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This article analyses data from the 2015 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) to investigate the differentiated political values of the middle class in China. Combining the two factors of market situation and institutional division, the article first categorizes several basic types of middle class and then identifies two kinds of political values (liberal and conservative) from the indicators of support for freedom, government satisfaction, and political voting. The results show that the middle class, as a whole, tends to be more liberal than the working class. However, the internal divisions among the sub-groups in the middle class are more obvious – the political tendency of the middle class within the redistribution system is conservative but the middle class sub-groups outside the system, especially the new middle class, have the most liberal tendencies and constitute a potential source for change in China. Thus, the middle class is not necessarily a stabilizer or a subverter of the status quo and has a heterogeneous nature shaped by the dual forces of markets and institutions. (China Q/GIGA)

Universities are accused of being left‐wing bastions, unwelcoming to conservative and right‐wing professors. However, we know little about the political orientation of professors in comparison to other professionals, which would be the right comparison group if we want to know whether universities are potentially hostile environments to conservatives. Examining culturally and economically oriented political orientations in Europe, it is demonstrated that professors are more liberal and left‐leaning than other professionals. However, there is no greater homogeneity of political orientations among the professoriate relative to other specific professions, suggesting that there is a diversity of opinions which is similar to what professionals would find in other occupations. One exception concerns attitudes towards immigration, on which professors have more liberal orientations and comparatively low residual variance around that more liberal mean. Importantly, the difference between professors and other professionals is not so clear within graduates from the social sciences, but emerges more clearly among graduates with a medical, STEM, economics or law degree. An important political cleavage exists between professionals and managers, a group of similar social standing.

Based on Lakoff's (2002) Strict Father and Nurturant Parent metaphors for political conservatism and liberalism respectively, two studies explored parenting styles, political ideology, and the moral orientations that might link the two. Restrictive parenting (by both mother and father) predicted political conservatism, and this path was mediated by a strong Social Order orientation (Study 1) reflecting, more broadly, an inhibition-based proscriptive morality (Study 2). Political liberalism was associated with a Social Justice orientation, but was not predicted by nurturant parenting in either study. Study 1 included mothers' reports of their own parenting, and these were correlated with the students' responses. Findings support a restrictive moral underpinning for conservatism, but raise questions about the assumed unique association between parental nurturance and political liberalism, which is addressed in the discussion.

"In this paper the author analyzes how Taiwanese liberalist scholars have discursively and operationally shaped the meanings of Taiwanese democratization via a mix of liberal values and nationalist concerns. He will argue that a valid understanding of democratization in Taiwan has never emerged in a way that adequately responds to a liberalist perspective of the country's ongoing political development. Instead, such an understanding has been subjectively influenced by liberal intellectuals writing on the subject. In other words, current discourses in Taiwan represent efforts on the part of scholars to manage connections between liberalist values and nationalist concerns rather than shared views regarding facts emerging from Taiwanese democratization. In this paper the author discusses four types of liberalist orientations to Taiwanese democratization - universal, moderate, pragmatic and nationalist - in the contexts of national-identity constraints, a balance between liberal values and national identity, and flexibility regarding liberalist and nationalist concerns. He concludes that democratization research in Taiwan reflects an aspect of knowledge production formulated by the relationship between the researcher and the subject under study." (author's abstract)

Based on Lakoff's (2002) Strict Father and Nurturant Parent metaphors for political conservatism and liberalism respectively, two studies explored parenting styles, political ideology, and the moral orientations that might link the two. Restrictive parenting (by both mother and father) predicted political conservatism, and this path was mediated by a strong Social Order orientation (Study 1) reflecting, more broadly, an inhibition-based proscriptive morality (Study 2). Political liberalism was associated with a Social Justice orientation, but was not predicted by nurturant parenting in either study. Study 1 included mothers' reports of their own parenting, and these were correlated with the students' responses. Findings support a restrictive moral underpinning for conservatism, but raise questions about the assumed unique association between parental nurturance and political liberalism, which is addressed in the discussion. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

In this paper I analyse how Taiwanese liberalist scholars have discursively and operationally shaped the meanings of Taiwanese democratization via a mix of liberal values and nationalist concerns. I will argue that a valid understanding of democratization in Taiwan has never emerged in a way that adequately responds to a liberalist perspective of the country's ongoing political development. Instead, such an understanding has been subjectively influenced by liberal intellectuals writing on the subject. In other words, current discourses in Taiwan represent efforts on the part of scholars to manage connections between liberalist values and nationalist concerns rather than shared views regarding facts emerging from Taiwanese democratization. In this paper I discuss four types of liberalist orientations to Taiwanese democratization – universal, moderate, pragmatic and nationalist – in the contexts of national-identity constraints, a balance between liberal values and national identity, and flexibility regarding liberalist and nationalist concerns. I conclude that democratization research in Taiwan reflects an aspect of knowledge production formulated by the relationship between the researcher and the subject under study.

In theoretical considerations on democracy freedom is sometimes understood in unconditional and conditional terms. This general distinction underlies I. Berlin's concept of negative and positive freedom, and E. Fromm's concept of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. The authors of this paper introduce the concept of extrinsic and intrinsic sense of freedom which is meant to be psychological representation of the philosophical distinction on unconditional and conditional freedom, respectively. An extrinsic freedom results from a lack of external restrictions/barriers, whereas intrinsic freedom is based on the belief that being free means compatibility between one's own actions and preferred values, life goals or worldview. Based on nationwide survey data, the authors show that both forms of freedom are embedded in entirely different basic human values and moral intuitions. Further, it is shown that intrinsic freedom negatively predicts liberal orientation and clearly favors communitarian orientation, whereas extrinsic freedom clearly favors liberal orientation. The authors argue that both forms of experiencing freedom have different effects on support for the principles of liberal democracy. The positive effect of extrinsic freedom is indirect, i.e., entirely mediated by liberal orientation. On the other hand, the effect of intrinsic freedom can be decomposed into three components: a) as a positive direct effect, b) as a positive indirect effect (by strengthening the communitarian orientation), and c) as a negative indirect effect (by weakening the liberal orientation). In conclusion, the consequences of intrinsic and extrinsic freedom are discussed in the light of their relationships with support for democratic principles. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

A survey of congressional voting records in the period between 1955 and 1960 indicates that the East is the least conservative section of the country, measured by atti tudes on economy questions and foreign policy. This is true for both eastern Democrats and eastern Republicans. East ern resistance to right-wing thought conforms to past history in the sense that the East is in the mainstream of American political and economic life. The conservative strength in Congress is found in the southern Democrats and the mid western Republicans. The South, no longer a monolithic spokesman for low tariffs and agricultural aid programs, now is more likely to speak for Standard Oil, Alcoa, and textiles. The extreme right-wing is at home in the small towns of the Midwest and in white-collar cities, where small business suf fers the painful results of changes in the national and local power structures. The liberal orientation of the West reflects a high degree of urbanization and the power of labor unions. Competition between political parties in the East and West is more issue-oriented than in the South and Midwest.

Also in the last year the signs of decomposition of the political, economic and institutional world conceived at the end of the Second World War and definitively freed from the end of the cold war have multiplied. Meanwhile, the advent of Donald Trump as president of the United States has introduced an unprecedented tension between the US and the international order they themselves produced. More generally, the growth of China and the renewed assertiveness of Russia seem to herald a new phase of the reflux of Western impact on the rest of the world. Above all, a variegated dispute over legitimacy has affected the liberal orientation of the post-bipolar order, with ever more profound consequences for the holding of the multilateral fabric of international coexistence, international organizations and even the institutional set-up of individual states. The ISPI 2019 Report questions this upheaval, both in the political and economic dimensions. The first part of the volume is dedicated to the global context and its repercussions on Europe, while the second is addressed as usual to Italian foreign policy.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Series Preface -- Introduction -- Part I Organizing the Arguments -- 1 Janet E. Halley (1994), 'Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability', Stanford Law Review, 46, pp. 503-68. -- Part II Substantive Progressive Arguments -- 2 David A.J. Richards (1979), 'Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution', Hastings Law Journal, 30, pp. 957-1018. -- 3 Ronald Dworkin (1989), 'Liberal Community', California Law Review, 77, pp. 479-504. -- 4 Edwin Cameron (1993), 'Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights', South African Law Journal, 110, pp. 450-72. -- 5 William N. Eskridge, Jr (1999), 'Hardwick and Historiography', University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 631-85. -- 6 Editorial Note (1985), 'The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification', Harvard Law Review, 98, pp. 1285-309. -- 7 Robert Wintemute (1997), 'Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes', Modern Law Review, 60, pp. 334-59. -- 8 Leslie Green (2000), 'Pornographies', Journal of Political Philosophy, 8, pp. 27-52. -- 9 Shannon Gilreath (2011), 'Pornography/Death: The Problem of Gay Pornography in a Straight Supremacist System', in The End of Straight Supremacy: Realizing Gay Liberation, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169-203. -- Part III Conservative Arguments and Responses to Them -- 10 John M. Finnis (1995), 'Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation'", Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, 9, pp. 11-39. -- 11 Andrew Koppelman, (1997), 'Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?', American Journal of Jurisprudence, 42, pp. 51-95

The 1930s are generally represented as a decade of crisis in Egypt's liberal experiment. In this conventional interpretation, a clear and acute expression of the crisis can be found in the intellectual discourse. The transition of Egyptian intellectuals to the large-scale production of Islamic literature (islāmiyyāt), books and texts dealing with classical Islamic themes and heroes, particularly biographies of the Prophet and al-Khulafā⊂ al-Rāshidün, is presented as "the crisis of orientation." This intellectual crisis is depicted as a general abandonment of the Western modernist project by intellectuals who, until that time, had advocated a progressive, rational, and liberal orientation and had assumed that the adoption of European ideas, values, and practices en masse was essential for the modernization of Egypt and its formation into a modern nation-state. Now, in the early 1930s, by enthusiastically embracing Islamic themes, the intellectuals were carrying out a "complete retreat on all these fronts."