending on the period it was German or Prussian country, including The Third Reich. Formally the management over the shipping and the whole Odra infrastructure was directed to Poland not earlier than 12 of August 1946. In order to properly manage the Odra river, the proper units of state administration had to be appointed. In 1946 came into being the state water boards separate for every harbour city. After a number of reorganizations, there came into being two ship owners enterprises on the Odra. The first is a state enterprise, Shipping on the Odra with the head office in Wrocław, that operated on the whole Odra river, and the second was a state enterprise Szczecin Shipping with the head office in Szczecin, that operated on the Lower Odra, from the aggregate main in Belinek to Świnoujście. For more than a half of a century, the lack of imagination of managers and at the same time, designation of too little resources lead to the degradation of infrastructure and means of transport on the Odra river. Currently accepted by Poland and the European Union development- repair programmes give hope that the water transport on the Odra river will be given back its proper place among other means of transport.

Competing demands between various sectors of water users such as agriculture, industry, urban and domestic use have put enormous pressure on the fresh water availability in India. Some investigations have shown that the per capita availability of water has gone down drastically in the last few decades. Yet, there is a little evidence to show that measures are being drawn up either to augment fresh water resources or to manage existing resource equitably. The reasons usually cited for the decline of water availability are deforestation, intensive water use in agriculture, growing population etc. Remedies must therefore be addressed to all these issues. However, there is an urgent need to look at the opportunities available in a country which is said to have had a riverine civilization and one which has the blessings of intensive precipitation during the monsoon months. Thus, on the one hand there are enormous possibilities available in rationalising water use in the agriculture sector, recycling water for industrial use and harnessing monsoon precipitation through water harvesting on a very large scale. It is also necessary to look at some of the policy aspects, legal aspects and financial aspects of water management. For instance, it needs to be asked whether official policy of conjunctive use of surface and ground water is being followed adequately. Also it needs to be asked whether, given that water is a State subject, there is adequate coordination among the States in order to facilitate optimalities in water use. In this context, it may be useful to re-evaluate all the existing inter-State water agreements which were drawn up several decades ago. Further, it needs to be investigated whether the moneys being spent on different aspects of water management such as inter-basin transfers, dam and canal construction, ground water management etc. are being done in a manner that is economically justifiable. Simultaneously, the existing fiscal mechanism in relation to water use should also be reexamined to see the future scope of making water use economically viable.

This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river- basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-o between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achive a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, and compare solutions with di erent information structure with the cooperative solution. Contrary to standard games, where decision variables di er among players, we assume that both players take the decisions concerning the water transfer. The equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. If the problem were set as a static game, the non-cooperative solution would match the cooperative solution. However, in a more realistic dynamic setting, in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure, the cooperative solution will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. The transfer amount is lower than in the case of cooperation, while the investment in usable water capacity is higher. Finally we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.

Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.

Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.

Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.

Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.

Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.

Producción Científica ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.