Suchergebnisse

This paper provides a first preliminary assessment of the recent two 3-year long-term refinancing operations (3Y LTROs) conducted by the ECB by putting them into a broader context. The perspective taken is that prevailing in the first half of the year 2012, directly after the path-breaking ECB decisions were made. The main aim of the paper is to convey an impression of the - not overall positive - general assessment of the LTRO measures which finally led to the implementation of an even more heavily debated unconventional monetary policy measure: the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) later on in 2012. It should thus serve as a contemporary document. For this purpose, we look first at the risk of losses for the ECB and try to assess inflation dangers stemming from the 3Y LTROs. In the same section, we also look at the effects of LTROs on real activity and government bond yields and on further impacts which might well consist of distorting the interbank and the capital market in the euro area. We then investigate potential side-effects of the LTROs such as the effects on the real economy and on sovereign bond yields via the so-called Sarko trade and the increasing dependence of national banks in the euro area on ECB funding.

Explores some causes of cash flow problems. Examines the types of
refinancing that may be available in the current market. Concludes that
only companies well prepared will be considered suitable for
refinancing. Offers worked examples.

In the course of the crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has acted several times to support the EU Member States and banking systems in financial distress by purchasing debt instruments: Covered Bonds Programmes (CBP), Securities Market Programmes (SMP), Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), and Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO), followed by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and then the Extended Asset Purchase Programmes (EAPP) - colloquially labelled as Quantitative Easing (QE). Initially, the support measures of the ESCB might have to be judged as monetary policy but the selectivity of OMT and - even more - SMP in conjunction with the transfer of risks to the ESCB speak against it.

In the course of the crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has acted several times to support the EU Member States and banking systems in financial distress by purchasing debt instruments: Covered Bonds Programmes (CBP), Securities Market Programmes (SMP), Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), and Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO), followed by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and then the Extended Asset Purchase Programmes (EAPP) – colloquially labelled as Quantitative Easing (QE). Initially, the support measures of the ESCB might have to be judged as monetary policy but the selectivity of OMT and – even more – SMP in conjunction with the transfer of risks to the ESCB speak against it.

In an earlier study Doyle and Sambanis (2000) [Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." American Political Science Review 94(4):779–801.] showed that United Nations (UN) peace operations have made positive contributions to peacebuilding in the short term, helping parties implement peace agreements. But are the effects of UN peace operations lasting? Because the UN cannot fight wars, such operations should not be used to enforce a peace. Peacekeeping operations contribute more to the quality of the peace—that is, to securing more than the mere absence of war—than to its duration, because the effects of such operations dissipate over time. For peace to be self-sustaining, countries must develop institutions and policies that generate economic growth. UN peacebuilding lacks a strategy for fostering self-sustaining economic growth that could connect increased participation with sustainable peace. The international community would benefit from an evolution that uses economic reforms to plug the gap between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance on the one hand and development on the other.

Intro -- LONG-TERM CARE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES -- LONG-TERM CARE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 LONG-TERM CARE (LTC): FINANCING OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- WHAT IS LTC? -- SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR LTC -- Public Sources of Financing for LTC -- Medicaid -- Eligibility -- Eligibility Criteria: Group One -- Eligibility Criteria: Group Two -- Other Requirements -- Services -- Mandatory Services -- Optional Services -- Medicare -- Home Health Services -- Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Services -- Other Public Payers -- Private Sources of Financing for LTC -- Private LTC Insurance -- Out-of-Pocket Spending -- Other Private Funds -- LTC ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- Barriers to Public and Private Coverage -- Strain on Federal, State, and Local Budgets -- Better Coordinating Care across Medicaid, Medicare, and Other Public Programs -- Better Coordinating Care across Provider Settings -- Medicaid Spending Still Dominated by Institutional Care -- Navigating the Current LTC System Is Complex -- Limited Supply of the LTC Workforce -- Limited Access to Affordable Housing -- Guaranteeing Quality Can Be Challenging -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEMAND FOR LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE -- Current Financing of LTC Services -- LTC Insurance Industry Trends -- FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEMAND FOR PRIVATE LTCI -- Cost and Complexity of Long-Term Care Insurance -- The Type of Coverage -- Dollar Amount of Coverage and Annual Inflation Adjustments -- Duration of the Benefit -- Elimination Period -- Adequacy of Consumer Protections For LTCI Policyholders -- State Oversight -- Federal Oversight -- Premium Instability -- Inappropriate Sales Practices -- Inappropriate Denial of Claims -- Solvency of LTC Insurers